Garcia v. McDowell

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 21, 2023
• Docket: 5:16-cv-05301
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ESEQUIEL GARCIA, Case No. 16-cv-05301-BLF (PR)

8 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 v. RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 10 NEIL MCDOWELL, Warden,

Respondent. 11

12 Before the Court is Petitioner’s post-judgment motion to “reconsider habeas decision 13 (Dkts. 87 & 88) Due Pending State Court Direct Attack on the Conviction and Stay Proceedings 14 Pursuant to Civil Rule 60.” Dkt No. 93. Rule 60 permits “the court [to] relieve a party . . . from a 15 final judgment, order, or proceeding” for a number of enumerated reasons that are inapplicable 16 here, as well as “any other reason that justifies relief.”1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) is 17 a catchall provision, and a party “seeking relief under [it] must show extraordinary circumstances 18 justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Henson v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 443- 19 44 (9th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). As explained below, Petitioner has not shown 20 extraordinary circumstances justifying relief. Therefore, his motion will be denied. 21 Discussion 22 Petitioner asks that these proceedings be stayed until the state court resolves a resentencing 23 petition he filed pursuant to California Penal Code § 1172.6. That statute provides that eligible 24 persons “may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s 25 murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any 26 remaining counts” when specified conditions applied. Cal. Penal Code § 1172.6(a). Petitioner 27 1 argues that a stay would promote judicial efficiency and comity because there exists a possibility 2 that the state proceedings would “moot … or significantly affect the resolution of [his federal] 3 claims.” Dkt No. 93 at 5-6. Respondent has not responded to Petitioner’s motion. 4 A. Younger Abstention is not Warranted 5 As a preliminary matter, the Court considers whether Younger abstention is warranted for 6 reasons of comity. Younger and its progeny “espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court 7 interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” 8 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assoc., 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); Younger v. 9 Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Supreme Court has “identified two sources for this policy: the 10 constraints of equity jurisdiction and the concern for comity in our federal system.” Gilbertson v. 11 Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2004). “Younger abstention permits federal courts to 12 preserve respect for state functions such that the national government protects federal rights and 13 interests in a way that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.” 14 Herrera v. City of Palmdale, 918 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted). 15 “Younger abstention is a jurisprudential rather than a jurisdictional question.” Kleenwell 16 Biohazard Waste & Gen. Ecology Consultants, Inc. v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 394 n.3 (9th Cir. 17 1995). To warrant Younger abstention, the state proceedings must (1) be “ongoing,” (2) 18 “implicate important state interests,” and (3) provide “an adequate opportunity ... to raise 19 constitutional challenges.” Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1044 (quoting Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). 20 In Duke v. Gastelo, 64 F.4th 1088 (9th Cir. 2023), the Ninth Circuit addressed whether 21 Younger abstention was warranted due to a pending § 1172.6 petition. In that case, the petitioner 22 filed his state resentencing petition and then, during its pendency, filed a federal habeas petition to 23 satisfy the statute of limitations. Id. at 1090-91. He also moved to stay his federal petition until 24 the state resentencing proceedings concluded. Id. at 1091. The lower court sua sponte determined 25 that Younger abstention was warranted, denied the motion to stay, and dismissed the petition 26 without prejudice. Id. at 1092. 27 On appeal, Ninth Circuit was tasked with determining “whether a federal habeas 1 Holding that it does not, the appellate court began its discussion by providing an overview of 2 § 1172.6:

3 California Penal Code § 1172.6 allows people convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences 4 doctrine to petition for resentencing if they could not currently be convicted of those offenses due to a change in state law that provides 5 “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” Cal. Penal Code § 188(a)(3). If a person is 6 prima facie eligible for § 1172.6 relief, the sentencing court must hold a hearing to determine whether the conviction should be vacated. Id. 7 § 1172.6(d)(1). At the hearing, the prosecution may rely on previously admitted evidence and has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable 8 doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder under current California law. Id. § 1172.6(b)–(d). The sentencing court must vacate the murder 9 conviction and enter a new sentence if it determines that the petitioner is entitled to § 1172.6 relief. Id. § 1172.6(d). 10 11 64 F.4th at 1091. 12 The court observed that the resentencing proceedings are limited in scope— “narrowly 13 focused on the statutory [resentencing] eligibility criteria.” Duke, 64 F.4th at 1091. As such, the 14 petitioner’s federal constitutional challenges would not be addressed therein, thereby negating the 15 third requirement for Younger abstention that there exist an adequate opportunity to litigate those 16 claims. Id. As the court explained, “where, as here, a state proceeding affords no opportunity for 17 a litigant to raise federal constitutional claims, Younger’s comity concerns do not come into play 18 because there is no risk that the federal court’s actions will evince an impermissible ‘presumption 19 that the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.’ ” Id. at 1095 (quoting 20 Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431). “Younger’s aim is to avoid interference with ongoing state-court 21 proceedings when the state court still has a chance to rule on federal claims.” Id. at 1096. But 22 because “Younger’s ‘adequate opportunity’ requirement is not satisfied, . . . Younger abstention 23 was not warranted.” Id. at 1098. 24 Here, as in Duke, Petitioner’s federal claims will not be at issue in the state resentencing 25 proceedings. For similar reasons, then, Younger abstention is not warranted in this case. 26 B. Petitioner’s Request for a Stay 27 1 As for Petitioner’s request for a stay, a Rhines / Kelly2 stay is unavailable because the 2 federal petition does not include unexhausted claims. See Duke, supra, 64 F.4th at 1098. 3 Nonetheless, a district court has discretionary power to stay proceedings in its own court under 4 Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). See Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 5 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005). 6 In Landis, the Supreme Court held that “the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the 7 power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy 8 of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” 299 U.S. at 254. To determine whether 9 a stay is appropriate, the court “must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” 10 Id. at 254–55. The competing interests include “the possible damage which may result from the 11 granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go 12 forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of 13 issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” CMAX, Inc. v. 14 Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55). “[I]f there is even a 15 fair possibility” that the stay will harm the non-moving party, the party seeking the stay “must 16 make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward.” Landis, 299 U.S. 17 at 255. To guide this balancing exercise, district courts consider: “(1) the stage of the litigation, 18 including whether discovery is or will be almost completed and whether the matter has been 19 marked for trial; (2) whether a stay will unduly prejudice or tactically disadvantage the nonmoving 20 party; and (3) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and streamline the trial, thereby 21 reducing the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court.” Oyster Optics, LLC v. Ciena 22 Corp., No. 20-cv-02354 JSW, 2021 WL 4027370, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2021). 23 As noted in this Court’s Order Denying Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 24 Corpus (Dkt No. 87), a jury convicted Petitioner of first degree murder and found true the special 25 circumstance of aiding and abetting. Dkt No. 56-9 at 235-36. In his state resentencing petition, 26 Petitioner argues that the special circumstance that was found true by the jury is not one of the 27 1 enumerated special circumstances under the recently revised California Penal Code § 190.2(a). 2 Accordingly, Petitioner asks the state court to vacate his sentence of life without the possibility of 3 parole and resentence him. He asserts here that “the outcome of [the state] proceedings may moot 4 the instant habeas proceeding or significantly affect the resolution of the claims.” Dkt No. 93 at 5. 5 On balance, the Court does not find that a stay is warranted. For one, judgment has 6 already been entered in this case. “An early stay may save the parties and the Court from 7 unnecessarily expending significant resources. A stay later in the proceedings will likely produce 8 less benefit and increase the possibility of prejudice.” Largan Precision Co. v. Motorola Mobility 9 LLC., No. 21-CV-09138-JSW, 2022 WL 2954935, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2022). The 10 proceedings at this Court have concluded after Petitioner’s claims were denied in their entirety; he 11 has now appealed from the judgment. As there is no likelihood that a stay would benefit either the 12 parties or this Court from unnecessarily expending significant resources, this factor weighs against 13 granting a stay. 14 Second, neither party will be unduly prejudiced or tactically disadvantaged by either the 15 grant or denial of a stay. Respondent has already filed a response to Petitioner’s habeas petition, 16 and judgment has already been entered. In addition, none of Petitioner’s claims will be forfeited if 17 a stay is not granted. Cf. Duke, 64 F.4th at 1099 (“The federal constitution guarantees Duke one 18 shot at federal review of the state courts’ resolution of his federal claims, and that right may be 19 forever lost if Duke’s petition is dismissed rather than stayed.”) This factor does not favor a stay, 20 either. 21 Lastly, the Court is unconvinced that these federal proceedings may be mooted by the state 22 court’s resolution of Petitioner’s resentencing petition. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief 23 because he was charged with murder under a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person 24 based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Cal. Penal Code § 1172.6(a). But 25 according to the jury instructions, Petitioner was charged with murder in the first degree as an 26 aider and abettor, not under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences 27 doctrine. Dkt No. 56-9 at 166-68. To find Petitioner guilty of first degree murder based on aiding 1 purpose and he or she specifically intend[ed] to, and [did] in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, 2 || encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” Dkt No. 56-9 at 198. That is, 3 before Petitioner could be found subject to a special circumstance, the jury was required to find 4 that he had the intent to kill. See People v. Padilla, 11 Cal.4th 891, 933 (1995). The evidence 5 supported such a finding, as discussed in this Court’s Order Denying Second Amended Petition 6 || for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 7 In addition, Petitioner is unlikely to show that he could not now be convicted under the 8 || revised sentencing laws. “Under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(1), a defendant is subject to the 9 [financial gain] special circumstance if the ‘murder was intentional and carried out for financial 10 gain.’ Even if the defendant 1s ‘not the actual killer,’ if that defendant ‘with the intent to kill, aids, 11 abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the commission of 12 || murder in the first degree,’ he or she 1s also subject to this special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. 5 13 (c).) ‘Reading the two provisions together it is clear that one who intentionally aids or encourages 14 a person in the deliberate killing of another for the killer’s own financial gain is subject to the 3 15 special circumstance punishment.’ ” People v. Fayed, 9 Cal.5th 147, 201-02 (2020). Because the a 16 || evidence supports a finding that Petitioner solicited the victim’s murder, thereby resulting in a 3 17 financial gain to the actual killer (Lucio Estrada), there exists a likelihood that he can now be 18 convicted under the revised sentencing laws. Accordingly, the Court finds that a stay is not 19 || warranted. 20 Conclusion 21 Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s Rule 60 motion, Dkt No. 93, is DENIED. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: June 21, 2023 24 felicia 6 BETH LABSON FREEMAN United States District Judge 27 28