Garren v. Watts

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: August 5, 2014
• Docket: 13-1085
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1085 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 5 August 2014

JAMES HOWARD GARREN, JR., Plaintiff

v. Buncombe County No. 11 CVS 6276 BECKY L. WATTS a/k/a SUNNY WILLIAMS and husband, NEIL WILLIAMS, ANTHONY GARREN, and KIM GARREN, Defendants

Appeal by defendants Becky L. Watts a/k/a Sunny Williams

and Neil Williams from order entered 3 June 2013 by Judge Mark

E. Powell in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court

of Appeals 6 February 2014.

Burt Langley, P.C., by Katherine Langley, for defendant- appellants Becky L. Watts a/k/a Sunny Williams and Neil Williams.

Adams Hendon Carson Crow & Saenger, P.A., by Matthew S. Roberson and George W. Saenger, for plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellees Anthony Garren and Kim Garren.

CALABRIA, Judge.

Becky L. Watts a/k/a Sunny Williams (“Watts”) and her

husband Neil Williams (collectively “defendants”) appeal from -2- the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of

James Howard Garren, Jr. (“plaintiff”), Anthony Garren

(“Anthony”), and Kim Garren (“Kim”) (collectively, “the

Garrens”). We affirm.

On 5 March 2009, Winifred Garren (“Winifred”) executed a

quitclaim deed (“the quitclaim deed” or “the deed”) to her

daughter, Watts.1 The deed was a preprinted form with blank

spaces for the completion of all required information. The deed

indicated that it was prepared by Watts. The portion of the

quitclaim deed intended to include the legal description of the

property being transferred was left blank. However, in the

section between Winifred’s signature and the notary

certification on the deed, Watts wrote “Parcel

#960704498200000.” The deed was recorded on 14 May 2009 at the

Buncombe County Register of Deeds.

On 29 April 2010, Winifred executed an “Affidavit of

Correction” (“the affidavit”) pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-

36.1 (2013), which added a legal metes and bounds description of

the property intended to be conveyed in the quitclaim deed. The

affidavit was recorded on 26 May 2010.

1 Watts later legally changed her name to Sunny Williams. -3- On 3 November 2010, Winifred died. Plaintiff, who was

Winifred’s son, believed that she had executed a will in 2009,

but he was unable to locate that document or any other will

after her death. However, plaintiff discovered that both the

deed and the affidavit had been recorded in the Buncombe County

Registry.

On 16 December 2011, plaintiff initiated an action against

defendants, Anthony, and Kim. Anthony and Kim were the children

of Winifred’s third child, who was deceased. In his complaint,

plaintiff sought to have the quitclaim deed declared void, to

have plaintiff and Watts declared one-third owners of Winifred’s

property, and to have Anthony and Kim declared one-sixth owners

of the property.

Anthony and Kim filed an answer to plaintiff’s complaint

which admitted all of plaintiff’s allegations and requested that

they be aligned with plaintiff against the remaining defendants.

On 17 May 2013, the Garrens jointly filed a motion for summary

judgment.

After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment

in favor of the Garrens on 3 June 2013. The trial court’s order

concluded that the description of the land conveyed in the deed -4- was insufficient such that the quitclaim deed was void ab

initio. Defendants appeal.

Defendants argue that the trial court erred by granting

summary judgment in favor of the Garrens and declaring the

quitclaim deed void. Specifically, defendants contend that the

deed had a sufficient description of the property conveyed. We

disagree.

“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment

is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only when the record

shows that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.’” In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572,

576 (2008) (quoting Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649

S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007)). This Court has previously explained

that

[a] description of land is void unless it is sufficient to identify the land or refers to something extrinsic by which the land may be identified with certainty. When the description itself, including the references to extrinsic things, describes with certainty the property, parol evidence is admissible to fit the description to the land.

Maurice v. Motel Corp., 38 N.C. App. 588, 590, 248 S.E.2d 430,

432 (1978). Moreover, -5- [t]o resolve cases in which a deed contains an ambiguous description, the courts have formulated various rules of construction and techniques to locate the boundaries of deeds whose descriptions are less than ideal. The most common rule of construction used by the courts is to gather the intention of the parties from the four corners of the instrument. The courts seek to sustain a deed if possible on the assumption that the parties intended to convey and receive land or they would never have been involved in the first place.

Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Wetherington, 127 N.C. App. 457, 462,

490 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1997) (internal quotations and citation

omitted).

In the instant case, the quitclaim deed stated, in relevant

part:

The Grantor, Winifred M. Garren, city of 102 Justice Ridge Rd. Candler, County of Buncombe, State of North Carolina, for the consideration of _________ CONVEY and QUIT CLAIM to Becky L. Watts of 11006 Kingfisher Dr., City of Charlotte, County of Mecklenburg, State of North Carolina, all interest in the following described real estate situated in the county of Buncombe, in the state of North Carolina, to wit:

The deed is then blank until Winifred’s signature. Below

Winifred’s signature and prior to the notary certification

section, Watts included the following: “Parcel#

960704498200000.”

Defendants contend that two pieces of information on the -6- quitclaim deed identify the property sufficiently to satisfy the

description element of a deed. First, defendants argue that

Winifred’s address listed on the deed, “102 Justice Ridge Rd.

Candler,” constitutes evidence of the property intended to be

conveyed. However, that address only appears as part of the

identification of Winifred as grantor. There is nothing in the

remainder of the deed which would support an inference that

Winifred intended to convey that particular piece of property.

The second piece of evidence cited by defendants is the

handwritten “Parcel # 960704498200000” which appears in the

lower portion of the deed. Defendants contend that this number

constitutes a tax parcel identification number (“PIN”) which

could be used to establish the boundaries of the property by

reference to the Buncombe County tax map. Defendants cite

Fisher v. Town of Nags Head, ___ N.C. App. ___, 725 S.E.2d 99

(2012) and GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Miller, 216 N.C. App. 416, 716

S.E.2d 876, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 2250, 2011 WL 4920645 (2011)

(unpublished), in support of their contention that a tax PIN,

standing alone, constitutes a legally valid description of a

property.

However, neither Fisher nor GMAC support defendants’

position. In Fisher, this Court found that the description of a -7- property which was to be condemned was sufficient when “the

description of the [property to be condemned] utilize[d] terms

that are well defined in the referenced portion of the

Administrative Code, such that a surveyor with experience in

oceanfront properties could accurately determine the

[property].” ___ N.C. App. at ___, 725 S.E.2d at 105. While

the Court noted that the condemnation notice also included “the

PIN Number and Tax Parcel for each . . . particular piece of

property[,]” those identifying factors were not cited as part of

the Court’s analysis in upholding the description. Id. In GMAC,

an unpublished case which “does not constitute controlling legal

authority[,]” N.C.R. App. P. 30(e)(3) (2013), this Court upheld

the description in a deed of trust based upon a tax parcel

identification number in conjunction with a deed which was also

referenced in the deed of trust. 216 N.C. App. 416, 716 S.E.2d

876. Thus, contrary to defendants’ argument, neither Fisher nor

GMAC stands for the proposition that a tax PIN, standing alone,

provides a legally sufficient property description. Instead,

those cases required additional identifying information together

with a tax PIN in order for a description to be valid.

Moreover, unlike the descriptions at issue in Fisher and

GMAC, the purported description in the quitclaim deed in the -8- instant case does not clearly state that the parcel number

refers to a tax parcel number. Defendants’ interpretation of

the term “Parcel #” as referring to a tax PIN requires an

inference that is not supported by any other portion of the

deed. Without this unsupported inference, it is, ultimately,

just a number recorded in a random location on the deed. Since

neither Winifred’s address as grantor nor the parcel number on

the deed provide a legally sufficient description of the

property to be conveyed, the trial court correctly determined

that the quitclaim deed was void ab initio because it failed to

“sufficient[ly] . . . identify the land or refer[] to something

extrinsic by which the land may be identified with certainty.”

Maurice, 38 N.C. App. at 590, 248 S.E.2d at 432. This argument

is overruled.

Defendants also briefly contend that the affidavit, which

attempted to add a legal metes and bounds description to the

deed, was merely a minor correction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47-

36.1 (2013) which further clarified the description of the

property that Winifred attempted to convey. However, as

defendants concede in their brief, “a defective deed cannot be

‘cured’ by filing an affidavit of correction.” Since we have

already determined that the quitclaim deed was defective due to -9- the lack of a sufficient legal description, defendants’ argument

necessarily fails.

In conclusion, the trial court correctly determined that

the quitclaim deed, which did not include a valid description of

the property to be conveyed, was void ab initio. Accordingly,

the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of

the Garrens. The trial court’s order is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Judges STROUD and DAVIS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).