Garrett Wilson v. Truist Bank

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 7, 2025
• Docket: 24-2838
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-2838 __________

GARRETT QUINCY WILSON, Appellant

v.

TRUIST BANK ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:23-cv-03898) District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 22, 2025 Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed July 7, 2025) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

Garrett Wilson appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his

amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. We will affirm.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. In October 2023, Wilson filed a complaint in the District Court against Truist

Bank. His complaint contained only one paragraph of facts, which appeared to allege

that Truist’s repossession of his car violated a host of federal banking, securities,

criminal, and consumer protection statutes. The District Court dismissed the complaint,

without prejudice, under Rule 8 for failure to state sufficient factual allegations to provide

notice of the basis for his claims. Wilson then filed an amended complaint which

vaguely alleged, again in just one paragraph of facts, that Truist “didn’t loan me

anything,” breached “a fiduciary duty,” “used extortion to coerce payment,” laundered

money, and “didn’t loan me money” in an “attempt to evade or defeat tax.” ECF 6 at 3.

When Wilson later attempted to file a similar second amended complaint, the District

Court ordered him to file a motion seeking leave of court. Wilson filed a one-sentence

motion, which the District Court denied. The District Court then dismissed Wilson’s

amended complaint, with prejudice, under Rule 8. This appeal ensued.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the dismissal of a

complaint under Rule 8 for abuse of discretion. See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d

69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019). “Fundamentally, Rule 8 requires that a complaint provide fair

notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 92 (cleaned up).

The complaint cannot be “so vague or ambiguous that a defendant cannot reasonably be

expected to respond to it,” but must “present[] cognizable legal claims to which a

defendant can respond on the merits.” Id. at 93–94 (cleaned up); see also Alston v.

Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying Rule 8 to a pro se complaint). 2 The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Wilson’s

amended complaint under Rule 8, as his complaint was so vague that it did not provide

“notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92

(cleaned up). The amended complaint did not contain any factual allegations regarding

how and when Wilson was allegedly injured by Truist’s conduct, and his “[c]onclusory

allegations of liability are insufficient.” Id.

On appeal, Wilson’s two-page brief and one-page reply generally repeat the list of

federal banking, securities, criminal, and consumer protection statutes that he cited in his

amended complaint, without pointing to any specific error in the District Court’s

conclusion that the amended complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to satisfy

Rule 8. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing forfeiture of

claims that were not developed in the appellants’ briefing). To the extent that Wilson has

developed any argument on appeal, his conclusory citations to those statutes did not

“present[] cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits.”

Garrett, 938 F.3d at 94; see also Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of

Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 190 (1994) (discussing limitations on inferring a private

right of action from a criminal statute).

We also agree with the District Court that Wilson had the opportunity to address

the pleading deficiencies in his complaint, that he failed to provide grounds to file a

second amended complaint, and that any further amendment would be futile. See

Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining 3 that “[a]mendment of the complaint is futile if the amendment will not cure the

deficiency in the original complaint or if the amended complaint cannot withstand a

renewed motion to dismiss”).

Accordingly, we will affirm.1

1 Appellant’s motion for discovery is denied. 4