HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE
10 KIER KEAND’E GARDNER, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00622-RAJ 11 Plaintiff, ORDER 12 v. 13 CHEVRON, K BILG CORPORATION, 14 and AMARIT BILG,
15 Defendants.
17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 19 (“Defendant” or “Chevron”)’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. # 41-1. Plaintiff Kier Keand’e 20 Gardner (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response, to which Defendant replied. Dkt. ## 44; 45. 21 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 22 PART Defendant’s Motion. 23 II. BACKGROUND 24 This is an employment discrimination case based on allegations that Defendant 25 denied Plaintiff employment due to his race. All facts derive from Plaintiff’s Second 26 Amended Complaint (“SAC”). On August 6, 2023, Plaintiff received an application for 27 1 employment as a cashier from Defendant K Bilg Corporation doing business as Chevron 2 Corporation in Bellingham, Washington. Dkt. # 27-1 at 6. Three days later, Plaintiff 3 returned to the premises to submit his application. Id. The cashier refused to accept the 4 application, and she stated “yes” when Plaintiff asked her if she did not want to accept his 5 application because he was black. Id. 6 Plaintiff has since identified the cashier as Amarjit Bilg. Id. He originally named 7 Chevron Corporation, LS1-LLC, and the cashier, previously identified as “Jane Doe,” as 8 Defendants.1 Dkt. # 14. Upon receiving information about the relationship between the 9 parties from Lucky Singh, the registered agent of LS1-LLC, Plaintiff sought to (1) remove 10 LS1-LLC as a defendant, (2) identify the Jane Doe defendant as Amarjit Bilg, and (3) add 11 K Bilg Corporation as a party to this action. Dkt. # 28 at 2. Accordingly, the proper 12 Defendants are Chevron, Amarjit Bilg, and K Bilg Corporation. Dkt. # 27-1 at 2–3. 13 Plaintiff moved the Court to amend the summonses so he could serve the proper parties, 14 along with leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. ## 27, 28. The Court granted 15 his Motion. Dkt. # 29. 16 The SAC asserts causes of action for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 17 Rights Act, Section 1981, Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), and the 18 Bellingham Municipal Code. Dkt. # 27-1 at 3–4. Defendant moves to dismiss the SAC 19 for failure to state a claim. Dkt. # 41-1. 20 III. LEGAL STANDARD 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for 22 failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The rule requires the court to assume the 23 truth of the complaint’s factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from 24 those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not 25 accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the 26
27 1 LS1-LLC is a limited liability company that leased the Chevron location in Bellingham from K Bilg Corporation. Dkt. # 27-1 at 4–5. 1 complaint.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2 2008). The plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is 3 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff 4 succeeds, the complaint avoids dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with the 5 allegations in the complaint” that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft 6 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 7 A court typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint, 8 although it may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the document is central 9 to the party’s claims and its authenticity is not in question. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 10 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider evidence subject to judicial notice. United 11 States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 12 Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must construe her “complaint[] liberally 13 even when evaluating it under the Iqbal standard.” Johnson v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 14 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). 15 “Furthermore, ‘[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the pleading could not possibly 16 be cured by the allegation of other facts, and should be granted more liberally to pro se 17 plaintiffs.’” Id. (quoting McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 18 2004)). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 A. Federal and State Employment Discrimination Claims 21 Defendant first moves to dismiss the discrimination claims alleged in the SAC that 22 fall under state and federal law. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Section 1981 make 23 it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire an individual due to the potential employee’s 24 race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Messer v. Meno, 936 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D. Tex. 1996) 25 (finding that the elements of substantive claims of employment discrimination are the same 26 under both Section 1981 and Title VII) (overruled in part on other grounds). Similarly, the 27 WLAD prohibits an employer from refusing to hire any person because of their race. RCW 1 § 49.60.180(1). Title VII and the WLAD both require a plaintiff to plead that the defendant 2 subjected him to an adverse employment action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 3 (9th Cir. 2000); Kinnune v. Washington, No. 2:23-cv-00026-MKD, 2024 WL 314994, at 4 *8 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2024). 5 Defendant posits that it is an improper party to this case, as Plaintiff does not allege 6 that Chevron took any action at all with respect to his employment application. Dkt. # 41- 7 1 at 5. Specifically, Defendant argues that there is no employment relationship between 8 Chevron and K Bilg Corporation and it was never Plaintiff’s employer. Id. at 6. When 9 making a determination on the existence of an employment relationship, courts consider 10 factors such as who controlled the work to be performed by the individual, who paid 11 consideration for the work, and who treated the individual as an employee for tax purposes. 12 Buhr v. Stewart Title of Spokane, LLC, 176 Wn. App. 28, 37, 308 P.3d 712 (2013). 13 Because the Court must accept all alleged facts by Plaintiff as true and apply a 14 liberal standard given his pro se status, it is premature to determine the relationship 15 between Chevron and K Bilg Corporation absent discovery. The key fact is that Amarjit 16 Bilg’s work shirt bore the Chevron logo. Dkt. # 44 at 3. Defendant can resolve this factual 17 dispute by submitting evidence proving it has no relation to K Bilg Corporation. Until 18 then, it would be inappropriate to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC based on Defendant’s statements 19 alone.
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HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 1
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE
10 KIER KEAND’E GARDNER, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00622-RAJ 11 Plaintiff, ORDER 12 v. 13 CHEVRON, K BILG CORPORATION, 14 and AMARIT BILG,
15 Defendants.
17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 19 (“Defendant” or “Chevron”)’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. # 41-1. Plaintiff Kier Keand’e 20 Gardner (“Plaintiff”) filed a Response, to which Defendant replied. Dkt. ## 44; 45. 21 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 22 PART Defendant’s Motion. 23 II. BACKGROUND 24 This is an employment discrimination case based on allegations that Defendant 25 denied Plaintiff employment due to his race. All facts derive from Plaintiff’s Second 26 Amended Complaint (“SAC”). On August 6, 2023, Plaintiff received an application for 27 1 employment as a cashier from Defendant K Bilg Corporation doing business as Chevron 2 Corporation in Bellingham, Washington. Dkt. # 27-1 at 6. Three days later, Plaintiff 3 returned to the premises to submit his application. Id. The cashier refused to accept the 4 application, and she stated “yes” when Plaintiff asked her if she did not want to accept his 5 application because he was black. Id. 6 Plaintiff has since identified the cashier as Amarjit Bilg. Id. He originally named 7 Chevron Corporation, LS1-LLC, and the cashier, previously identified as “Jane Doe,” as 8 Defendants.1 Dkt. # 14. Upon receiving information about the relationship between the 9 parties from Lucky Singh, the registered agent of LS1-LLC, Plaintiff sought to (1) remove 10 LS1-LLC as a defendant, (2) identify the Jane Doe defendant as Amarjit Bilg, and (3) add 11 K Bilg Corporation as a party to this action. Dkt. # 28 at 2. Accordingly, the proper 12 Defendants are Chevron, Amarjit Bilg, and K Bilg Corporation. Dkt. # 27-1 at 2–3. 13 Plaintiff moved the Court to amend the summonses so he could serve the proper parties, 14 along with leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. ## 27, 28. The Court granted 15 his Motion. Dkt. # 29. 16 The SAC asserts causes of action for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 17 Rights Act, Section 1981, Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), and the 18 Bellingham Municipal Code. Dkt. # 27-1 at 3–4. Defendant moves to dismiss the SAC 19 for failure to state a claim. Dkt. # 41-1. 20 III. LEGAL STANDARD 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint for 22 failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The rule requires the court to assume the 23 truth of the complaint’s factual allegations and credit all reasonable inferences arising from 24 those allegations. Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2007). A court “need not 25 accept as true conclusory allegations that are contradicted by documents referred to in the 26
27 1 LS1-LLC is a limited liability company that leased the Chevron location in Bellingham from K Bilg Corporation. Dkt. # 27-1 at 4–5. 1 complaint.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2 2008). The plaintiff must point to factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is 3 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 568 (2007). If the plaintiff 4 succeeds, the complaint avoids dismissal if there is “any set of facts consistent with the 5 allegations in the complaint” that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. at 563; Ashcroft 6 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 7 A court typically cannot consider evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint, 8 although it may rely on a document to which the complaint refers if the document is central 9 to the party’s claims and its authenticity is not in question. Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 10 448 (9th Cir. 2006). A court may also consider evidence subject to judicial notice. United 11 States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). 12 Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must construe her “complaint[] liberally 13 even when evaluating it under the Iqbal standard.” Johnson v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 653 F.3d 14 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). 15 “Furthermore, ‘[l]eave to amend should be granted unless the pleading could not possibly 16 be cured by the allegation of other facts, and should be granted more liberally to pro se 17 plaintiffs.’” Id. (quoting McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 18 2004)). 19 IV. DISCUSSION 20 A. Federal and State Employment Discrimination Claims 21 Defendant first moves to dismiss the discrimination claims alleged in the SAC that 22 fall under state and federal law. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Section 1981 make 23 it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire an individual due to the potential employee’s 24 race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Messer v. Meno, 936 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D. Tex. 1996) 25 (finding that the elements of substantive claims of employment discrimination are the same 26 under both Section 1981 and Title VII) (overruled in part on other grounds). Similarly, the 27 WLAD prohibits an employer from refusing to hire any person because of their race. RCW 1 § 49.60.180(1). Title VII and the WLAD both require a plaintiff to plead that the defendant 2 subjected him to an adverse employment action. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 3 (9th Cir. 2000); Kinnune v. Washington, No. 2:23-cv-00026-MKD, 2024 WL 314994, at 4 *8 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2024). 5 Defendant posits that it is an improper party to this case, as Plaintiff does not allege 6 that Chevron took any action at all with respect to his employment application. Dkt. # 41- 7 1 at 5. Specifically, Defendant argues that there is no employment relationship between 8 Chevron and K Bilg Corporation and it was never Plaintiff’s employer. Id. at 6. When 9 making a determination on the existence of an employment relationship, courts consider 10 factors such as who controlled the work to be performed by the individual, who paid 11 consideration for the work, and who treated the individual as an employee for tax purposes. 12 Buhr v. Stewart Title of Spokane, LLC, 176 Wn. App. 28, 37, 308 P.3d 712 (2013). 13 Because the Court must accept all alleged facts by Plaintiff as true and apply a 14 liberal standard given his pro se status, it is premature to determine the relationship 15 between Chevron and K Bilg Corporation absent discovery. The key fact is that Amarjit 16 Bilg’s work shirt bore the Chevron logo. Dkt. # 44 at 3. Defendant can resolve this factual 17 dispute by submitting evidence proving it has no relation to K Bilg Corporation. Until 18 then, it would be inappropriate to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC based on Defendant’s statements 19 alone. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as it relates to 20 Plaintiff’s federal and state employment discrimination claims. 21 B. Municipal Employment Discrimination Claim 22 The Court summarily dismisses Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination under the 23 Bellingham Municipal Code. Bellingham Municipal Code 6.64.190 states that public 24 corporations cannot discriminate on the basis of race or color with respect to employment 25 or membership on the board of directors. Bellingham Mun. Code § 6.64.190 (emphasis 26 added). The Bellingham Municipal Code defines “public corporation” as a corporation, 27 commission, or authority organized under the Bellingham Municipal Code to improve 1 governmental efficiency and services. Id. at §§ 6.64.010; 6.64.020. Plaintiff never alleges 2 that Defendant is a public corporation as defined by the Bellingham Municipal Code. 3 Additionally, he concedes in his Response that this claim likely lacks merit. Dkt. # 44 at 4 2. The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as it relates to Plaintiff’s municipal 5 employment discrimination claim. 6 V. CONCLUSION 7 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 8 PART Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. # 41-1. Plaintiff’s discrimination claim under 9 the Bellingham Municipal Code is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 10 11 Dated this 10th day of September, 2025.
12 13 A 14
15 The Honorable Richard A. Jones 16 United States District Judge 17 18 19 e 20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27