Garcia v. TDBBS, LLC

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 25, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00299
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LEONARDO GARCIA, Case No. 25-cv-00299-AMO

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. STAY DISCOVERY PENDING RESOLUTION OF MOTION TO 10 TDBBS, LLC, DISMISS 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. No. 28

12 13 Before the Court is Defendant TDBBS, LLC’s (“Barkworthies”) motion to stay discovery 14 pending resolution of its motion to dismiss. The matter is fully briefed and suitable for decision 15 without oral argument. Accordingly, the hearing set for June 26, 2025, was VACATED. ECF 30; 16 see Civil L.R. 7-1(b), Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 78(b). Having read the parties’ papers and carefully 17 considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court 18 hereby GRANTS Barkworthies’s motion to stay discovery for the following reasons. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff Leonardo Garcia brings five causes of action alleging that Barkworthies falsely 21 advertises several of its “bully sticks” dog chews as odor-free: (1) violation of California’s 22 Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”); (2) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law 23 (“UCL”); (3) violation of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”); (4) breach of express 24 warranty; and (5) unjust enrichment. See Compl. (ECF 1). On March 13, 2025, Barkworthies 25 filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim and lack of standing. See ECF 26 16. After the Court continued the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Barkworthies filed the instant 27 motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. ECF 28. Garcia opposes. 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) permits a court, upon showing of good cause, to 3 “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 4 burden or expense” by, inter alia, forbidding discovery, or by specifying limits on discovery. Fed. 5 R. Civ. Proc. 26(c)(1)(A)-(D). “Good cause for staying discovery may exist when the district 6 court is ‘convinced that the plaintiff will be unable to state a claim for relief.’ ” In re Nexus 6p 7 Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 17-CV-02185-BLF, 2017 WL 3581188, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2017) 8 (quoting Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002)). In determining whether to stay 9 discovery pending resolution of dispositive motions, courts in this District consider the following 10 two factors: (1) whether the pending motion is potentially dispositive of the entire case, or at least 11 dispositive on the issue at which discovery is directed, and (2) whether the pending dispositive 12 motion can be decided absent additional discovery. Micron Tech., Inc. v. Un. Microelectronics 13 Corp., No. 17-cv-06932-JSW, 2018 WL 7288018 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2018) (citing The 14 Pacific Lumber Co. v. Nat’l Un. Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 220 F.R.D 349, 352 (N.D. Cal. 15 2003)). “In applying the two-factor test, the court deciding the motion to stay must take a 16 ‘preliminary peek’ at the merits of the pending dispositive motion to assess whether a stay is 17 warranted.” Yamasaki v. Zicam LLC, No. 21-CV-02596-HSG, 2021 WL 3675214, at *1 (N.D. 18 Cal. Aug. 19, 2021) (citation omitted). 19 On the first factor of the Pacific Lumber test, Barkworthies filed a motion to dismiss, 20 raising arguments regarding failure to state any claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and standing. ECF 16. 21 If the Court grants Barkworthies’s motion in its entirety, it will dispose of all claims. 22 Barkworthies argues that “each of Plaintiff’s claims fail to state an actionable claim because . . . 23 Plaintiff’s uniquely personal experience . . . is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief 24 under any of his causes of action because it is not tied to the plain language of this Product’s 25 label.” Mot. at 3; see also Mot. Dismiss (ECF 16) at 4. Second, Barkworthies argues a stay is 26 warranted because “Barkworthies argues for complete dismissal on the grounds that the “odor 27 free” statement is nonactionable puffery.” Id. at 5. Finally, it argues that “Barkworthies raises 1 entire case or at a minimum significantly narrow the claims and thus the necessary discovery.” Id. 2 at 7-15. The Court, having taken a “preliminary peek” at Barkworthies’s motion, finds that the 3 motion to dismiss has the potential to be case dispositive. This is sufficient to meet the first factor. 4 Garcia resists this conclusion by arguing that the motion to dismiss fails as improperly 5 raising factual disputes and, if the motion to dismiss is granted, will likely result in amended 6 pleading pursuant to Rule 15. See Opp. (ECF 28) at 2-5. However, the inquiries into whether 7 Barkworthies’s Motion to Dismiss is ultimately successful and whether Plaintiff may be granted 8 leave to amend do not factor into this District’s Pacific Lumber factors. See Leonard v. CVS 9 Pharmacy, Inc., Case No. 25-cv-6280-EJD, 2025 WL 1266929, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2025); 10 Heck v. Amazon.com, Inc., Case No. 22-cv-03986-JSW, 2022 WL 16579372, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 11 Nov. 1, 2022) (rejecting nearly identical argument and explaining, “the fact that Plaintiff could 12 possibly remedy any deficient allegations with leave to amend is not germane to the question 13 before the Court on a motion to stay discovery: whether Defendants’ motion is potentially 14 dispositive of the entire case.”) (quoting Pac. Lumber Co., 220 F.R.D. at 351 (emphasis added)). 15 The Court finds Defendants’ motion is potentially dispositive of the entire case and concludes that 16 Defendants have satisfied the first prong of the test. 17 As to the second factor, Garcia “concedes that no further discovery is necessary to decide 18 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,” Opp. at 1 n.1, leaving no basis to reject Barkworthies’ motion 19 under the Pacific Lumber test. 20 Plaintiff further argues that Defendant fails to identify a particular and specific need to stay 21 discovery. Opp. at 5-7. Garcia fails to cite any authority that a “particular and specific need” to 22 stay discovery is a required showing for a defendant seeking a stay of discovery, and Garcia fails 23 to locate this requirement within the Pacific Lumber context. The Court therefore rejects Garcia’s 24 argument. 25 // 26 // 27 // 1 Wl. CONCLUSION 2 The Court finds in its discretion that both party and judicial resources will be most 3 efficiently used if discovery is stayed until the Court decides the pending motion to dismiss. 4 || Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to stay discovery. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: June 25, 2025 8 - 9 . ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN 10 United States District Judge 11 12

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