Gary Allen Brownfield v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 16, 2019
• Docket: 19A-CR-323
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 16 2019, 8:52 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Edward A. McGlone Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Terre Haute, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Courtney Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Gary Allen Brownfield, August 16, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-323 v. Appeal from the Vermillion Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert M. Hall, Appellee-Plaintiff Special Judge Trial Court Cause No. 83C01-1804-F6-52

Baker, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-323 | August 16, 2019 Page 1 of 9 [1] Gary Brownfield brings this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order

denying his motion to suppress certain evidence, arguing that the pat-down

search violated both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Finding no violation, we

affirm.

Facts [2] On April 25, 2018, Clinton City Police Department Officer Brandon Mahady

was patrolling on Main Street in Vermillion County. Officer Mahady had

received information from a confidential informant that Brownfield would be

entering Vermillion County in a red pickup truck. The informant had told

Officer Mahady that Brownfield “was gonna be coming from Terre Haute to

Clinton delivering methamphetamine.” Tr. Vol. II p. 8.

[3] Using his radar gun, Officer Mahady detected a white cargo van driving by at

thirty-five miles per hour in a twenty-mile-per-hour zone. Officer Mahady also

noticed that the front windshield had a large crack in it. Officer Mahady then

activated his police lights and conducted a traffic stop.

[4] As he approached the vehicle, Officer Mahady came upon a man later

identified as Brownfield sitting in the driver’s seat. Officer Mahady asked

Brownfield for his driver’s license and proof of insurance. While Brownfield

searched for this, Officer Mahady asked Brownfield where he was going, to

which Brownfield replied that he was going to the informant’s house, pointing

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-323 | August 16, 2019 Page 2 of 9 at a house down the street. After reviewing Brownfield’s information, Officer

Mahady recognized Brownfield’s name as the one matching the information

provided by the informant and noticed that Brownfield appeared “nervous.” Id.

at 15. Officer Mahady also asked Brownfield if he had any weapons on him, to

which Brownfield said that he did not have a gun on him but that “there was a

knife in the van.” Id.

[5] Fearing that Brownfield might pose a risk to his safety, Officer Mahady asked

Brownfield to exit the vehicle so that he could conduct a pat-down search to

check for weapons, to which Brownfield replied “okay.” Defendant’s Ex. 1 at

03:38:13.1 To confirm just what “okay” meant, Officer Mahady asked the

question again, and Brownfield responded by saying “yes.” Id. at 03:38:22.

Brownfield then exited his vehicle, turned around, and put his hands on the

vehicle without any prompting. As Officer Mahady was patting Brownfield

down, Officer Mahady wanted to search Brownfield’s pockets and asked, “You

don’t care if I check?” to which Brownfield responded “no.” Id. at 03:38:46-

03:38:49; see also Tr. Vol. II p. 31. Officer Mahady found a knife and a baggie of

a substance that was later determined to be methamphetamine in Brownfield’s

pockets. Officer Mahady then read Brownfield his Miranda2 rights and had

1 This exhibit represents audio recorded from Officer Mahady’s body camera during the traffic stop. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-323 | August 16, 2019 Page 3 of 9 Brownfield perform three field sobriety tests, all of which he failed. Brownfield

was then arrested.

[6] On April 27, 2018, the State charged Brownfield with one count of Level 6

felony possession of methamphetamine and one count of Class C misdemeanor

operating while intoxicated. On August 14, 2018, Brownfield filed a motion to

suppress evidence obtained from the pat-down, arguing that the search violated

both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Following a November 16, 2018,

hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Then, on November

28, 2018, the trial court denied Brownfield’s motion to suppress. Brownfield

now brings this interlocutory appeal.

Discussion and Decision [7] Brownfield’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred when it denied

his motion to suppress certain evidence because the search violated both the

United States and Indiana Constitutions. Specifically, Brownfield argues that he

did not consent to Officer Mahady’s request to conduct a pat-down search and

that the search was not reasonable under a totality of the circumstances.

[8] As a general matter, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Article 1, Section 11

of the Indiana Constitution contains nearly identical language and says that

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-323 | August 16, 2019 Page 4 of 9 effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated[.]”

Evidence that is the product of an unlawful search is inadmissible under both

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section

11 of the Indiana Constitution. Hill v. State, 956 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Ind. Ct. App.

2011) (holding that evidence obtained from an illegal search is “fruit of the

poisonous tree,” and therefore, inadmissible in a court of law).

[9] Brownfield is appealing from a negative judgment, so he has the burden of

showing that the trial court’s ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to

law. State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind. 2017). We will reverse this

negative judgment only if the evidence points to a conclusion opposite that

reached by the trial court. State v. Moriarity, 832 N.E.2d 555, 557-58 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2005). We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo, giving no

weight to the legal analysis below. Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind.

2013).

I. Fourth Amendment [10] The United States Supreme Court has established that a police officer may

conduct a pat-down search of a driver after a valid traffic stop if the officer

reasonably suspects that the driver is armed and dangerous. Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977). “[T]here must exist articulable facts to

support an officer’s reasonable belief that the particular individual is armed and

dangerous.” Patterson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 478, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). To

determine whether an officer acted reasonably, we consider the specific,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-323 | August 16, 2019 Page 5 of 9 reasonable inferences that the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of

his experience. Id.

[11] The record shows that Officer Mahady conducted a valid traffic stop after

detecting that Brownfield was driving almost fifteen miles per hour over the

speed limit. Officer Mahady then asked Brownfield for his driver’s license and

insurance information. After learning that this was the same Brownfield whom

Officer Mahady suspected of trafficking in narcotics, Officer Mahady asked

Brownfield if he had any weapons. Once Brownfield informed Officer Mahady

that he had a knife, Officer Mahady testified to the following:

Based off of—after we—[the informant]—came up in our conversation I could tell he was very nervous with, you know, there’s a knife—he stated to me there was a knife that could potentially be a threat to my safety I had him step out of the van, conducted—to conduct a pat down for weapons.

Tr. Vol. II p. 15 (emphasis added).

[12] From this information, we find that Officer Mahady had a reasonable belief

that Brownfield was armed and dangerous, thereby warranting a pat-down

search to check for weapons. Not only did a “nervous” Brownfield explicitly

inform Officer Mahady that he had a knife, but Officer Mahady also had prior

knowledge that this was the Brownfield that had been trafficking in illegal

narcotics. See Bell v. State, 13 N.E.3d 543, 545-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (finding

that an officer may conduct a pat-down if a suspect displays suspicious behavior

and the arresting officer has concrete knowledge that the suspect is transporting

drugs). The specific facts and circumstances that Officer Mahady drew on to Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-323 | August 16, 2019 Page 6 of 9 conclude that his life was in danger independently support the trial court’s

conclusion that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.

[13] Consequently, Brownfield cannot claim a constitutional violation, and we need

not consider any argument about whether Brownfield consented to the pat-

down search.

II. Article 1, Section 11 [14] Searches by law enforcement require a different review under Article 1, Section

11 of the Indiana Constitution:

Conformity of a search to the Indiana Constitution turns on an evaluation of the “reasonableness” of the conduit of the law enforcement officers, not on the expectation of privacy commonly associated with Fourth Amendment analysis. Relevant considerations in evaluating reasonableness of a search under all the circumstances include the degree to which the search or seizure disrupts the suspect’s normal activities, and those facts and observations that support the officer’s decision to initiate the search or seizure . . . [T]he reasonableness of a search or seizure generally turns on a balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.

Stark v. State, 960 N.E.2d 887, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations

omitted). With this analysis in mind, we find that Officer Mahady’s pat-down

search of Brownfield did not violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-323 | August 16, 2019 Page 7 of 9 Constitution, and therefore, any evidence obtained as a result of the lawful

search is admissible.3

[15] First, Officer Mahady had a high degree of concern that some law had been

violated. He had received information from a confidential informant that

Brownfield was driving to Clinton to deal methamphetamine. Even though

Brownfield was driving a white cargo van and not a red pickup truck, Officer

Mahady quickly figured out that the driver was, in fact, Brownfield.

Furthermore, Brownfield was driving fifteen miles per hour over the speed

limit, his windshield was cracked, and Officer Mahady testified that Brownfield

appeared nervous. All of this information in the aggregate would create a high

degree of suspicion that some criminal activity was afoot.

[16] Next, the search of Brownfield and the seizure of his knife and

methamphetamine imposed minimal intrusion into Brownfield’s ordinary

activities. It is clear that Officer Mahady had the authority to conduct a Terry4

stop of Brownfield’s vehicle after detecting the speeding violation and noticing a

large crack in his windshield. So, the subsequent pat-down did not create an

excessive intrusion or impede Brownfield’s tasks. It is not logical to say that

3 Additionally, Brownfield argues that he was entitled to the presence and advice of counsel pursuant to Pirtle v. State, 323 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 1975). However, this is the first time Brownfield is raising this argument, and at the trial court level, Brownfield only argued that consent was not given and that the pat-down search was unreasonable. Therefore, Brownfield has waived this argument for appellate review. See Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Ind. 1993). We note briefly, however, that even if the argument had been timely raised, it would not have changed the result because Brownfield was not in custody at the time he consented to the search. See Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 601-02 (Ind. 2008). 4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-323 | August 16, 2019 Page 8 of 9 Officer Mahady’s actions unreasonably intruded into Brownfield’s ordinary

activities when Brownfield had already been stopped for a legitimate reason.

Plus, Brownfield willingly answered all Officer Mahady’s questions, exited his

vehicle, and placed his hands on his vehicle without prompting. Furthermore,

Officer Mahady did not conduct a search of Brownfield’s entire body or of his

most personal possessions.

[17] Finally, Officer Mahady testified that he had felt that the traffic stop could have

turned into a precarious situation. He had been informed that Brownfield was

transporting illegal narcotics, and Brownfield himself told Officer Mahady that

he had a knife. So, it was not unreasonable for Officer Mahady to believe that

Brownfield was potentially armed and dangerous. Under these circumstances,

the extent of law enforcement needs was significant. Moreover, all that Officer

Mahady requested was Brownfield’s driver’s license, proof of insurance, and to

check for weapons. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Mahady’s

search of Brownfield was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana

Constitution.

[18] In sum, the trial court did not err when it denied Brownfield’s motion to

suppress.

[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-323 | August 16, 2019 Page 9 of 9