1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TERESA GARCIA, No. 1:20-cv-00850-MCE-JDP 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 14 SANOFI PASTEUR INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Teresa Garcia (“Plaintiff”) initiated this personal injury lawsuit against 18 Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (“Merck”), the manufacturer and distributer of the 19 Pneumovax® 23 (“Pneumovax 23”) pneumococcal disease vaccine, and Sanofi Pasteur 20 Inc. (“Sanofi”), the manufacturer of the Adacel® (“Adacel”) Tetanus, Diphtheria, 21 Pertussis (“TDaP”) vaccine, (collectively, “Defendants”) for injuries sustained following 22 her inoculation with both vaccines in April 2018. After she initially filed this action in state 23 Court, Merck removed it here and both Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were 24 granted with leave to amend. ECF Nos. 7, 15, 17. Plaintiff then filed a First Amended 25 Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 30, after which Defendants filed a second round of Motions 26 to Dismiss, which were granted as well, with final leave to amend. ECF No. 56. 27 /// 28 1 Plaintiff has now filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ECF No. 58, which 2 Defendants have again moved to dismiss, ECF Nos. 61-62. For the following reasons, 3 those Motions are GRANTED without leave to amend.1 4 5 STANDARD 6 7 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 8 Procedure 12(b)(6),2 all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 9 construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 10 Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain 11 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the 12 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 13 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 14 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 15 detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of 16 his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 17 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 18 quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 19 couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 20 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 21 above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & 22 Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the 23 pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a 24 suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)). 25 /// 26 1 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court declined to set a 27 hearing date and decides this matter on the briefs. E.D. Local Rule 230(g).
28 2 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 2 assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and 3 quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 4 to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 5 the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & 6 Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to 7 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their 8 claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” 9 Id. However, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that 10 actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and 11 unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 12 A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 13 grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 14 “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 15 to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of [the] 16 amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 17 Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 18 be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 19 merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 20 carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 21 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 22 “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest 23 Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 24 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th 25 Cir. 1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 26 constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 27 /// 28 /// 1 ANALYSIS 2 3 Very generally, Plaintiff contends that she suffered injury to her shoulder, resulting 4 in a tear to her rotator cuff and “frozen shoulder” after she received the Pneumovax 23 5 and Adacel vaccines. The bulk of the facts and analysis set forth in the Court’s prior 6 order, ECF No. 56, remain applicable to Plaintiff’s amended allegations in the SAC. 7 Accordingly, that Memorandum and Order is hereby incorporated by reference in its 8 entirety. 9 In that decision, this Court concluded that: (1) Plaintiff’s claims against Sonifi 10 were preempted to the extent that they were “based on Sinofi’s failure to warn [Plaintiff] 11 and other end users such as the general public”; (2) all of Plaintiff’s claims were barred 12 under the learned intermediary doctrine; (3) Plaintiff alleged that her injuries resulted 13 from shoulder injuries related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”), which is a well-known 14 side effect of the physical administration of the vaccine, so Defendants did not have a 15 duty to disclose; and (4) Plaintiff failed to adequately plead causation, namely that the 16 vaccines as opposed to their administration, could have caused the injuries to Plaintiff’s 17 shoulder. Id. at 9-11. In her SAC, Plaintiff left the bulk of her allegations untouched, but 18 now disclaims that her injuries are SIRVA-related.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TERESA GARCIA, No. 1:20-cv-00850-MCE-JDP 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 14 SANOFI PASTEUR INC., et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Teresa Garcia (“Plaintiff”) initiated this personal injury lawsuit against 18 Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. (“Merck”), the manufacturer and distributer of the 19 Pneumovax® 23 (“Pneumovax 23”) pneumococcal disease vaccine, and Sanofi Pasteur 20 Inc. (“Sanofi”), the manufacturer of the Adacel® (“Adacel”) Tetanus, Diphtheria, 21 Pertussis (“TDaP”) vaccine, (collectively, “Defendants”) for injuries sustained following 22 her inoculation with both vaccines in April 2018. After she initially filed this action in state 23 Court, Merck removed it here and both Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were 24 granted with leave to amend. ECF Nos. 7, 15, 17. Plaintiff then filed a First Amended 25 Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 30, after which Defendants filed a second round of Motions 26 to Dismiss, which were granted as well, with final leave to amend. ECF No. 56. 27 /// 28 1 Plaintiff has now filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ECF No. 58, which 2 Defendants have again moved to dismiss, ECF Nos. 61-62. For the following reasons, 3 those Motions are GRANTED without leave to amend.1 4 5 STANDARD 6 7 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 8 Procedure 12(b)(6),2 all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 9 construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 10 Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain 11 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the 12 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 13 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 14 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 15 detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of 16 his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 17 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 18 quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 19 couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 20 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 21 above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & 22 Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the 23 pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a 24 suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)). 25 /// 26 1 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court declined to set a 27 hearing date and decides this matter on the briefs. E.D. Local Rule 230(g).
28 2 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 2 assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and 3 quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 4 to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 5 the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & 6 Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to 7 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their 8 claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” 9 Id. However, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that 10 actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and 11 unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 12 A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 13 grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 14 “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 15 to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of [the] 16 amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 17 Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 18 be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 19 merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 20 carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 21 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 22 “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest 23 Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 24 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th 25 Cir. 1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 26 constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 27 /// 28 /// 1 ANALYSIS 2 3 Very generally, Plaintiff contends that she suffered injury to her shoulder, resulting 4 in a tear to her rotator cuff and “frozen shoulder” after she received the Pneumovax 23 5 and Adacel vaccines. The bulk of the facts and analysis set forth in the Court’s prior 6 order, ECF No. 56, remain applicable to Plaintiff’s amended allegations in the SAC. 7 Accordingly, that Memorandum and Order is hereby incorporated by reference in its 8 entirety. 9 In that decision, this Court concluded that: (1) Plaintiff’s claims against Sonifi 10 were preempted to the extent that they were “based on Sinofi’s failure to warn [Plaintiff] 11 and other end users such as the general public”; (2) all of Plaintiff’s claims were barred 12 under the learned intermediary doctrine; (3) Plaintiff alleged that her injuries resulted 13 from shoulder injuries related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”), which is a well-known 14 side effect of the physical administration of the vaccine, so Defendants did not have a 15 duty to disclose; and (4) Plaintiff failed to adequately plead causation, namely that the 16 vaccines as opposed to their administration, could have caused the injuries to Plaintiff’s 17 shoulder. Id. at 9-11. In her SAC, Plaintiff left the bulk of her allegations untouched, but 18 now disclaims that her injuries are SIRVA-related. She instead alleges that “[a]ny claims 19 that Plaintiff suffered, or is suffering, from SIRVA are hereby abandoned in this action.” 20 SAC, ECF No. 6 n.1. Despite abandoning any SIRVA claims, Plaintiff nonetheless 21 alleges that her type of injuries were known to Defendants because they have occurred 22 in individuals who sustained SIRVA-related injuries. Id. ¶¶ 39, 49. 23 Plaintiffs’ amended claims are still insufficiently pled. Plaintiff sets forth only 24 conclusory allegations indicating that her injuries were caused by the vaccines 25 themselves as opposed to by their administration. All of her supporting facts indicating 26 that her types of injuries should have been known and disclosed by Defendants turn on 27 the presence of SIRVA complaints going to vaccine administration. 28 /// 1 Plaintiff never explains how the vaccines themselves could result in a torn rotator cuff or 2 frozen shoulder. Nor does she explain how Defendants would have known about those 3 risks, rather than the risks attendant to improper administration. If Defendants were not 4 aware of vaccine-specific risks, they could not have warned against them. 5 Alternatively, and contradictorily, Plaintiff goes on to aver, however, that the 6 injuries she sustained should have been known to Defendants, given all of the SIRVA 7 complaints she identifies in her pleading and Defendants thus should have issued 8 warnings. See also Pl.’s Opp. to Merck Mot., ECF No. 67, at 1 (“Defendant knew or 9 reasonably should have known of the injuries Plaintiff suffered given widespread articles 10 and Federal Claims Court vaccine claims related to similar injuries resulting after 11 receiving Defendant’s vaccine.”). This Court previously determined that Plaintiff’s SIRVA 12 complaints were “well-known ailment[s] associated with the improper administration of a 13 vaccine,” thereby absolving Defendants of a duty to warn of those risks. ECF No. 56 at 14 10. But Plaintiff takes it a step further here. She contends that since the SIRVA-related 15 injuries are so well-known, Defendants were thus on notice that the vaccine could have 16 caused her similar injuries, which would not be well-known, and Defendants thus had a 17 duty to warn of the latter. The argument is circular inasmuch as it is tortured. 18 At base, Plaintiff’s allegations are unchanged; she just backs away from the 19 “SIRVA” label for her injuries. This does not work logically because she has not alleged 20 any facts to tie the vaccine itself to the damages she sustained. Nor can she allege that 21 Defendants should have been aware of a vaccine-related cause when she can only 22 identify administration-related claims that have previously been lodged. Accordingly, 23 Plaintiff’s new arguments are rejected for the reasons set forth herein, and the 24 arguments carrying over from her prior pleading are rejected for the reasons previously 25 stated by the Court and incorporated in this Memorandum and Order.3 26 3 There are multiple challenges to evidence and requests for to file additional briefing before the 27 Court. Because the Court evaluated only the four corners of the Complaint, none of those challenged filings were considered and any objections to their submission (e.g., Defendant’s Motion for Extension of 28 Time and for Leave to File a Response, ECF No. 73) are OVERRULED and/or DENIED as moot. 1 CONCLUSION 2 3 Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 61, 62) are each GRANTED without 4 | leave to amend. Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time is DENIED as moot. The 5 || Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. 6 IT |S SO ORDERED. 7 | Dated: September 10, 2024 ly Z 8 tp AOA, ° SENIOR UNITED STATES URTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28