Garrity v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
This text of 984 So. 2d 900 (Garrity v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Robert T. GARRITY, Jr.
v.
ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, M.G. Mayer Yacht Services, Inc. and ABC Insurance Company.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
*902 Patrick D. Derouen, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Al M. Thompson, Jr., Attorney at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
Panel composed of Judges MARION F. EDWARDS, WALTER J. ROTHSCHILD, and GREG G. GUIDRY.
GREG G. GUIDRY, Judge.
Defendants, M.G. Mayer Yacht Services, Inc., and its insurer Essex Insurance Company, appeal from the trial court judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Robert T. Garrity, Jr., awarding him $22,166.00 plus court costs and legal interest from the date of judicial demand, for damages he sustained as a result of the negligent work done on his trawler yacht. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
Garrity purchased a 41-foot Performance Trawler, the LUANA, in January 2003. In April of 2003, Garrity hired Mayer to renovate the heads (bathrooms) on the vessel by removing the manually operated toilets and installing electric ones. To bring power to the electric toilets, Mayer installed a three-block fuse panel on the vessel's helm station. The two toilets were wired through this fuse panel. The lead wire for the third fuse block was not being used. Typically, when a wire such as this is not being used, it is capped off with a plastic cap on the end of the wire, taped off with tape or silicone covering the wire, or removed from the base. This work was completed in July of 2003. In June of 2004, while cruising in Lake Pontchartrain, the LUANA lost steerage. It was determined that the metal parts of the steering system beneath the waterline had been severely damaged, as had the rudders, due to a current problem, referred to as electrolysis. Thereafter, Seabrook Marine was hired to examine the vessel, determine the cause of the problem and repair it. Jeffrey Montz, the manager/owner of Seabrook Marine testified that during his examination of the LUANA he discovered that a wire was touching the copper line for the steering and causing the electrolysis that damaged the vessel. The wire was *903 the third, unused wire from the three block fuse panel that Mayer installed when doing the renovations on the bathrooms. The wire was neither capped off nor taped off.
Garrity made a claim for the damages to his vessel against his insurer, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company. St. Paul denied the claim. Garrity also made amicable demand on Mayer. On August 11, 2004, Garrity filed suit against Mayer.[1] The matter was tried without a jury on April 2, 2007. The trial court rendered judgment on April 25, 2007, in favor of Garrity and against Mayer for $22,166.00 plus costs and interest from the date of demand. It is from this judgment that Mayer appeals.
On appeal, Mayer assigns four errors in support of his argument that the trial court was clearly wrong in rendering judgment in favor of Garrity. More specifically, Mayer argues that because he did not have exclusive custody or control of the vessel, and the corrosive damage did not occur until after other repairmen worked on the vessel in the same vicinity of the loose wire, Garrity failed to exclude other reasonable explanations for how the damage occurred. Therefore, Mayer argues Garrity did not meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Garrity argues, to the contrary, that no one else worked on that specific part of the vessel, the loose wire showed no evidence of ever being capped or taped, and the record, as a whole, supports a finding that the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one.
In a negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Hanks v. Entergy Corp., 06-477, p. 19 (La.12/18/06), 944 So.2d 564, 578. Proof is sufficient to constitute a preponderance when the entirety of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, shows the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. Id. The plaintiff does not have to conclusively exclude all other possible explanations for his injuries, as he would if the standard was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The proof may be by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. However, the inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence must cover all of the necessary elements of negligence, and the plaintiff must still sustain the burden of proving his injuries were more likely than not the result of the defendant's negligence. Id. at 20, 944 So.2d at 579. If, as in this case, circumstantial evidence is relied upon, that evidence taken as a whole, and considered with the direct evidence, must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis with a fair amount of certainty. Id. at 20, 944 So.2d at 579.
The threshold issue in any negligence action is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, and whether the duty was breached. Id. at 21, 944 So.2d at 579. Whether the defendant breached that duty and whether that breach was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries are factual question to be determined by the factfinder. Id. at 22, 944 So.2d at 580. The standard of review by an appellate court of a district court's findings of fact is well known. The district court's factual findings may not be set aside in the absence of manifest error or unless they are *904 clearly wrong. Where there is a conflict in the testimony, inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the reviewing court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Hanks v. Entergy Corp., 06-477, p. 22 (La.12/18/06), 944 So.2d 564, 580; Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989); Stobart v. State, Though DOTD, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). In order to reverse a district court's determination of a fact, a reviewing court must review the record in its entirety and (1) find a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine the record establishes the factfinder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Hanks, 06-477 at 22, 944 So.2d at 580; Bonin v. Ferrellgas, Inc. 03-3024, p. 6-7, 877 So.2d 89, 94-95; Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. The issue to be resolved by the reviewing court is not whether the factfinder was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Hanks, 06-477 at 23, 944 So.2d at 580; Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882.
Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Hanks, 06-477 at 23, 944 So.2d at 580; Bonin, 03-3024 at 7, 877 So.2d at 95; Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844. When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error or clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings because only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Hanks, 06-477 at 23, 944 So.2d at 580; Bonin, 03-3024 at 7, 877 So.2d at 95; Rosell, 549 So.2d at 844.
Applying these principles to the case before us, we find that the record provides a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's findings and we do not find that the factfinder was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous in its judgment.
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984 So. 2d 900, 2008 WL 1735523, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garrity-v-st-paul-fire-marine-ins-co-lactapp-2008.