Gardner v. Coldwell Banker Legacy LLC

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: July 9, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01724
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 WILLIAM GARDNER, Case No.: 3:25-cv-1724-CAB-DEB Plaintiffs, 12 ORDER: v. 13 14 COLDWELL BANKER LEGACY, LLC, 1. DENYING MOTION FOR TRO et al., 15 2. DENYING MOTION TO FILE Defendants. ELECTRONICALLY 16

17 3. TO SHOW CAUSE RE: VENUE

18 [Doc. Nos. 2–3] 19 20 Plaintiff has filed an ex parte motion for temporary restraining order seeking to 21 enjoin an ongoing divorce court proceeding in New Mexico. [Doc. No. 3 at 2]; Case No. 22 D-202-DM-2023-03332. Plaintiff has also sought permission to electronically file 23 documents. [Doc. No. 2.] 24 As it relates to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it 25 involves a court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.” United States 26 v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). This threshold requirement “‘spring[s] from the 27 nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without 28 exception.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (quoting 1 Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). The Court can dismiss 2 a case on subject matter jurisdiction grounds sua sponte. Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 3 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). 4 The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction. Scott v. 5 Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986). The court need not presume the truthfulness 6 of the plaintiff’s allegations when evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(1). White v. Lee, 7 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and 8 lack of jurisdiction is presumed unless proven otherwise. See Stock W., Inc. v. 9 Confederated Tribes of the Colville Rsrv., 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). 10 As further explained below, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over 11 the TRO request. 12 i. Younger Abstention 13 The Younger abstention doctrine, as described in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 14 (1971), counsels federal courts to maintain respect for state functions and avoid undue 15 interference with certain ongoing state proceedings. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. 16 Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367–68 (1989). 17 Under this doctrine, a federal court abstains from hearing a case when there are 18 ongoing state proceedings at the time the federal case is filed that fall within at least one of 19 three case categories: (1) state criminal proceedings; (2) state civil enforcement 20 proceedings; and (3) state “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in 21 furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint 22 Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013) (quoting New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 367– 23 68) (quotation marks omitted). The doctrine applies to actions seeking declaratory and 24 injunctive relief. Hirsh v. Justices of the Sup. Ct. of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 A federal court must abstain under Younger where the following four factors are 26 met: 27 (1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating 28 1 federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so, 2 i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger 3 disapproves.

4 San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 5 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (abrogated on other grounds). 6 All four factors counsel in favor of abstention. First, there is an ongoing state divorce 7 proceeding. [See generally Doc. No. 3-1.] This proceeding implicates a core state interest. 8 See Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236, 237 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the strong state interest 9 in domestic relations). Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that he is barred from litigating 10 federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 11 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1987) (burden for this factor is on the plaintiff). Finally, the injunctive 12 relief sought is aimed at stopping a state family court judge from entering a final judgment 13 in a divorce proceeding—representing a significant interference with a state proceeding. 14 When addressing issues of family law, federal courts have held abstention is 15 “particularly appropriate.” Friends of Children, Inc. v. Matava, 766 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 16 1985). “[T]here is perhaps no state administrative scheme in which federal court intrusions 17 are less appropriate than domestic relations law.” DuBroff v. DuBroff, 833 F.2d 557, 561 18 (5th Cir. 1987). The Court finds that abstention is appropriate. 19 ii. Anti-Injunction Act 20 Pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, “[a] court of the United States may not grant an 21 injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of 22 Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its 23 judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. None of the exceptions authorized by the Act apply here. 24 As such, the Anti-Injunction Act independently prohibits the Court from exercising 25 jurisdiction over the requested TRO. See Elias v. Connett, 908 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 26 1990) (the Anti-Injunction Act is a jurisdictional bar). 27

28 1 iii, Venue 2 District courts have the authority to raise the issue of defective venue sua sponte. 3 || See Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986). Venue is governed by statute: 4 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Plaintiff, a resident of San Diego, claims that all Defendants reside 5 New Mexico. [Compl. at 2.] 6 None of the events alleged in the complaint occurred in California. As pleaded, they 7 || relate to an ongoing state court proceeding in New Mexico. Because venue is likely proper 8 the District of New Mexico, the provision in Section 1391(b)(3) does not apply. The 9 ||Court is inclined to dismiss this case on grounds of improper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 10 || 1406(a). The Court ORDERS Plaintiff to submit a brief by July 18, 2025 explaining why 11 || venue is proper in the Southern District of California. 12 iv. Conclusion 13 Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the Court DENIES the motion 14 TRO with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Moreover, Plaintiff has not 15 certified his compliance with the District’s rules on electronic filing. That certification is 16 |/available at https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/ProSe/Prose-FilingInfo.aspx. Plaintiff is 17 |/instructed to include that certification as part of any renewed motion to file documents 18 |/electronically. At present, his motion to file electronic documents is DENIED without 19 || prejudice. 20 It is SO ORDERED. 21 22 © g 23 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 24 || Dated July 9, 2025 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28