Garrison v. Garrison

15 N.J. Eq. 266
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedFebruary 15, 1858
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 15 N.J. Eq. 266 (Garrison v. Garrison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garrison v. Garrison, 15 N.J. Eq. 266 (N.J. Ct. App. 1858).

Opinion

The Ordinary.

This writing was propounded for probate, as the last will and testament of Peter A. Garrison, deceased, to the surrogate of the county of Bergen. A caveat was put in against proving it. A protracted investigation was had before the Orphans Court of the county, and that court unanimously admitted the will to probate. The caveators have appealed from this order of the Orphans Court to this court.

There are two objections made to the admission of the will to probate.

First. That the decedent had not sufficient mental capacity, at the time the paper was executed, to make a will.

Second. That either in consequence of fraud, mistake, or some circumstance beyond the decedent’s control, the contents of the writing are not such as he intended they should be, and that therefore the waiting is not the decedent’s will.

This will was executed on the 26th of June, 1854. The decedent died, on the 23d day of July following, at the age of sixty-three or four years. The disease which caused his death was consumption, produced by the excessive use of ardent spirits.

As to the evidence of the general capacity of the testator for the ordinary business of life, we have the following facts, which are not controverted. He was the owner of a large farm, which he inherited from his father, in the county of Bergen, and another farm, of some hundred acres, adjoining the same, which he had acquired himself. He carried on the business of fanning for some thirty-five years immediately preceding his death. He was the overseer of his own farm, and superintended and carried it on without the agency or aid of any one else. Most of the time his family consisted of several members. He was always the head of his family, and, as such, was always regarded and respected by its in[268]*268mates. He bought and sold both real and personal estate, made his own bargains, executed papers, kept his own accounts, invested his money and received the interest, and transacted all business appertaining to the management of his property and his domestic affairs without even the friendly advice or interference of any one. During all this time there is no evidence of his ever having even once made, or of his having proposed to make an improvident bargain, or of committing a mistake of the most trivial kind in all these various transactions from which the inference could be deduced that he was not perfectly competent to their transaction. This superintendence and management of his affairs continued to the day of his death; and there is nothing in the case to show that any one, during his life, except one single individual, and he a mere passing acquaintance, expressed the opinion that he was not fully competent to manage his own affairs. And yet many respectable witnesses testify that, during the few months preceding his death, and more particularly about the time of the execution of this will, he was not of sufficient mental capacity to transact business, and to dispose, by last will and testament, of that property which he was from day to day managing with prudence and judgment. It is my duty, therefore, to look at the facts upon which such opinions are based, and to determine whether they justify the conclusion to which the witnesses have arrived. The very best evidence of a man’s capacity to dispose of his property by last will and testament is the fact of his management and disposition of it, in every other respect, with prudence and judgment. It is difficult to conceive how it is possible for a man to have the sole control of his property, to buy and sell with judgment, and to dispose of the proceeds judiciously, and yet deny to him the capacity of saying how his property shall be disposed of when death deprives him of his personal control over it. The capability of the testator to discharge the duties of a public situation affords a strong presumption of his capacity to make a will. White v. Wilson, 13 Ves. 87.

[269]*269On both sides witnesses have been required to give their opinions as to the capacity of the testator. This evidence is competent; it is merely preliminary to the further inquiry of the facts and circumstances upon which these opinions are formed. It is not the opinion of the witness upon which the court relies, but the court draws its own conclusion and forms its own judgment from the premises which have produced the conviction in the mind of the witness. The mere opinion of a subscribing witness is entitled to no more weight with the court than that of any other witness. It is true he is called upon by the testator, as his witness of the execution of the instrument and of his competency to make a will, and the theory is, that “ the attesting witnesses to a will are regarded in the law as placed around the testator in order that no fraud may be practised upon him in the execution of the will, and to ascertain and judge of his capacity.” 1 Jar-man 73. Our experience in these matters is sufficient to satisfy us that the subscribing witnesses seldom if ever take any pains to ascertain the capacity of the testator, and are generally those who know least of his general character and disposition or of his mental capacity. As a general thing, very little regard is paid by the testator to the character of the individuals who are called upon as the attesting witnesses to this most solemn and important act. Their duty is discharged by their formal attestation of the instrument; and any effort on their part to ascertain the state of mind of the testator, or the fact, whether he was the dupe of others who were more active in the transaction, and upon whom the testator was reposing his confidence, would be regarded as inquisitive, and as an unwarrantable interference with matters which did not concern them. The opinion of a witness who is a stranger to the testator, and who sees or hears nothing except what is necessary to enable him to attest the instrument as a subscribing witness, is not as much to be relied upon as that of a neighbor and familiar acquaintance of the testator. The truth is, the opinion of neither is of any weight with the court, except as it proves itself to be a cor[270]*270rect and sound conclusion from facts which justify and warrant it. A man who will subscribe an instrument attesting that the testator is of sound mind, memorv, and understanding, and then repudiate under oath his own attestation, does not occupy a position that will justify a court in giving any weight to his mere opinion. A will may be sustained although all the subscribing witnesses depose to the incapacity of the deceased. Le Breton v. Fletcher, 2 Hagg. 568; Lowe v. Jolliffe, 1 Sir Wm. Bl. 365; Shelford on Lunacy 54, 55. And it is a frequent occurrence for a will to be refused probate, notwithstanding the strongest kind of testimony in support of the mental capacity of the decedent. I have thought proper to say more, as to the weight to be given to the evidence of a subscribing witness, than perhaps is called for by this particular case. But in. several cases, lately argued before this court; an undue weight, it seemed to me, was attached to the opinions of subscribing witnesses, and an idea seemed to prevail that a court ought not to scrutinize as closely the facts from which such witnesses formed their opinions as those which were the base upon which the opinions of other witnesses rested.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re Halton
161 A. 809 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1932)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
15 N.J. Eq. 266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garrison-v-garrison-njsuperctappdiv-1858.