Garlock v. Jordan

2025 Ohio 82

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 10, 2025
• Docket: S-23-030, S-23-031
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Garlock v. Jordan, 2025-Ohio-82.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SANDUSKY COUNTY

Ashley Garlock, Individually and Court of Appeals No. S-23-030 as Mother and Natural Guardian of S-23-031 A. G., a minor Trial Court No. 21 CV 946 Appellant

v.

Christopher Jordan, et. al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellees Decided: January 10, 2025

[Joy Smith and Janel Strong – Appellants]

*****

George R. Oryshkewych, for appellant, Ashley Garlock.

James W. Hart and John M. Felter, for appellants, Joy Smith and Janel Strong.

Daniel J. Hurley, for appellee, Wyandot Mutual Insurance Company.

***** ZMUDA, J.

{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, plaintiff-appellant, Ashley Garlock, and

defendants-appellants, Joy Smith and Janel Strong (collectively, appellants), appeal the

October 24, 2023 order of the Sandusky County Common Pleas Court declaring that intervening plaintiff-appellee, Wyandot Mutual Insurance Company (“Wyandot”), had no

duty to defend or indemnify any defendant regarding Garlock’s claims. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

{¶ 2} On December 13, 2021, Garlock, both individually and in her capacity as

natural guardian of her minor daughter, A.G., filed a complaint in Sandusky County

Common Pleas Court against Smith, Strong, Robert Downing, and Chistopher Jordan

(collectively, defendants-appellants).1 Garlock’s complaint alleged that on July 31, 2021,

A.G. was visiting the defendants-appellants’ home when a dog that was owned, kept, or

harbored by the defendants-appellants attacked A.G., biting her in the face, and asserted

that defendants-appellants were strictly liable for the resulting damages.

{¶ 3} When the incident occurred, A.G. was at a cookout hosted by Strong and

Jordan at their home. The home was owned by a trust for which Smith served as trustee

and was covered by a home insurance policy through Wyandot. The home insurance

policy contained a provision excluding from coverage the following:

“Bodily injury” or “Property Damage” caused by full or partial breed Dobermans, German Shepherds, Pit Bulls, Chows, Akitas and Rottweilers or any other dog or dogs, regardless of breed, that have been involved in past human biting incident; or any dangerous or vicious dogs as defined in the Ohio Revised Code, section 955.11 and any revision of that section of law; owned by or in the care, custody or control of the “insured” or for which the “insured” is legally responsible.

1 Downing died during this case’s pendency, and Garlock subsequently dismissed her claims against him and amended the complaint to assert her claims against Smith in Smith’s capacity as trustee of Downing’s trust. Jordan has not filed a brief in this appeal. For simplicity, all defendants will be referred to collectively as defendants-appellants.

2. {¶ 4} As an intervening plaintiff, Wyandot filed a complaint seeking declaratory

judgment, requesting that the court declare that Wyandot had no duty to defend or

indemnify Jordan because he was not an “insured” under the policy. In addition,

Wyandot sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify any other

defendant because the dog that bit A.G. was at least part Rottweiler and the policy

excluded bodily injury caused by full or partial breed Rottweilers.

{¶ 5} On October 28, 2022, Wyandot moved for summary judgment. Wyandot

argued that the policy excluded all injuries caused by full or partial breed Rottweilers.

Wyandot asserted that because the dog that caused A.G.’s injuries was at least a partial

breed Rottweiler, the injuries at issue were excluded from coverage.

{¶ 6} Smith and Strong opposed Wyandot’s motion. Garlock also filed an

opposition to Wyandot’s motion, which she combined with her own motion for summary

judgment. Smith, Strong, and Garlock, in their respective filings, argued the court must

interpret the policy to find coverage even if the dog was a partial breed Rottweiler. In

support, Smith and Strong submitted the affidavit of an English language professor

analyzing the grammar of the exclusion. In his affidavit, the professor opined that the

absence of a semi-colon after the word Rottweiler in the relevant exclusion meant that

only injuries caused by full or partial breed Rottweilers that had been involved in prior

human biting incidents were excluded from coverage. Under this interpretation, A.G.’s

injuries were covered because there was no evidence that the dog at issue, even if it were

a full or partial breed Rottweiler, had been involved in a prior biting incident. Appellants

3. further argued that even if Wyandot’s proposed interpretation could be construed as

reasonable, the interpretation of its expert witness was a second reasonable interpretation,

and therefore the exclusion was ambiguous and must be construed against Wyandot in

favor of coverage.

{¶ 7} On May 10, 2023, the parties stipulated that the dog at issue was a partial

breed Rottweiler, and the trial court granted Wyandot’s motion for summary judgment on

May 25, 2023. The trial court’s analysis of the issues is set forth below in its entirety:

Wyandot argues that their policy excludes dog bites involving certain breed dogs, including Rottweilers or Rottweiler mixed dogs. The language in the policy is clear and uncontroverted. The parties have stipulated that [the dog at issue] is a Rottweiler mixed breed dog.

Following its analysis, the trial court’s decision concluded that Wyandot’s motion for

summary judgment was granted. The court did not address Wyandot’s request for

declaratory judgment. The trial court’s conclusion also did not address, nor did the trial

court otherwise rule on, Garlock’s motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 8} All parties sought clarification from the court regarding the effect of the

court’s order. On June 9, 2023, Garlock filed a motion for clarification regarding the

May 25, 2023 order, pointing out that the court’s opinion did not address the grammatical

structure of the exclusion and did not rule on her motion for summary judgment. On

June 12, 2023, Wyandot filed a request for the trial court to “expressly declare the

parties’ respective rights and obligations.” And on June 20, 2023, Smith and Strong filed

a request for modification of the court’s May 25, 2023 order, arguing that the trial court

had not addressed the English professor’s expert opinion.

4. {¶ 9} While the motions for clarification were still pending, Garlock filed a notice

of appeal in this court concerning the May 25, 2023 order, and Smith and Strong filed a

cross appeal. On August 23, 2023, we granted Wyandot’s motion to dismiss the appeal

due to a lack of a final, appealable order because the trial court had not yet entered an

order declaring the rights and obligations of the parties under the insurance policy and did

not include language pursuant to Civ.R. 54(B) that there is “no just reason for delay” in

its May 25, 2023 decision.

{¶ 10} On October 24, 2023, the trial court issued a judgment entry in response to

the pending motions. The trial court’s judgment entry, which it issued “in accordance

with the Court’s May 25, 2023 decision,” declared that “[Wyandot] is not obligated to

defend or indemnify an[y] of the Defendants with respect to the injuries [Garlock] may

have sustained as a result of the dog bite/attack incident.” The court explained that an

expert witness was unnecessary for the court to interpret the policy language. The court

also declared that Jordan and Smith did not qualify as insureds under the policy. Finally,

the court denied Garlock’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court’s order

expressly stated, “[t]here is no just reason for delay.”

{¶ 11} Garlock filed a timely appeal with a merit brief, and Smith and Strong filed

a separate, timely appeal with their own merit brief. The appeals were consolidated, and

appellants’ assignments of error will be addressed together below.

5. II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 12} Garlock asserts the following assignments of error for our consideration:

1. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, by granting summary judgment in favor of Wyandot and by denying plaintiff/appellant’s motion for summary judgment.

2. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in making a finding as to Joy Smith’s status as an “insured.”

{¶ 13} Next, Smith and Strong’s single assignment of error is set forth below:

The trial court erred by granting Intervening Plaintiff/Appellee Wyandot Mutual Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

III. Law and Analysis

{¶ 14} Smith and Strong’s single assignment of error and Garlock’s first

assignment of error both require us to interpret the exclusion’s language. Appellants

contend that the exclusion is ambiguous and thus must be construed in favor of coverage,

and therefore the trial court erred in holding that Wyandot had no duty to defend or

indemnify. In support, they point to the exclusion’s punctuation, arguing that if the

parties had intended to make the listed dog breeds its own separate category regardless of

their biting history, then the list of breeds should have been followed by a semi-colon.

{¶ 15} This court reviews the interpretation of an insurance policy as a matter of

law. Buehrer v. Meyers, 2020-Ohio-3207, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.). “It is well settled that

‘insurance policies should be enforced in accordance with their terms as are other written

contracts. Where the provisions of the policy are clear and unambiguous, courts cannot

enlarge the contract by implication so as to embrace an object distinct from that originally

6. contemplated by the parties.’” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.

of U.S., 54 Ohio St.2d 45, 47 (1979). “As we examine the contract as whole, we presume

that the parties' intent is reflected in the language used. When the policy language is

clear, the court may look no further to find the intent of the parties.” Id., quoting

Houston v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2005-Ohio-4177, ¶ 36.

{¶ 16} On the other hand, “[w]here provisions of a contract of insurance are

reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation, they will be construed strictly

against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.” King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35

Ohio St.3d 208 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus. However, to create ambiguity, the

possible interpretations must be reasonable. Lager v. Miller-Gonzalez, 2008-Ohio-4838,

¶ 16. Indeed, “[t]he mere potential for ambiguity in a clause in a contract is not sufficient

to establish that the provision is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation.”

Id. at ¶ 29.

{¶ 17} “When interpreting a contract, we will presume that words are used for a

specific purpose and will avoid interpretations that render portions meaningless or

unnecessary.” Wohl v. Swinney, 2008-Ohio-2334, ¶ 22. Accordingly, an interpretation

that makes policy language unnecessary or superfluous cannot be reasonable and

therefore does not create ambiguity. Id.

{¶ 18} Further, if a strict grammatical reading of the language results in

unnecessary or superfluous terms, then such an interpretation is not reasonable. Burgess

v. Erie Ins. Group, 2007-Ohio-934 (10th Dist.). For example, the Tenth District Court of

7. Appeals examined an insurance policy that was missing a comma in a provision

excluding coverage for “bodily injury to anyone we protect while operating occupying, or

when struck by [motor vehicles not specifically identified in the policy].” Id. at ¶ 7. In

that case, the insureds argued that the exclusion was ambiguous because of the lack of a

comma in the phrase “operating occupying.” Id. at ¶ 8. The court held that only one

interpretation of the phrase was reasonable, making the exclusion was unambiguous:

Because a person must be occupying a vehicle while operating it, the use of the term “occupying” in the phrase “operating occupying” is not necessary and would therefore be redundant. Thus, the only reasonable construction of the phrase is to read the terms as two separate actions, despite the lack of a comma between them.

Id. at ¶ 18. Accordingly, even a grammatical error, such as the omission of punctuation,

does not render a policy provision ambiguous if only one reasonable interpretation of the

provision exists.

{¶ 19} Here, like the insured in Burgess, appellants point to the lack of

punctuation in the exclusion as creating ambiguity in the following portion of the

exclusion:

caused by full or partial breed Dobermans, German Shepherds, Pit Bulls, Chows, Akitas and Rottweilers or any other dog or dogs, regardless of breed, that have been involved in past human biting incident;2

They contend that to exclude the listed breeds without regard to their past biting history,

the exclusion must contain a semi-colon after Rottweilers. By failing to include the semi-

2 The policy contains another category of exclusion, dogs that qualify as dangerous or vicious dogs under R.C. 955.11, but this category is not at issue and is therefore not discussed.

8. colon, appellants argue that grammatical rules dictate the phrase “that have been involved

in a past biting incident” must apply to all of the preceding language, including the listed

breeds, and not merely to the phrase “any other dog or dogs.” They claim that at best, the

language is ambiguous and therefore the policy must be interpreted in their favor. In

contrast, Wyandot argues that the list of breeds—regardless of biting history—constitutes

its own separate category, and to interpret the language otherwise would render the list of

the named breeds unnecessary and therefore such an interpretation must be unreasonable.

{¶ 20} After examining the language in the exclusion, we agree that the lack of a

semi-colon or any other punctuation between “Rottweilers” and “or any other dog or

dogs” makes the language subject to two possible interpretations. In the first

interpretation, the lack of punctuation separating the phrases means that they must be

read together, so that the only excluded damages are those caused by dogs that have been

involved in a past human biting incident. In the second interpretation, the punctuation

must be “read in” to create two categories of exclusion: (1) damages caused by a dog that

is at least partially one of the specific listed breeds; and (2) damages caused by a dog of

any breed that was involved in a past human biting incident.

{¶ 21} However, the outcome in this case turns on the reasonableness of the

proposed interpretations, not which interpretation is the most grammatically sound.

Appellants’ argument fails because they rely solely on the grammatical mechanics of the

exclusion without regard for its meaning. Although a sentence’s mechanics are one

factor to consider in interpreting contractual language, a rote focus on mechanics, such as

9. inclusion or omission of punctuation, cannot supersede the resulting effect on the

language’s meaning. Burgess at ¶ 18. Here, the first interpretation is not reasonable due

to its effect on the list of specific breeds. If the parties’ intent was to exclude all dogs

with a history of biting without regard to breed and to have no breed-specific exclusion,

then the list of specific breeds would be unnecessary. An interpretation that results in

unnecessary language is unreasonable, even if the alternative, reasonable interpretation

contains minor mechanical errors, such as omitted punctuation. Id.

{¶ 22} Just as the Burgess court reasoned that an individual cannot “operate” a

vehicle without also “occupying” it, and therefore the two terms must constitute two

separate categories of exclusion, a dog cannot be a Rottweiler without also being a dog of

any breed. Id. Because only the second interpretation—creating two categories of

exclusion, one for the specific listed breeds and one for dogs of any breed with a history

of a human biting incident—does not render any language unnecessary or meaningless,

there is only one reasonable interpretation. And because only one reasonable

interpretation of the policy exists, the policy is unambiguous. Lager, 2008-Ohio-4838, at

¶ 16, 29.

{¶ 23} Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly determined that the policy

exclusion was unambiguous and the only reasonable interpretation excludes coverage for

injuries caused by partial breed Rottweilers, regardless of the dog’s biting history.

Because the parties have stipulated that A.G.’s injuries were caused by a partial breed

Rottweiler, the trial court correctly issued declaratory judgment holding that Wyandot

10. had no duty to defend or indemnify any party for the claims asserted in this case.

Garlock’s first assignment of error and Strong and Short’s single assignment of error are

found not well-taken.

{¶ 24} Further, because Wyandot has no duty to defend or indemnify any of the

claims asserted in this action, Garlock’s second assignment of error is moot, and we need

not consider whether Strong is an insured under the policy. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, the October 24, 2023 order of the Sandusky

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. Appellants are ordered to pay the costs of this

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, J. ____________________________ Myron C. Duhart, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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