Garratt-Callahan Co. v. Yost

Oregon Supreme Court

Garratt-Callahan Co. v. Yost

409 P.2d 907, 242 Or. 401, 1966 Ore. LEXIS 600

CourtOregon Supreme Court

DecidedJanuary 19, 1966

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 409 P.2d 907 (Garratt-Callahan Co. v. Yost) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Garratt-Callahan Co. v. Yost, 409 P.2d 907, 242 Or. 401, 1966 Ore. LEXIS 600 (Or. 1966).

Pincite

Opinion

SLOAN, J.

Plaintiff is here attempting to enforce a restrictive covenant in an employment contract. Defendant was first employed as a “trainee salesman” by plaintiff in 1959. Later defendant signed a written contract which imposed the restriction that he would not engage in any competitive employment for a period of two years after his employment with plaintiff should terminate. The trial court held the contract to be unenforceable. Plaintiff appeals.

We have concluded that for all practicable purposes, the case is moot and we need not review the legal and factual problems presented. The covenant limited the restriction, if enforceable, to a period of two years from the date of termination of employment. Defendant was discharged from plaintiff’s employ on January 20,1964. His salary was apparently paid until the end of that month. At best, therefore, any order we would enter would only be effective until January 31, 1966. Such an order would, therefore, be literally useless. Courts do not enjoin conduct already committed. Wiegand v. West, 1914, 73 Or 249, 255, 144 P 481. Nor do courts enter orders that are academic, *403 Smith v. Smith et al, 1956, 209 Or 96, 98, 304 P2d 421, as a restraining order in this case would be.

Plaintiff also asked the court to use its equity power, aside from the terms of the contract, to restrain defendant. Plaintiff claims that defendant was using knowledge of its trade secrets gained during defendant’s employment. There was evidence that plaintiff’s alleged trade secrets, relating to the chemical treatment of water for industrial uses, was not secret at all. The same is true of plaintiff’s customers. Anyone could have readily learned of potential users of the type of product and service rendered by plaintiff. See Section 757 Restatement, Torts, and comments. We agree with the trial court that plaintiff did not establish its right to injunctive relief.

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

SLOAN, J.

Plaintiff is here attempting to enforce a restrictive covenant in an employment contract. Defendant was first employed as a “trainee salesman” by plaintiff in 1959. Later defendant signed a written contract which imposed the restriction that he would not engage in any competitive employment for a period of two years after his employment with plaintiff should terminate. The trial court held the contract to be unenforceable. Plaintiff appeals.

We have concluded that for all practicable purposes, the case is moot and we need not review the legal and factual problems presented. The covenant limited the restriction, if enforceable, to a period of two years from the date of termination of employment. Defendant was discharged from plaintiff’s employ on January 20,1964. His salary was apparently paid until the end of that month. At best, therefore, any order we would enter would only be effective until January 31, 1966. Such an order would, therefore, be literally useless. Courts do not enjoin conduct already committed. Wiegand v. West, 1914, 73 Or 249, 255, 144 P 481. Nor do courts enter orders that are academic, *403 Smith v. Smith et al, 1956, 209 Or 96, 98, 304 P2d 421, as a restraining order in this case would be.

Plaintiff also asked the court to use its equity power, aside from the terms of the contract, to restrain defendant. Plaintiff claims that defendant was using knowledge of its trade secrets gained during defendant’s employment. There was evidence that plaintiff’s alleged trade secrets, relating to the chemical treatment of water for industrial uses, was not secret at all. The same is true of plaintiff’s customers. Anyone could have readily learned of potential users of the type of product and service rendered by plaintiff. See Section 757 Restatement, Torts, and comments. We agree with the trial court that plaintiff did not establish its right to injunctive relief.

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

409 P.2d 907, 242 Or. 401, 1966 Ore. LEXIS 600, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garratt-callahan-co-v-yost-or-1966.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack