Garrard v. McCaskill

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Garrard v. McCaskill

64 S.E.2d 210, 83 Ga. App. 572, 1951 Ga. App. LEXIS 911

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMarch 16, 1951

Docket33371

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 64 S.E.2d 210 (Garrard v. McCaskill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Garrard v. McCaskill, 64 S.E.2d 210, 83 Ga. App. 572, 1951 Ga. App. LEXIS 911 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951).

Pincite

Opinion

Worrill, J.

In this case the plaintiff in error contends that the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer to the petition, because the husband is the head of the family, is liable for his own debts and the debts contracted in the support of his family. The defendant in error contends that the wife became liable for the services furnished to her husband by virtue of an original undertaking on her part to pay for the services ordered. The allegations show that the defendant’s husband was ill in a sanitarium, that she employed the defendant, a nurse, to nurse him, and that the defendant nursed her husband. The grounds of the demurrer are without merit. It is the law in Georgia that a married woman may, as an original undertaker, become liable for services furnished to her husband, even though she received no personal benefit therefrom. See Wimpee v. McHenry, 18 Ga. App. 475 (1, 2) (89 S. E. 607), holding: “While, under the laws of this State, a wife can not bind her separate estate by any contract of suretyship, nor by any assumption of the debts of her husband (Civil Code, § 3007), yet she may, upon her own responsibility and voluntarily, enter into a contract with another to render services for her husband and for his benefit, and from which she may receive no personal benefit; and for the value of such services she may be held liable under her contract. White v. Stocker, 85 Ga. 200 (11 S. E. 604); Hill v. Cooley, 112 Ga. 115 (37 S. E. 109); Johnson v. Leffler Co. 122 Ga. 670 (50 S. E. 488).” Also, see Stafford v. Birch, 189 Ga. 405 (1) (5 S. E. 2d, 744), and Freeman v. Coleman, 86 Ga. 590 (12 S. E. 1064), to the effect that a married woman is bound on a contract which is an original undertaking on her part. It was said in Freeman v. Coleman, supra: “It is too well settled, both by our statute and repeated adjudications, to require further discussion, that a married woman can not be bound by a contract of suretyship, but it may now be considered as settled that she may, upon her own responsibility, purchase goods for the benefit of another and execute notes and mort[574]*574gages to secure the same; and when she does this, she is bound by her contract.”

The petition set out a cause of action, and the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to ,the petition.

Judgment affirmed.

Sutton, C.J., and Felton, J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Worrill, J.

In this case the plaintiff in error contends that the trial court erred in overruling the demurrer to the petition, because the husband is the head of the family, is liable for his own debts and the debts contracted in the support of his family. The defendant in error contends that the wife became liable for the services furnished to her husband by virtue of an original undertaking on her part to pay for the services ordered. The allegations show that the defendant’s husband was ill in a sanitarium, that she employed the defendant, a nurse, to nurse him, and that the defendant nursed her husband. The grounds of the demurrer are without merit. It is the law in Georgia that a married woman may, as an original undertaker, become liable for services furnished to her husband, even though she received no personal benefit therefrom. See Wimpee v. McHenry, 18 Ga. App. 475 (1, 2) (89 S. E. 607), holding: “While, under the laws of this State, a wife can not bind her separate estate by any contract of suretyship, nor by any assumption of the debts of her husband (Civil Code, § 3007), yet she may, upon her own responsibility and voluntarily, enter into a contract with another to render services for her husband and for his benefit, and from which she may receive no personal benefit; and for the value of such services she may be held liable under her contract. White v. Stocker, 85 Ga. 200 (11 S. E. 604); Hill v. Cooley, 112 Ga. 115 (37 S. E. 109); Johnson v. Leffler Co. 122 Ga. 670 (50 S. E. 488).” Also, see Stafford v. Birch, 189 Ga. 405 (1) (5 S. E. 2d, 744), and Freeman v. Coleman, 86 Ga. 590 (12 S. E. 1064), to the effect that a married woman is bound on a contract which is an original undertaking on her part. It was said in Freeman v. Coleman, supra: “It is too well settled, both by our statute and repeated adjudications, to require further discussion, that a married woman can not be bound by a contract of suretyship, but it may now be considered as settled that she may, upon her own responsibility, purchase goods for the benefit of another and execute notes and mort[574]*574gages to secure the same; and when she does this, she is bound by her contract.”

The petition set out a cause of action, and the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to ,the petition.

Judgment affirmed.

Sutton, C.J., and Felton, J., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

64 S.E.2d 210, 83 Ga. App. 572, 1951 Ga. App. LEXIS 911, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garrard-v-mccaskill-gactapp-1951.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack