Garner v. Capital Area Transit

702 S.E.2d 319, 208 N.C. App. 266, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 2427
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedDecember 7, 2010
DocketCOA10-149
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 702 S.E.2d 319 (Garner v. Capital Area Transit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garner v. Capital Area Transit, 702 S.E.2d 319, 208 N.C. App. 266, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 2427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

STEELMAN, Judge.

The Industrial Commission found that plaintiffs version of the alleged accident was not credible. Because the medical causation testimony was based upon this unreliable testimony, plaintiff failed to establish that she was injured as a result of a compensable accident under Chapter 97 of the General Statutes.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2007, Teresa L. Gamer (plaintiff) was employed by Capital Area Transit (CAT) as a bus driver. Prior to 2007, plaintiff was involved in three separate bus accidents and as a result injured her neck, back, and arm. On 9 March 2007, plaintiff was driving bus #103, which was parked behind bus #1235 waiting to begin its route at the station. At approximately 4:30 p.m., Bus #1235 rolled backwards towards plaintiffs bus and hit the front of bus #103. Plaintiff contended that this contact caused her to be thrown back and she “heard something pop[.]” Plaintiff and Stephanie Wright (Wright) filled out a Raleigh Transit Division ATC accident report, which did not indicate that any injuries had occurred. Police investigated the accident, but a report was not filed due to the lack of damage to the buses and lack of injuries. Wright described the impact as “a little nudge” and stated that the impact was less than going over a speed bump. Following the accident, plaintiff continued with her shift at 5:15 p.m. Plaintiff asserted that she subsequently began to feel pain and tightness in her neck. When plaintiff finished her shift at 7:17 p.m., she submitted a work injury report to CAT. Plaintiff asserted that she injured her neck, back, and shoulder.

On 10 March 2007, plaintiff visited the Wake Medical Center Emergency room. Plaintiffs chief complaint was neck pain. However, plaintiffs neck did not reveal any tenderness and she had good range of motion. The emergency room physician concluded “[p]atient’s mechanism of injury and exam appear to be physiologically impossi *268 ble to relate to her accident.” Plaintiff was discharged and ordered to take two Tylenol every four hours. Two days later, plaintiff visited Concentra Medical Centers and presented to Dr. Michael J. Landolf. Plaintiff again complained of neck, shoulder, and back pain. An x-ray showed degenerative changes in plaintiff’s cervical spine with anterior osteophytes at C5 and C6 and a reversal of the normal curvature of the spine. Dr. Landolf restricted plaintiff to no lifting over fifteen pounds, and no pushing or pulling over thirty pounds of force. Plaintiff was also directed not to drive a bus and was referred to physical therapy. On 15 March 2007, plaintiff’s cervical strain was resolved and she was released to regular work duty. On 10 April 2007, plaintiff was continued on regular work activity and released from medical care. On that same day, CAT denied her claim for workers’ compensation benefits.

On 13 June 2007, plaintiff presented to Dr. Paul B. Suh (Dr. Suh), an orthopaedic surgeon, without a referral. Plaintiff complained of neck, mid-back, and left-arm pain. Dr. Suh diagnosed plaintiff with cervical degenerative disc disease and cervical radiculopathy. Dr. Suh opined that the 9 March 2007 bus accident “served to aggravate a preexisting condition of cervical degenerative disc disease.” On 28 February 2008, Dr. Suh performed an anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion. After the surgery, plaintiff was unable to work in any capacity.

On 23 October 2009, the Full Commission entered an Opinion and Award denying plaintiff workers’ compensation benefits. The Commission found that plaintiff’s testimony regarding her version of the accident was inconsistent with the greater weight of the evidence, and that because Dr. Suh relied upon the veracity of plaintiff’s version of events, his opinion regarding causation and aggravation of plaintiff’s pre-existing condition was also inconsistent with the greater weight of the evidence. Plaintiff appeals.

II. Standard of Review

The applicable standard of appellate review in workers’ compensation cases is well established. Appellate review of an opinion and award from the Industrial Commission is generally limited to determining: “(1) whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the conclusions of law are justified by the findings of fact.” Clark v. Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41, 43, 619 S.E.2d 491, 492 (2005) (citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986)).

*269 Hassell v. Onslow Cty. Bd. of Educ., 362 N.C. 299, 305, 661 S.E.2d 709, 714 (2008). The Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence before it. Id. This Court does not “have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court’s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.” Id. (quotations omitted). The Commission’s findings of fact are conclusive when supported by competent evidence, even though there may be evidence that would support findings to the contrary. Id. The Commission’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 701 (2004).

III. Medical Causation

In her first argument, plaintiff contends there is no competent evidence in the record to support the Commission’s finding that Dr. Suh’s opinion pertaining to causation was based upon unproven facts provided by plaintiff. We disagree.

“[Aggravation of a pre-existing condition which results in loss of wage earning capacity is compensable under the workers’ compensation laws in our state.” Smith v. Champion Int'l, 134 N.C. App. 180, 182, 517 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1999). It is well-established that “[t]he claimant in a workers’ compensation case bears the burden of initially proving each and every element of compensability, including a causal relationship between the injury and his employment.” Adams v. Metals USA, 168 N.C. App. 469, 475, 608 S.E.2d 357, 361 (quotation omitted), aff’d per curiam, 360 N.C. 54, 619 S.E.2d 495 (2005). When a case involves “complicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.” Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 232, 581 S.E.2d 750, 753 (2003) (quotation omitted).

In the instant case, only one medical expert was deposed and opined as to whether the 9 March 2007 accident aggravated plaintiff’s pre-existing condition of cervical degenerative disc disease.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
702 S.E.2d 319, 208 N.C. App. 266, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 2427, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garner-v-capital-area-transit-ncctapp-2010.