Garmon v. IDOC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 21, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-00027
StatusUnknown

This text of Garmon v. IDOC (Garmon v. IDOC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garmon v. IDOC, (S.D. Ill. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JESSE C. GARMON, #B23470,

Plaintiff, Case No. 21-cv-00027-SPM

v.

IDOC, WARDEN, Centralia CC, WARDEN, Shawnee CC, COUNSELOR, Centralia CC, COUNSELOR, Shawnee CC, RECORDS OFFICE, Centralia CC, RECORDS OFFICE, Shawnee CC, INMATES ISSUES, Springfield IL, PAROLE BOARD, DONALD DUNN, GRIEVANCE OFFICERS, Centralia CC, GRIEVANCE OFFICERS, Shawnee CC, and SPRINGFIELD GRIEVANCE ISSUES BOARD,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge: Plaintiff Jesse Garmon, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is currently incarcerated at Danville Correctional Center, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. Garmon claims that he was not credited for time served while incarcerated and so his release date of January 22, 2019 was calculated incorrectly. He seeks monetary damages and good conduct credits. The Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT Garmon alleges he was arrested on July 14, 2012, and was later sentenced to 6 years imprisonment and 4 year mandatory supervised release (“MSR”). (Case citation provided 12-CF- 141). On August 18, 2015, he received a second amended sentence for 3 ½ years imprisonment with 4 years of MSR and credit for time served. After his sentence was recalculated, his projected release day was June 26, 2015, which had already passed. He was immediately released a few days later on August 21, 2015. (Doc. 16, p. 31). After his release, Garmon was arrested again October 8, 2015. He was sentenced to 30 days in the Sangamon County Jail. Garmon went before the Parole Review Board, which included member Donald Dunn, at Centralia Correctional Center on March 2, 2016. It was determined that

he violated the conditions of his MSR. He remained in custody, and his release date was wrongly calculated as January 22, 2019. Garmon claims he did not receive credit for the 2 months and 9 days served from June 16, 2015 through August 21, 2015. He alleges that he over served his sentence as calculated in case 12-CF-141 when he was incarcerated from October 8, 2015 to January 22, 2019. DISCUSSION The Complaint does not survive preliminary review pursuant to Section 1915A and will be dismissed. First, Garmon lists as Defendants several entities that cannot be sued under Section 1983. IDOC, the Records Offices of Centralia and Shawnee Correctional Centers, Inmates Issues,

the Parole Board, and the Springfield Grievance Issues Board are not “persons” subject to suit for money damages under Section 1983. Thomas v. Ill., 697 F. 3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) (“a state and its agencies are not suable ‘persons’ within the meaning of section 1983”). Second, Garmon has not asserted any allegations against the remaining individual Defendants – the Wardens, Counselors, and Grievance Officers of Centralia and Shawnee

Correctional Centers, and Donald Dunn, a member of the Parole Review Board. With the exclusion of Donald Dunn, none of these Defendants are mentioned in the statement of claim. Plaintiffs are required to associate specific defendants with specific claims, so that defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Where a plaintiff has not included a defendant in his statement of the claim, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately put on notice of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against him. Furthermore, merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Because Garmon does not mention the Wardens, Counselors, and Grievance Officers elsewhere in the Complaint, the claims

against them are dismissed. As for Donald Dunn, all Garmon states is that Dunn was on the Parole Review Board when the determination was made that he had violated his supervised release. He does not include any allegations regarding Dunn’s involvement in his sentence recalculation. Therefore, these factual allegations are not sufficient to state a claim against Dunn. See Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (“a defendant must be personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right”). For these reasons, the Court finds that Garmon has failed to state a claim against any of the listed Defendants, and the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Garmon will be given,

however, an opportunity to replead his claims in an amended complaint. MOTION TO AMEND After filing the Complaint, Garmon filed a Motion for 2nd Amended Civil Rights Complaint. (Doc. 16). He asks to amend the Complaint to provide the names and professional titles of Defendants and to add exhibits.

The motion is denied. Garmon may not amend the Complaint in this type of piecemeal fashion. An amended complaint generally supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004). As such, an amended complaint must stand on its own without reference to any other pleading and must include all claims against all defendants and all supporting exhibits. MOTION FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE The Court recognizes that because Garmon is incarcerated he may have difficulty effectuating service within the 90 day time limit imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Therefore, the Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 15) is granted. If

Garmon files an amended complaint in accordance with the instructions set forth in this Order and successfully pleads a claim against a defendant, then the Court will conduct service on his behalf. MOTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL Garmon has filed a motion asking the Court to recruit counsel on his behalf. (Doc. 14). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the Court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” When faced with a motion for recruitment of counsel the Court applies a two part test: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Santiago v. Walls
599 F.3d 749 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Calvin Thomas v. State of Illinois
697 F.3d 612 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Pruitt v. Mote
503 F.3d 647 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service
577 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Garmon v. IDOC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garmon-v-idoc-ilsd-2022.