Garibay v. Treasurer of the State

964 S.W.2d 474, 1998 Mo. App. LEXIS 364, 1998 WL 85742
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 3, 1998
DocketNo. 72652
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 964 S.W.2d 474 (Garibay v. Treasurer of the State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garibay v. Treasurer of the State, 964 S.W.2d 474, 1998 Mo. App. LEXIS 364, 1998 WL 85742 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

KAROHL, Judge.

Claimant, for the third time, appeals an award of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission) denying benefits from the Second Injury Fund (the Fund). On January 16, 1989, claimant sustained an injury to his left shoulder. His claim against his employer was settled. An Administrative Law Judge (AL J) heard his claim against the Fund which was based upon allegations of prior disabilities of “morbid obesity, sleep apnea and previous injuries to the ‘left lower extremity’ and ‘right upper extremity.’ ” The ALJ found claimant was permanently and totally disabled and made an award against the Fund.

On July 22, 1994, the Commission, citing Shipp v. National Vendors, 862 S.W.2d 344 (Mo.App. E.D.1993), ruled claimant failed to prove his “preexisting problems” caused any difficulty which precluded him from performing his essential job functions. It decided claimant worked before the shoulder injury, full-time without interruption, so he was not entitled to recover from the Fund. We reversed and remanded to the Commission for reconsideration in accordance with a new standard set forth in section 287.220.1 RSMo 1994 because that statute, enacted in 1993, was a remedial statute and changed the standard for liability of the Fund. Garibay v. Marcraft, Inc., 899 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.App. E.D.1995)(Garibay I).

On November 7, 1995, the Commission made a second final award denying compensation. It found, “although claimant has numerous preexisting injuries, none of them constituted an obstacle or hindrance to claimant’s employment.” We subsequently held the Commission failed to comply with our mandate following the first appeal. It “failed to apply the statutory standard in evaluating Garibay’s preexisting disabilities.” Garibay v. Treasurer of Missouri, 930 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Mo.App. E.D.1996)(Garibay II). We reversed and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings “consistent with the opinion.”

On May 29, 1997, the Commission entered a third final award denying compensation. It found claimant’s sleep apnea was not a permanent condition; his morbid obesity was not a permanent condition, a prior fracture of his left wrist did not cause a permanent disability and did not hinder or obstruct employment or re-employment; a prior left ankle injury caused no permanent disability, hindrance or obstacle to employment or reemployment; a right elbow condition was not a disability; and, injuries of his left ankle and his knee which were treated surgically, were not a permanent disability. The Commission concluded the Fund was not liable because claimant had no preexisting permanent partial disabilities.

We review claimant’s points on his third appeal. The Commission’s factual find[476]*476ings -will be affirmed if they are supported by competent and substantial evidence and are not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Davis v. Research Medical Center, 903 S.W.2d 557, 571 (Mo.App. W.D.1995). If credibility of witnesses was an issue before the ALJ and the Commission, we would accept the Commission’s decision. Section 287.495 RSMo 1994. However, credibility of all witnesses was not a disputed issue of fact. We will affirm the Commission’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence and are not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Davis, 903 S.W.2d at 571. Because this is a third appeal we also review, as. a question of law, whether the Commission has rendered an award in conformity with its own previous findings which preceded the prior appeals and were the factual basis of previous opinions and mandates in this case. The Commission is without authority to modify, alter, amend or otherwise depart from the previous mandates. Hankins v. Hankins, 864 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Mo.App. W.D.1993).

The ALJ held one hearing only. All of the evidence was before the Commission prior to the original award. In the first award, the Commission expressly accepted “as true the testimony of the claimant.” It observed that “[t]his claimant no doubt had numerous preexisting injuries, none of them were ‘industrially disabling.’ ” It did not reject the claim on the basis that the preexisting conditions were not permanent. In our first opinion we referred to “claimant’s prior medical conditions.” Garibay I, 899 S.W.2d at 555. The Commission’s second award included a finding that claimant “had numerous preexisting injuries.” It found those injuries were not a hindrance or obstacle to employment and denied benefits. It did not find the injuries did not cause permanent disabilities. On appeal, we found “this commission faded to apply the statutory standard in evaluating Garibay’s preexisting disabilities.” (Emphasis added). 930 S.W.2d at 60. We were required to reverse and remand because the Commission’s award was based upon the former “industrial disability” evaluation which the legislature rejected and replaced. We reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with our opinion and said, when reconsidering Garibay’s preexisting disabilities in connection with the 1993 amendment, the Commission should be aware that not all portions of section 287.220.1 RSMo 1994, as amended, are to be applied retroactively, the provisions limiting the degree of disability that must be found in order for liability of the Fund to attach does affect a substantive right and, thereby, must be applied retrospectively. Garibay II, 930 S.W.2d at 60-61. We found that “each of the experts testifying about Garibay’s preexisting disabilities concluded that given the presence of his sleep apnea, his employment in the open labor market would be severely and totally limited.” (Emphasis added).

Claimant argues the Commission erred as a matter of law by: (1) deciding claimant’s failure to have knowledge before the 1989 shoulder injury that he had a preexisting sleep apnea condition would exclude consideration of that condition as an existing permanent partial disability; and, (2) by rejecting morbid obesity as a preexisting permanent partial disability because it was “self-inflicted.” Finally, claimant argues the Commission erred as a matter of law in denying an award against the Fund because it is not supported by competent and substantial evidence.

THE EVIDENCE

Claimant testified in person. James Israel, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, testified for claimant in person. All the Fund’s witnesses were by deposition. Claimant offered a report of James Israel as an exhibit and the deposition testimony of Dr. Eli Ronald Shuter, a neurologist. The Fund offered the deposition testimony of Dr. Philip George, an orthopedic surgeon; the deposition testimony of Dr. Harold E. Walters, also an orthopedic surgeon, and, the testimony of Mr. James M. England, a rehabilitation counselor. In making the present award, the Commission apparently ignored its original finding that claimant’s testimony was true. Nothing occurred after that finding which would change the Commission’s appraisal of claimant’s credibility. Moreover, the ALJ’s findings and credibility determination remain part of the record as a whole on the testimo[477]*477ny of claimant and his witnesses.

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Bluebook (online)
964 S.W.2d 474, 1998 Mo. App. LEXIS 364, 1998 WL 85742, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garibay-v-treasurer-of-the-state-moctapp-1998.