Garnett v. Comm'r, Maine Dep't of Agric.
This text of Garnett v. Comm'r, Maine Dep't of Agric. (Garnett v. Comm'r, Maine Dep't of Agric.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT PENOBSCOT, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-08-027 t, 1/ • ' : til j, V . " ,rr ' Ie,.' - /1 . WAYNE GARNETT,
PlaintifflPetitioner,
v. ORDER COMMISSIONER, MAINE r-----_._ . DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FILED & ENTER'ED SUPFRIOP ~()UAT Defendant/Respondent. APR 03 2009
PENOBSCOT COUNTY ~=+;1:'~:r:r:;;~~~~r'""'f'Jo...J..eview of final
agency action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C as well as independent actions against the
defendant/respondent pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C(i). The Commissioner has filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. I2(c) as to Count III of
Garnett's complaint, equitable estoppel.
BACKGROUND
Accepting all matters pleaded in the complaint as true, the facts of this case are as
follows. Wayne Garnett owns and operates a large game shooting area pursuant to a
permit issued by the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture. The permit
is required under 7 M.R.S. § 1342 (2008). The Commissioner may only issue a license to
operate a large game shooting area "to a person who operated a commercial large game
shooting area during the period beginning October 1, 1999 and ending March 15, 2000
and only for large game offered for harvesting within that area during that time period."
7 M.R.S. § 1342. Garnett first applied for his license in 2001, stating in his application
that the type of animals shot between October 1, 1999 and March 15,2000 included red
1 deer. Garnett later indicated in yearly renewal applications that he also offered elk,
fallow deer, sika deer, bison, and domesticated boar.
On January 30, 2007, a livestock specialist with the Department of Agriculture
sent a letter to Garnett advising him that if he wished to continue to offer bison for
harvest along with other large game other than cervids 1 then he would need to increase
his shooting zone acreage to at least 200 acres. On January 22, 2008, the Commissioner
notified Garnett that his original 2001 license could not be amended to include bison or
boar because he had not offered those species for harvest between October 1, 1999 and
March 15,2000. On February 6,2008, Garnett faxed a letter to the Commissioner stating
that he did offer bison and boar for harvest during the applicable time period. He also
submitted three letters from individuals stating that Garnett had indeed offered bison and
boar for harvest during the applicable period.
On February 25, 2008, the Commissioner sent a letter to Garnett stating that
Garnett could no longer offer boar or bison for harvest or advertise that such were
available. The Commissioner did permit Garnett to honor hunts for bison and boar that
he had already booked, the last being scheduled for October 12, 2008. The
Commissioner stated that all bison and boar were to be removed by October 17, 2008. A
subsequent advice letter to the Commissioner from the Attorney General's Office
indicated that the Commissioner found the letters submitted by Garnett to be insufficient
evidence that bison and boar were offered for harvest between October 1, 1999 and
March 15, 2000. The Commissioner again renewed Garnett's license on November 13,
2008; however, the license indicated on its face that such license was "for cervids only."
I '''Cervid' means a member of the cervidae family and hybrids, including deer, elk, caribou, reindeer and
related species, specified by the commissioner by rule with the written concurrence of the Commissioner of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife." 7 M.R.S. § 1333(1)(A) (2008).
2 DISCUSSION
A. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court accepts all matters pleaded
by the nonmoving party as true and construes all reasonable inferences from those facts
in favor of the nonmoving party. See Town of Eddington v. Univ. of Me. Found., 2007
ME 74, ~ 5, 926 A.2d 183, 184. The standard is no different in a case such as the present
one where the motion relates to an independent action filed alongside a petition for
review of final agency action. Judgment is only warranted if no rational view of the
pleading would result in the success of a cause of action.
The Commissioner argues that judgment on Count III, equitable estoppel, is
appropriate because "estoppel is 'available only for protection, and cannot be used as a
weapon ofassault.'" Waterville Homes, Inc. v. Me. Dep't ofTransp., 589 A.2d 455,457
(Me. 1991) (quoting Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580-81 (1880)). See Buker v.
Town of Sweden, 644 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Me. 1994). Garnett has alleged that prior to the
action of the Commissioner that he was licensed to offer bison and boar for harvest. He
now attempts to use equitable estoppel as a shield to prevent his license from being
restricted. This case differs from Waterville Homes and Buker because Garnett seeks to
protect a right that the Commissioner had already allegedly given him (i. e., permission to
offer bison and boar) rather than seeking to acquire a new right. See Buker v. Town of
Sweden, 644 A.2d at 1043 (plaintiff sought conditional use permit); Waterville Homes,
589 A.2d at 457 (plaintiffs sought to enjoin Department of Transportation from changing
site of proposed highway interchange).
3 Furthermore, equitable estoppel is a cause of action truly independent of Garnett's
petition for review of final agency action. A cause of action is only independent to the
petition if the petition would not provide an adequate remedy. Colby v. York County
Comm'rs, 442 A.2d 544, 547 (Me. 1982); Fisher v. Dame, 433 A.2d 366, 372 (Me.
1981). The Commissioner could not consider Garnett's equitable estoppel claim because
he has not been granted equitable powers by statute; therefore, this remedy is unavailable
by mere review and is independent. Berry v. Bd of Trs., Me. State Ret. Sys., 663 A.2d
14, 19 (Me. 1995). See Donald G. Alexander et aI., The Maine Rules of Civil Procedure
with Advisory Committee Notes and Practice Commentary 528 (MSBA 2008)
(characterizing equitable estoppel as an independent claim). Accepting all matters
pleaded as true, Garnett's claim of equitable estoppel does not fail as a matter of law;
therefore, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied.
B. Jurisdiction under the Maine Administrative Procedure Act
After reviewing the filings in this case, the court requests that the parties brief the
issue of the timeliness of Garnett's petition for review of final agency action, Counts I
and II of the complaint. See 5 M.R.S. § 11002(3) (2008). See Post v. State ofMe. , Dep't
of Marine Res., 605 A.2d 81 (Me. 1992). Each party shall file a single brief, not to
exceed ten pages, to be filed within ten days of the date of this order.
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