JACOBS, Judge:
This appeal was taken from an order of the trial court dismissing appellant’s preliminary objections to the in personam jurisdiction of the court.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Appellees filed a complaint in trespass against appellant, a non-registered foreign corporation, on January 13, 1975, alleging that Stephen Garfield was injured when he fell on a defectively maintained ice skating rink at appellant’s resort in Spring Glen, New York. Service of the complaint was effected by registered mail to the Secretary of the Common[395]*395wealth and to the appellant in New York, whereupon appellant filed preliminary objections challenging jurisdiction.
The parties stipulated the following facts:
1. For each week during approximately the past five years, appellant has advertised its resort in The Jewish Exponent, a newspaper published and distributed in the Philadelphia area;
2. The cost of this advertising is $2,000.00 per year;
3. Appellant maintains a toll-free telephone number for Philadelphia area residents to make reservations with its lodge;
4. Appellant provides advertising brochures to several Philadelphia travel agents and pays a ten per cent referral fee for customers referred by a travel agency to the lodge.
The language of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute2 clearly covers appellant’s activities in this case. In § 8309(a)(1), the Act defines “doing business” for jurisdictional purposes as
“The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object.”3
We think the stipulated facts that appellant continuously advertises its resort through a Pennsylvania newspaper, maintains a toll-free telephone number in Pennsylvania for lodge reservations, and retains Pennsylvania travel agents on a ten per cent commission basis demonstrate that appellant is doing a series of similar acts in this Commonwealth for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit, and therefore hold that sufficient contacts exist for in personam jurisdiction on the basis of the statutory language alone. However, additional reasons exist for a finding of sufficient contacts to trigger jurisdiction here.
In Nettis v. DiLido Hotel, 215 Pa.Super. 284, 257 A.2d 643 (1969), this Court held that service of process on a Philadel[396]*396phia travel agent who booked reservations to defendant’s Florida hotel on a ten per cent commission basis was an invalid effort to bring the defendant, a non-registered foreign corporation, within the jurisdiction of the court, because the travel agent was not an agent of defendant. In dictum, the Court stated that insertion in a Pennsylvania newspaper of an advertisement for the defendant’s Florida hotel did not constitute an introduction of business into the Commonwealth so as to allow in personam jurisdiction over a non-registered foreign corporation.
Nettis is not dispositive of the issue in the present case because it was decided before the 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania long-arm statute. Section 8309(b), added in 1972, provides:
“In 'addition to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section the jurisdiction and venue of courts of the Commonwealth shall extend to all foreign corporations and the powers exercised by them to the fullest extent allowable under the Constitution of the United States.”4
The 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania long-arm statute were designed to remove all Pennsylvania statutory and decisional impediments to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa.Super. 12, 17, 323 A.2d 11 (1974). They were clearly intended to liberalize Pennsylvania’s position.5 By extending in personam jurisdiction to the full measure consistent with due process standards by § 8309(b), contacts sufficient to satisfy the constitutional due process requirements are now sufficient to satisfy the “doing business” requirement of Pennsylvania law. Proctor & Schwartz, supra 228 Pa.Super. at 17, 323 A.2d 11.
A three-pronged test exists to facilitate the ad hoc factual analysis this Court must make to determine whether [397]*397the requisite contacts are present. First, the defendant must have purposely availed itself of the privilege of acting within the forum state thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). Secondly, the cause of action must arise from defendant’s activities within the forum state. See Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968); Electric Regulator Corp. v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 280 F.Supp. 550 (D.Conn.1968). Lastly, the acts of the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it reasonable. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); see Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., supra; see also Parise v. AAA Warehouse Corp., supra.
We have no difficulty concluding in the first instance that the appellant purposely availed itself of the privilege of acting within this Commonwealth by its intensive and continuous advertising in a Pennsylvania newspaper, its maintenance of a toll-free telephone number in Pennsylvania for lodge reservations, and its arrangements with Pennsylvania travel agents on a ten per cent commission basis for referrals to its resort. For the same reasons, this intensive level of activity by appellant in Pennsylvania provides a substantial enough connection with the Commonwealth to make the exercise of jurisdiction over appellant fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
The dissent would not resolve these issues, however, reasoning that there is no evidence on record that the cause of action arose from appellant’s activities in Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, our inquiry is not concluded for this reason, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s statement in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, that:
“There have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” 326 U.S. at 318-19, 66 S.Ct. at 159.
[398]*398We hold here that the defendant’s method of soliciting business in Pennsylvania consisted of such substantial and continuous activities in this Commonwealth as to render it amenable to in personam jurisdiction. The stipulated facts of the case dictate this result.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
JACOBS, Judge:
This appeal was taken from an order of the trial court dismissing appellant’s preliminary objections to the in personam jurisdiction of the court.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Appellees filed a complaint in trespass against appellant, a non-registered foreign corporation, on January 13, 1975, alleging that Stephen Garfield was injured when he fell on a defectively maintained ice skating rink at appellant’s resort in Spring Glen, New York. Service of the complaint was effected by registered mail to the Secretary of the Common[395]*395wealth and to the appellant in New York, whereupon appellant filed preliminary objections challenging jurisdiction.
The parties stipulated the following facts:
1. For each week during approximately the past five years, appellant has advertised its resort in The Jewish Exponent, a newspaper published and distributed in the Philadelphia area;
2. The cost of this advertising is $2,000.00 per year;
3. Appellant maintains a toll-free telephone number for Philadelphia area residents to make reservations with its lodge;
4. Appellant provides advertising brochures to several Philadelphia travel agents and pays a ten per cent referral fee for customers referred by a travel agency to the lodge.
The language of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute2 clearly covers appellant’s activities in this case. In § 8309(a)(1), the Act defines “doing business” for jurisdictional purposes as
“The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object.”3
We think the stipulated facts that appellant continuously advertises its resort through a Pennsylvania newspaper, maintains a toll-free telephone number in Pennsylvania for lodge reservations, and retains Pennsylvania travel agents on a ten per cent commission basis demonstrate that appellant is doing a series of similar acts in this Commonwealth for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit, and therefore hold that sufficient contacts exist for in personam jurisdiction on the basis of the statutory language alone. However, additional reasons exist for a finding of sufficient contacts to trigger jurisdiction here.
In Nettis v. DiLido Hotel, 215 Pa.Super. 284, 257 A.2d 643 (1969), this Court held that service of process on a Philadel[396]*396phia travel agent who booked reservations to defendant’s Florida hotel on a ten per cent commission basis was an invalid effort to bring the defendant, a non-registered foreign corporation, within the jurisdiction of the court, because the travel agent was not an agent of defendant. In dictum, the Court stated that insertion in a Pennsylvania newspaper of an advertisement for the defendant’s Florida hotel did not constitute an introduction of business into the Commonwealth so as to allow in personam jurisdiction over a non-registered foreign corporation.
Nettis is not dispositive of the issue in the present case because it was decided before the 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania long-arm statute. Section 8309(b), added in 1972, provides:
“In 'addition to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section the jurisdiction and venue of courts of the Commonwealth shall extend to all foreign corporations and the powers exercised by them to the fullest extent allowable under the Constitution of the United States.”4
The 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania long-arm statute were designed to remove all Pennsylvania statutory and decisional impediments to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa.Super. 12, 17, 323 A.2d 11 (1974). They were clearly intended to liberalize Pennsylvania’s position.5 By extending in personam jurisdiction to the full measure consistent with due process standards by § 8309(b), contacts sufficient to satisfy the constitutional due process requirements are now sufficient to satisfy the “doing business” requirement of Pennsylvania law. Proctor & Schwartz, supra 228 Pa.Super. at 17, 323 A.2d 11.
A three-pronged test exists to facilitate the ad hoc factual analysis this Court must make to determine whether [397]*397the requisite contacts are present. First, the defendant must have purposely availed itself of the privilege of acting within the forum state thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). Secondly, the cause of action must arise from defendant’s activities within the forum state. See Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968); Electric Regulator Corp. v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 280 F.Supp. 550 (D.Conn.1968). Lastly, the acts of the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it reasonable. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); see Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., supra; see also Parise v. AAA Warehouse Corp., supra.
We have no difficulty concluding in the first instance that the appellant purposely availed itself of the privilege of acting within this Commonwealth by its intensive and continuous advertising in a Pennsylvania newspaper, its maintenance of a toll-free telephone number in Pennsylvania for lodge reservations, and its arrangements with Pennsylvania travel agents on a ten per cent commission basis for referrals to its resort. For the same reasons, this intensive level of activity by appellant in Pennsylvania provides a substantial enough connection with the Commonwealth to make the exercise of jurisdiction over appellant fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
The dissent would not resolve these issues, however, reasoning that there is no evidence on record that the cause of action arose from appellant’s activities in Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, our inquiry is not concluded for this reason, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s statement in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, that:
“There have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” 326 U.S. at 318-19, 66 S.Ct. at 159.
[398]*398We hold here that the defendant’s method of soliciting business in Pennsylvania consisted of such substantial and continuous activities in this Commonwealth as to render it amenable to in personam jurisdiction. The stipulated facts of the case dictate this result.
Rather than focusing solely upon whether the injured parties actually used the solicitation methods employed by Homowack Lodge, we will examine the intensity of appellant’s activities in Pennsylvania and appellant’s intent that Pennsylvania residents use its advertising and solicitation facilities. Homowack Lodge provided regular advertising, a toll-free telephone line, and Philadelphia travel agents for the obvious purpose of obtaining Pennsylvania customers for its New York resort. These activities control the jurisdictional determination rather than the actual use of appellant’s advertising activities by plaintiffs.
Serious injuries have been alleged here by appellees, and this Commonwealth has a definite interest in resolving a suit brought by one of its residents. Aquarium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Industrial Pressing & Packaging, Inc., 358 F.Supp. 441 (E.D.Pa.1973); Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., supra. We have consequently concluded that appellees are not to be deprived of their forum for the sole reason that appellant does not have a registered office in Pennsylvania, in light of the intensive solicitation for profit appellant carries on in this Commonwealth.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court dismissing appellant’s preliminary objections is affirmed.
HOFFMAN, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ., join.