Gary Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided January 23, 2023·No. AT-315H-17-0513-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GARY L. BROWN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-315H-17-0513-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: January 23, 2023 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Gary L. Brown, Gainesville, Florida, pro se.

Heather G. Blackmon, Esquire, Gainesville, Florida, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction . Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the appropriate jurisdictional standard, we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 The appellant is a preference eligible who was terminated from a Veterans Recruitment Appointment (VRA). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 20, 25. “VRAs are excepted appointments, made without competition, to positions otherwise in the competitive service.” 5 C.F.R. § 307.103. Individuals serving under VRAs have the same appeal rights as excepted-service employees under 5 C.F.R. part 432 (concerning performance-based actions) and part 752 (concerning adverse actions). 5 C.F.R. § 307.105. In addition, any individual serving under a VRA, whose employment is terminated within 1 year after the date of such appointment, has the same right to appeal that termination under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 as a career or career-conditional employee has during the first year of employment. Maibaum v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 18 (2011); 5 C.F.R. § 307.105. ¶3 In the initial decision, the administrative judge correctly cited the statute setting forth the relevant definition of an excepted-service employee with appeal rights pursuant to 5 U.S.C. chapter 75. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID) at 2 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B)). However, the administrative judge erroneously 3

analyzed the appeal pursuant to the definition applicable to individuals in the competitive service. ID at 2-3; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A). ¶4 We modify the initial decision, as follows, to clarify the appropriate jurisdictional standard applicable to the appellant. Only an “employee,” as defined under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, can appeal an adverse action to the Board. Winns v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 8 (2017), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 892 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1), 7513(d). As relevant here, an “employee” with adverse- action appeal rights includes “a preference eligible in the excepted service who has completed 1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar positions” in an Executive agency. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B)(i). When analyzing section 7511(a)(1)(B), the Board defers to the regulation in 5 C.F.R. § 752.402, which defines “current continuous employment” as “a period of employment or service immediately preceding an adverse action without a break in Federal civilian employment of a workday.” Winns, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶¶ 13, 16. Here, the appellant acknowledges that he only served 9 months in his position, and he has not alleged one of the regulatory grounds for appealing his termination under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2 at 3. Thus, we find that he has failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction. 2 ¶5 We agree with the administrative judge’s finding that, to the extent the appellant is raising a claim of disability discrimination, we lack the authority to review such a claim absent an otherwise appealable action. ID at 3; see Wren v.

2 The administrative judge notified the appellant of how to establish he had chapter 75 appeal rights as an “employee” in the competitive service instead of the excepted service. IAF, Tab 3 at 3-4. However, we find that any such error did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights because he received adequate notice of the requirement to prove that he completed 1 year of current continuous service to qualify as an “employee” with appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, which is the dispositive issue in this appeal. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B). Further, the administrative judge correctly notified the appellant of the regulatory grounds for appealing a probationary termination under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806. IAF, Tab 3 at 2-3. 4

Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In his petition for review, the appellant reasserts his arguments on the merits of his termination. PFR File, Tab 2 at 3; IAF, Tab 1 at 2. We decline to address these arguments further because they are not relevant to the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

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Gary Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2023).

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