Gardiner v. Davis

86 A. 176, 110 Me. 310, 1913 Me. LEXIS 24
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedMarch 29, 1913
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 86 A. 176 (Gardiner v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gardiner v. Davis, 86 A. 176, 110 Me. 310, 1913 Me. LEXIS 24 (Me. 1913).

Opinion

Whitehouse, C. J.

In this action the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract on the part of the defendants in refusing to accept and pay for a quantity of sweet corn grown by the plaintiff for the defendants, who were co-partners doing business under the firm name of the Portland Packing Company. The contract between the parties is in writing and contains the following provisions:

“Each of said subscribers will, during the season of 1911, plant with sweet corn raised from seed to be furnished by .said Portland Packing Company, at $4.00 per bushel, and properly cultivate- the quantity of land set against his name, and no more, and will, when the corn is in a green state, and in a suitable condition for canning, or at any time when ordered so to do, gather and deliver the com at the Company’s cannery at S'kowhegan.
“Each of said subscribers hereto agrees to deliver the CORN -at the said cannery in a perfectly tender condition, free from dry, tough, or hard ears, and if such ears are delivered, the Portland Canning Co. shall not be liable for the rejection of the entire load of which these ears are a part.
“Each of said subscribers hereby agrees that if he is once notified by man in charge to so deliver his corn, he is to assume all risks and deliver AEE his com in the condition above specified without further notification.”

The quantity of land cultivated by the plaintiff in pursuance of the contract was four acres.

It is not in controversy that prior to September 19, 1911, the defendants accepted 394 bushels of com delivered by the plaintiff [312]*312át their cannery in Skowhegan, and paid for the same according to the contract; and it is not denied by the defendants that they refused to accept the balance of 285 bushels raised by the plaintiff on the land in question. In their brief statement of special matters of defence, they state that “on the 14th day of September, 1911, there was an unusual, severe and unseasonable frost,- whereby the corn of the plaintiff was frozen and rendered unsuitable for canning purposes'.” They accordingly claim that by the terms of their contract, they were under no obligation to accept corn which was not “in a suitable condition for canning.”

The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff for $101.17, and the case comes to this court on the defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict as against the evidence. There are no exceptions pending, and there is no dispute between the counsel of the respective parties in relation to the law applicable to the case. The sole question before the court is'one of fact, and that is whether the plaintiff’s corn in question, at the time the defendants refused to accept it, “was in a suitable condition for canning,” having reference to the nature and purpose of the defendants’ whole enterprise and the manner in which their canning business was necessarily conducted.

The defendants maintain fourteen canning factories throughout the corn belt of the State, and have been engaged in the packing of corn for more than thirty years. It is not in controversy that on the night of the 13th, or the morning of the 14th of September, there was an unusually severe frost which affected the growing corn to a greater or less extent throughout the State. But whether the corn grown on land in a given locality was frost-bitten to a degree that rendered it unsuitable for canning, was a question to be determined upon the facts of that particular case; for it is obvious that there may be as many different degrees of frost and qualities and conditions of corn as there are tracts of land. It is therefore necessary to take into consideration, not only the direct testimony relating to the effect of the frost upon the leaves and spindles of corn and the apparent condition of the kernels of corn, during the two or three days after the frost, but the knowledge derived from long experience respecting the chemical changes that take place in corn that has been frost-bitten in different degrees, and- canned at varying periods of time after it is struck by the frost. As bearing [313]*313upon the probabilities of the severity of the frost and its effect upon the corn, in a given case, it is also important to consider whether the com was grown on high or low land, and if the weather was clear and cool or cloudy, and warm immediately after the frost; for it is an elementary principle in the science of physics that the atmosphere, rarified and made lighter by warmth, has a universal tendency to rise, while the colder and heavier air takes the lower position to which gravitation entitles it. Hence, it is a matter of familiar experience that the early frosts of autumn are more severe upon the low grounds than upon the neighboring hills, which are not only covered with warmer air, but are more exposed to the winds which prevent its stagnation.

Furthermore, it might not be, and ordinarily would not be possible for the defendants, with the factory operated to its full capacity, to can, in a single day, or in two or three days after a frost, all of the frost-bitten corn that might be offered by the contracting parties.

The plaintiff’s corn was growing on low land, about 2-1- miles below the village of Skowhegan. In his testimony, he says “It was planted on the intervale, on what is called the Lowe farm by the river. . . . The next morning after the frost I went down to the piece of corn, the first thing, about six o’clock, and examined it. The spindles and the leaves and the outer husks were chilled. I stripped some of the corn down and the inner leaves of the ears weren’t frozen any, and the corn apparently was all right. I couldn’t see where it had touched the corn. . . . The stalks were all right at that time. . . . The spindles and leaves, as 1 say, were frozen.” On cross examination, he says, “It was a severe frost;” and in answer to the question, “Did you ever know of a frost as heavy as this at that time in the season in your experience,” he says, “Well, I don’t know as I ever did.” He also admits that between Thursday, the morning of the frost, and the Saturday following “there had been some change in the appearance of the leaves and spindles.” “They were all bleached,” so that the entire field of corn looked whiter. But he says they continued to eat the corn in the family for a week or ten days after the frost as they had before, and “couldn’t see any difference.” He admits, how[314]*314ever, that he never had any experience in packing corn, and had no knowledge in regard to the effect of frost upon growing corn as far as suitability for canning was concerned.

The plaintiff’s testimony in regard to the bleaching of the leaves and husks of the corn, and the use of it on the table after the frost as well as before, was .corroborated by his hired man, and by the testimony of a neighbor that the outside of the plaintiff’s corn looked white in the field, but “the stalks were straight and green.”

No other witnesses were called by the plaintiff. No evidence was offered by him in relation to the chemical change in the corn caused by the action of the frost on the husks of the ear, or the suitability of the corn for canning purposes after it is frost-bitten. The burden was on the plaintiff to prove that his corn was suitable for canning. But he introduced no witness who had ever had experience in packing corn, or had ever tested the quality or condition of frost-bitten corn after it had been canned.

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Bluebook (online)
86 A. 176, 110 Me. 310, 1913 Me. LEXIS 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gardiner-v-davis-me-1913.