Garmon v. Milwaukee County

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 11, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-00277
StatusUnknown

This text of Garmon v. Milwaukee County (Garmon v. Milwaukee County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garmon v. Milwaukee County, (E.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

D’QUAILYNN GARMON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 21-CV-277

MILWAUKEE COUNTY, MILWAUKEE COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE, and ABRAHAM ABU DOKULY,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiff D’Quailynn Garmon, who is incarcerated at the Milwaukee County Jail and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. This order resolves Garmon’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because Garmon was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On March 31, 2021, the court waived payment of the initial partial filing fee.

(ECF No. 6.) The court will grant Garmon’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and allow him to pay the full filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. 2. Screening of the Complaint 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA the court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

2 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)).

The court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Garmon’s Allegations Garmon alleges that on November 18, 2020, while he was confined in the mental health unit at the Milwaukee County Jail, he was attacked by another inmate, Abraham Abu Dukuly. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Garmon was out of his cell for his

allotted recreation time when Dukuly, completely naked, kicked open his cell door and began attacking Garmon. (Id.) Garmon states that several unnamed correctional officers at the jail failed to prevent this attack. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) The officers also took a long time to respond to the attack. (Id.) After the attack, the officers continued to keep Garmon in the same pod as Dukuly and failed to put a “keep separate” order in place. (Id.) The officers

3 were aware of Dukuly’s aggressive tendencies and knew he had attacked staff previously. (Id.) 2.3 Analysis

Garmon appears to be attempting to state a failure to protect claim. Under § 1983, besides alleging that he suffered a deprivation of a right guaranteed by the Constitution or U.S. law, Garmon must also allege that the deprivation “was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2009). Garmon names Milwaukee County, the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office, and Dukuly as defendants. None of

the defendants named by Garmon can be held liable under § 1983. Dukuly is a fellow inmate. Garmon does not allege that Dukuly was acting under the color of state law when he attacked Garmon. That means that Garmon cannot sue Dukuly under § 1983. Regarding the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office, § 1983 only holds “persons” liable. Id. The Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Office is not a person, nor is it a separate legal entity that can be sued under §1983. See Louis v. Milwaukee County Jail, No.

17-cv-113-wed-pp, 2017 WL 3037567 at *2 (E.D. Wis. July, 18 2017) (citing Powell v. Cook Cty. Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757, 758 N.D. Ill. 1993)). There are some circumstances in which Milwaukee County may be held liable under § 1983. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In order for a municipality to be liable, the plaintiff must allege that the violation was a result of a municipal policy or custom. Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of

4 Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978)). This includes “governmental customs” that result in constitutional violations even though the “custom has not received formal

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Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service
577 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Powell v. Cook County Jail
814 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Illinois, 1993)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Alma Glisson v. Correctional Medical Services
849 F.3d 372 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Colbert v. City of Chicago
851 F.3d 649 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Garmon v. Milwaukee County, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garmon-v-milwaukee-county-wied-2021.