24CA1386 Garcia v Jefferson County 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1386 Jefferson County District Court No. 24CV30089 Honorable Andrew C. Poland, Judge Honorable Meegan A. Miloud, Judge
Joanne Garcia,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jefferson County R-1 School District,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE TOW Lum and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Bachus & Schanker, LLC, Scot C. Kreider, Corey A. Holton, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Caplan and Earnest LLC, Justin H. Miller, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellee ¶1 Plaintiff, Joanne Garcia, appeals the district court’s judgment
dismissing her negligence action against defendant, Jefferson
County R-1 School District (the District). She also appeals the
court’s post-dismissal order granting the District’s request for
attorney fees. We affirm the judgment and the order.
I. Background
¶2 The following facts are taken from Garcia’s complaint.
¶3 Garcia fell and injured herself when she tripped over a
two-inch protruding steel stanchion embedded in the floor of a
middle school gym’s doorway in the District. The purpose of a
stanchion is to secure a door mullion. A mullion is a vertical steel
bar in the middle of a double doorway, which allows the double
doors to be locked or secured. It is designed to be removable,
however, which permits use of the entire width of the doorway.
¶4 The mullion had been removed from the doorway of the gym to
allow students to move large instruments into the gym in
preparation for a band concert that day. The District failed to
replace the mullion before arrival of guests for the band
performance. Garcia tripped on the stanchion and was injured.
1 ¶5 Garcia sued the District under the Colorado Premises Liability
Act, § 13-21-115, C.R.S. 2025, and in the alternative brought a
negligence claim. The District moved to dismiss the complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1),
contending that it was immune from liability under the Colorado
Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S.
2025. Garcia sought discovery on the jurisdictional issue. The
district court denied Garcia’s request for discovery and granted the
District’s motion to dismiss.
¶6 The District moved for an award of $23,023.25 in attorney fees
under section 13-17-201, C.R.S. 2025, which the court awarded.
II. Motion to Dismiss
¶7 Garcia contends that the district court erred by dismissing her
complaint. We discern no error.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶8 The applicability of immunity under the CGIA is an issue of
subject matter jurisdiction to be determined by the district court in
accordance with C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271,
276 (Colo. 1995); Young v. Jefferson Cnty. Sheriff, 2012 COA 185,
¶ 7. “When the alleged jurisdictional facts are in dispute, the trial
2 court should conduct an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the
jurisdictional issue.” Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 25 P.3d 1176, 1180
(Colo. 2001). But where, as here, the relevant facts are undisputed,
the issue of governmental immunity is one of law, and the district
court may rule on the jurisdictional issue without an evidentiary
hearing.1 Id. In such a case, we review the district court’s
jurisdictional ruling de novo. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83
P.3d 75, 81 (Colo. 2003).
¶9 A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction exists,
so, in the context of the CGIA, it must demonstrate that immunity
has been waived. Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colorado Springs,
1 Although Garcia requested discovery on factual issues such as
whether doors were locked, when guests and students arrived, and when the mullion was removed, she did not request discovery on the design of the mullion-stanchion mechanism. In fact, she concedes that the mullion was designed to be removable. See Herrera v. City & County of Denver, 221 P.3d 423, 428 (Colo. App. 2009) (concluding that the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the city and county was immune under the CGIA from suit arising from a collision between a motorist’s vehicle and a snowplow, inasmuch as the city and county did not contend on appeal that a factual question existed as to whether the snowplow met the statutory definition of “motor vehicle,” and the issue of whether the snowplow could be a “motor vehicle” was one of law). Thus, no evidentiary hearing was required regarding the design of the door.
3 2018 CO 10, ¶ 21. Because the CGIA “derogates Colorado’s
common law,” we strictly construe its immunity provisions, but we
broadly construe its waiver provisions “in the interest of
compensating victims of governmental negligence.” Id. at ¶ 22.
¶ 10 Further, to the extent our review depends on an interpretation
of the CGIA, we review such questions de novo. See Springer v. City
& County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798-99 (Colo. 2000). Our primary
purpose when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to
the General Assembly’s intent. Id. at 799. We look first to the
statute’s language, giving words and phrases their plain and
ordinary meanings. Id. If the statute is unambiguous, we need not
conduct any further statutory analysis. Id.
¶ 11 Under the CGIA, public entities are generally immune from
liability in “all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort.”
§ 24-10-106(1), C.R.S. 2025. However, sovereign immunity is
waived in actions for injuries that resulted from “[a] dangerous
condition of any public building.” § 24-10-106(1)(c). A dangerous
condition is
either a physical condition of a facility or the use thereof that constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which
4 is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity or public employee in constructing or maintaining such facility.
§ 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. 2025. The supreme court has interpreted
this definition as creating a four-part test. St. Vrain Valley Sch.
Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, ¶ 16 (citing Springer, 13 P.3d
at 799). A dangerous condition exists when a plaintiff establishes
that their injuries occurred because of (1) the physical condition of
the public facility or use thereof, (2) which constituted an
unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, (3) which
was known to exist or should have been known to exist in the
exercise of reasonable care, and (4) which was proximately caused
by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing
or maintaining such facility. Id.
¶ 12 A dangerous condition “shall not exist solely because the
design of any facility is inadequate.” § 24-10-103(1.3). Thus, as a
threshold jurisdictional matter, a plaintiff must show that the
dangerous condition arose due to governmental conduct, or lack
thereof, in constructing or maintaining the condition, and not due
5 to the design alone. Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d
1380, 1384 (Colo. 1997).
¶ 13 Maintenance is defined as “the act or omission of a public
entity or public employee in keeping a facility in the same general
state of repair or efficiency as initially constructed or in preserving a
facility from decline or failure.” § 24-10-103(2.5). Further,
maintenance does not include any duty to “modernize, modify, or
improve the design or construction of [the] facility.” Id. By
contrast, to design is “to conceive or plan out in the mind.”
Swieckowski, 934 P.2d at 1386 (citing Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 611 (1986)).
¶ 14 Based on these definitions, an injury is the result of negligent
maintenance when a dangerous condition “is allowed to develop
subsequent to the initial design and construction,” whereas an
injury is the result of negligent design when the dangerous
condition is “inherent in the design itself and is allowed to persist to
the time of the injury.” Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 456 (Colo.
2001). The scope of the public entity’s duty, and the associated
waiver, must therefore be measured by comparing the original
condition of the facility to the condition of the facility when the
6 injury occurred. Id. at 448-49. “Only after making this
determination can [we] ascertain whether the dangerous condition
. . . developed through a lack of maintenance subsequent to the
initial design and construction of the [facility], and thus, whether
immunity has been waived.” Id. at 449.
B. Analysis
¶ 15 Garcia concedes “that the facts are undisputed with respect to
the nature of the door system and its intended uses.” She alleged
in her complaint that the mullion was removeable and, when it was
removed, the two-inch stanchion protruded up from the floor into
the doorway. The district court concluded that, if removal of the
mullion created a dangerous condition by exposing the two-inch
stanchion, the condition arose solely from inadequate design and
not from the District’s failure to maintain the door. Based on
Garcia’s complaint, we agree with this conclusion and reject
Garcia’s arguments to the contrary.
¶ 16 As an initial matter, we agree with the District that Garcia did
not preserve her argument that it had a “ministerial” obligation to
eliminate the trip hazard posed by the exposed stanchion because
she never made this argument in the district court. Thus, we do
7 not address it. See Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2019
COA 11, ¶ 21 (“It is axiomatic that in civil cases, issues not raised
in or decided by the trial court generally will not be addressed for
the first time on appeal.”). Instead, we turn to her preserved
arguments.
¶ 17 Garcia contends that the mullion-stanchion mechanism exists
in two states of efficiency. In one state, the mullion is in place and
the double doors latch and lock. In the second state, the mullion is
removed and the stanchion protrudes.2 She contends that by
leaving the mullion-stanchion mechanism in the latter state of
efficiency, the District failed to “maintain” the door in “the same
general state of . . . efficiency as initially constructed.” We disagree.
¶ 18 But nothing in the record suggests whether the “original” state
of efficiency was with the mullion in place or removed.3 Moreover,
we do not read “the same general state of . . . efficiency as initially
constructed” as imposing a “maintenance” obligation on the District
2 Notably, Garcia does not allege that when the mullion is removed,
the stanchion is supposed to be removed or altered in some other manner so that it does not protrude in a dangerous way. 3 It does not appear that Garcia’s outstanding discovery requests
would have answered this question.
8 to default to one use of the design over the other. § 24-10-103(2.5).
Rather, as noted, the District is only liable for failing to “maintain”
with respect to a condition if that condition arose subsequent to the
initial design of the door. See Medina, 35 P.3d at 456.
¶ 19 Garcia argues that removal of the mullion created a condition
of the facility (or, perhaps more accurately, was a use thereof),
which was such a subsequently occurring condition. But her
argument proves too much because it essentially means any use of
a design that involves two possible states of efficiency constitutes
maintenance. This would essentially swallow the design exception
altogether.
¶ 20 Garcia also contends that the district court broadly construed
the word “design” to encompass not only the “conception” of the
door, but also all conduct of the District that arguably falls within
the scope of the design’s function. She further argues that by so
concluding, the district court read “solely” out of the part of the
CGIA that provides that a dangerous condition “shall not exist
solely because the design of any facility is inadequate.”
§ 24-10-103(1.3) (emphasis added). In essence Garcia’s argument
is that, even though the design allowed for removal of the mullion,
9 the District was negligent for allowing the public to use the door
with the mullion removed and the stanchion exposed.4
¶ 21 But the District used this function of the door specifically as it
was designed. The mullion was removed — as it was designed to
be — so large instruments could be moved into the gym; it was not
removed for the purpose of cleaning, repairing, or otherwise
performing any maintenance on the mullion, the stanchion, or the
door. Thus, contrary to Garcia’s contention, the condition (and use)
of the mullion-stanchion mechanism at the time of her injury
existed solely because of the door’s design.
¶ 22 Alternatively, Garcia contends that the district court’s order
can be read as requiring some degradation from the “as designed”
state in order to trigger the District’s maintenance obligation. We
do not read the district court’s order to say that. The district court
correctly recited the definition of maintenance in its order, and its
subsequent analysis of whether the dangerous condition developed
because of the District’s lack of maintenance did not concern
4 It is difficult to distinguish Garcia’s argument from a contention
that the stanchion is a dangerous condition because it protrudes two inches above the floor when the mullion is removed — which is clearly a condition that is solely related to the design of the door.
10 whether the door had degraded or not. Rather, the court correctly
found that the “exposed stanchion did not arise from a condition of
the doorway that arose subsequent to the initial design but, rather
was a design choice that persisted to the time of injury.”
¶ 23 In short, human intervention caused the mullion to be
removed. This intervention can be seen as either part of the
mullion-stanchion design or not. If it is, then the situation was
“solely” a result of the design and immunity applies. If it is not,
then Garcia needed to show that the removal was a function of
either negligent construction or maintenance, which she did not.5
¶ 24 Thus, the district court did not err by granting the motion to
dismiss.
5 We reject Garcia’s argument that, in light of the district court’s
restriction on discovery, it is premature to resolve the issue of whether the removal of the mullion fell within the definition of maintenance. None of the requested discovery for, as Garcia describes it in her opening brief, the “design specifications of the doorway system” or the “policies and procedures related to removal” of the mullion would have further illuminated that issue. Moreover, the record sufficiently demonstrates that the mullion removal was not a maintenance function.
11 III. Attorney Fees
¶ 25 Garcia contends that the district court erred by awarding the
full amount of the District’s attorney fees. We discern no error.
A. Additional Background
¶ 26 After the district court dismissed the complaint, the District
moved for an award of $23,023.25 in attorney fees under section
13-17-201. After both parties briefed the issue, the district court
held an evidentiary hearing and awarded the District its requested
attorney fees.
¶ 27 The court found that the hourly rates for defendants’ attorneys
were reasonable based on their expertise and experience, and that
the hours they expended were reasonable. The court multiplied the
rates by the hours expended to calculate $23,023.25 in attorney
fees. The court then made findings as to why it was not making
any adjustments to that amount, including that the amount of time
spent was reasonable, this is a specialty area of law, this case
precluded other work, the rates were customary in the locality, and
the amount of purported damages was high and the results
obtained were significant.
12 B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 28 An award of attorney fees under section 13-17-201 is
mandatory when a district court dismisses an action under
C.R.C.P. 12(b). Crandall v. City of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo.
2010); US Fax L. Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 205 P.3d 512, 517
(Colo. App. 2009). But the award of attorney fees under the statute
must be reasonable. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys.,
262 P.3d 991, 998 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 29 We review the reasonableness of an attorney fees award for an
abuse of discretion. Planning Partners Int’l, LLC v. QED, Inc., 2013
CO 43, ¶ 12. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, and we will not
overturn a district court’s determination of a reasonable attorney
fees award unless it is patently erroneous and unsupported by the
evidence. Id.
¶ 30 A district court makes an initial estimate of reasonable
attorney fees by calculating the lodestar amount, which represents
the number of hours reasonably expended on the case, multiplied
by a reasonable hourly rate. Payan v. Nash Finch Co., 2012 COA
135M, ¶ 18. The court’s calculation of the lodestar amount carries
13 with it a strong presumption of reasonableness. Id. The district
court then has discretion to make upward or downward
adjustments to the lodestar amount based on factors including the
amount in controversy, the length of time required to represent the
client effectively, the complexity of the case, the value of the legal
services to the client, and awards in similar cases. Tallitsch v. Child
Support Servs., Inc., 926 P.2d 143, 147 (Colo. App. 1996); Colo. RPC
1.5.
C. Analysis
¶ 31 Garcia contends that the district court failed to make factual
findings related to the number of hours expended by the District’s
lawyers on its motion to dismiss. We disagree.
¶ 32 The district court’s calculation of the lodestar amount carries
with it a presumption of reasonableness, and its findings as to why
it was not adjusting that amount upward or downward followed the
required criteria: the time and labor required, the complexity of the
action, that the work precluded other employment, the customary
practice in the legal community regarding fees in similar cases, the
amount in controversy involved and the results obtained, the
14 experience of the lawyers, and the value of the legal services to the
client. See Colo. RPC 1.5(a)(1).
¶ 33 Moreover, in conjunction with discussing these factors, the
court specifically found at the hearing that the time spent by the
District’s lawyers was appropriate given the type of motion, which
involved a specialty area of law that required a significant amount
of research, evidence review, and site visits to properly brief.
¶ 34 Accordingly, we find no merit in Garcia’s argument that the
district court failed to make factual findings related to the number
of hours expended by the District’s lawyers on its motion to
dismiss. Thus, the district court did not err by awarding the
District $23,023.25 in attorney fees.
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 35 The District requests its appellate attorney fees under section
13-17-201.
¶ 36 A party that successfully defends an appeal of an action that
was dismissed on a pretrial motion to dismiss under the CGIA is
entitled to recover its reasonable appellate attorney fees under
section 13-17-201. Wark v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 47 P.3d 711, 717
(Colo. App. 2002). The District has prevailed on appeal, so we grant
15 its request. Creekside Endodontics, LLC v. Sullivan, 2022 COA 145,
¶ 54. Because the district court is better suited to conduct any
factfinding necessary to determine the reasonableness and
necessity of the fees, we exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1
and remand the case to the district court to determine the amount
of the District’s reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.
V. Disposition
¶ 37 The judgment and order are affirmed, and the case is
remanded to the district court to determine the amount of the
District’s reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.
JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.