Garofalo v. General Motors Corp.

243 N.E.2d 691, 103 Ill. App. 2d 389, 1968 Ill. App. LEXIS 1440
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedDecember 17, 1968
DocketGen. 52,411
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 243 N.E.2d 691 (Garofalo v. General Motors Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garofalo v. General Motors Corp., 243 N.E.2d 691, 103 Ill. App. 2d 389, 1968 Ill. App. LEXIS 1440 (Ill. Ct. App. 1968).

Opinion

MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by Eugene Garofalo when the automobile he was operating left the highway after he was allegedly rendered unconscious due to a defect in the exhaust system or the fuel intake system of the vehicle. On motion of defendants-appellees the trial court struck the answers to certain interrogatories propounded by one of the defendants-appellees, struck the amended complaint, and dismissed the action as to both defendantsappellees. Plaintiffs maintain that the answers to the interrogatories in question and the information contained in the amended complaint sufficiently and reasonably informed defendants-appellees of the matters they were called upon to meet.

The original complaint, consisting of seven counts, was filed on September 27, 1963, and alleged that on August 19, 1961, Eugene Garofalo purchased a new Oldsmobile automobile from Larry Faul Oldsmobile Company, the same having been manufactured by the General Motors Corporation. The complaint further alleged that Eugene Garofalo was operating the vehicle at approximately 3:00 a. m. on the morning of October 7, 1961, when he was rendered unconscious by carbon monoxide or gasoline fumes caused by a defect in the automobile. The vehicle left the road, struck a ditch and overturned, causing the injuries complained of. It was further alleged that Eugene Garofalo had made complaint on several occasions prior to the mishap to representatives of Faul Oldsmobile of the presence of the fumes inside the vehicle and that employees of Faul Oldsmobile were instructed to locate the source of the fumes. Garofalo’s wife, Emma, joined in the complaint for loss of consortium.

The original complaint named as defendants the General Motors Corporation and Larry Faul Oldsmobile Company (hereinafter referred to as “defendants”), and a construction firm which was in the process of making highway repairs at the place where the mishap occurred. On motions of General Motors and Faul Oldsmobile, several of the counts of the original complaint were stricken on February 19, 1964, and plaintiffs were given 45 days within which to file an amended complaint. No amended complaint was filed within the time prescribed in the order and on August 25, 1964, the trial court entered an order requiring plaintiffs to file an amended complaint within 30 days. On November 23,1964, on motion of General Motors, the action was dismissed as to that defendant for plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the order of August 25th. It should also be noted that interrogatories served upon plaintiffs in January 1964 by Faul Oldsmobile went unanswered.

On December 7, 1964, General Motors filed a motion that the order of dismissal of November 23rd be vacated. Four days later, by leave of court, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, consisting of three counts, against the three defendants named in the original complaint, to which all three defendants filed answers. The construction firm filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by affidavits, in March 1965 and plaintiffs were ordered to file counteraffidavits within 30 days. Hearing on the motion for summary judgment was continued from time to time and plaintiffs were again ordered to file counteraffidavits within 30 days from date, which they again failed to do. On September 9, 1965, the trial court granted the construction firm’s motion for summary judgment after plaintiffs failed to file any pleadings, affidavits, or other matters in connection therewith.

A notice to admit facts, among which was that plaintiffs had no knowledge of the specific defect which caused the condition in the Garofalo automobile complained of, was served upon plaintiffs by General Motors on February 16,1965; plaintiffs filed no response thereto.

In addition to the aforementioned notice to admit facts, plaintiffs were also served with the interrogatories in question requesting, among other information, the specific defect in the Garofalo automobile which was the cause of the condition complained of. Ten months later, in December 1965, a motion was filed by General Motors, which was later joined in by Faul Oidsmobile, to strike the amended complaint for failure of plaintiffs to answer the interrogatories. The trial court, however, entered an order requiring, inter alia, plaintiffs to file answers to the interrogatories within 30 days from date. On March 14, 1966, on motion of General Motors, the trial court struck the amended complaint and dismissed the action as to General Motors for the reason that plaintiffs failed to answer the interrogatories as previously ordered. The trial court vacated the March 14th order on April 12, 1966, on motion of plaintiffs, and allowed plaintiffs to file their answers to the interrogatories instanter.

In response to the interrogatories relating to the specific defect in the Garofalo vehicle which caused the condition complained of, plaintiffs submitted such answers as: “gasoline—gasoline fumes smell in the inside of vehicle,” “seepage of gasoline fumes in the inside of vehicle,” “res ipsa loquitur—smell and fumes of gasoline in the inside of vehicle,” and the like. General Motors filed a motion to strike such answers to the interrogatories on the ground that they were unresponsive and evasive. Hearing on the motion to strike was continued from time to time and on August 1, 1966, plaintiffs were allowed 60 days within which to file supplemental answers to the interrogatories in question, which were filed on October 25,1966.

The supplemental answers were again objected to by defendants as unresponsive and providing no more information than did the answers originally filed. The defendants’ accompanying motion to strike the supplemental answers and to dismiss the action was denied and defendants were given leave to file additional interrogatories. Plaintiffs were ordered to file answers to the additional interrogatories within 30 days of service of them on plaintiffs.

The additional interrogatories were served upon plaintiffs on January 10, 1967, again requesting plaintiffs to state the specific defect in the Garofalo automobile which was the cause of the condition of which they complained. The additional interrogatories went unanswered, and defendants filed a motion on March 27, 1967, requesting the trial court to dismiss the amended complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to file answers to the additional interrogatories as ordered by the court. Although not appearing in the common-law record, plaintiffs apparently thereafter filed answers to the additional interrogatories. Defendants again filed a motion to strike certain of the answers to the additional interrogatories, among which were again the answers pertaining to the specific defect, as being unresponsive and as giving no more information than did the prior answers which were objected to. Defendants also moved for a dismissal of the action. The trial court allowed the motion, struck the answers to the designated interrogatories, struck the amended complaint and dismissed the action as to all parties.

The unreasonable failure to comply with the rules and orders regarding pretrial discovery may result in the imposition of sanctions by the trial court against the party at fault. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219.

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Bluebook (online)
243 N.E.2d 691, 103 Ill. App. 2d 389, 1968 Ill. App. LEXIS 1440, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garofalo-v-general-motors-corp-illappct-1968.