25CA1045 Garcia v ICAO 01-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1045 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 27609-2024
Danielle Garcia,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and JF & G Investments LP,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026
Danielle Garcia, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Campbell Killin Brittan & Ray LLC, Phillip A. Parrott, Lara W. Gabrys, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent JF & G Investments LP ¶1 Danielle Garcia appeals the denial of her claim for
unemployment benefits. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Garcia waited tables at Great Scott’s Eatery 2 (Employer) for
approximately two years until Employer terminated her
employment. Shortly thereafter, a deputy for the Division of
Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied Garcia’s claim for
unemployment benefits. Garcia appealed that decision, and the
Division scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding
the reasons for Garcia’s job separation.
¶3 Upon reviewing the evidence introduced at the hearing, the
hearing officer found that Employer terminated Garcia for
“performance and attendance concerns,” failing “to follow
[Employer’s] policies and procedures relating to reports of alleged
harassment,” and failing to obey a reasonable instruction.
¶4 The hearing officer ruled that Garcia was disqualified from
receiving benefits pursuant to section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI), C.R.S.
2025 (disqualifying claimants terminated for deliberate
disobedience of a reasonable instruction). When Garcia reported
sexual harassment, the hearing officer determined, she deliberately
1 refused a reasonable instruction to provide details regarding the
allegations.
¶5 The hearing officer also ruled that Garcia was disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to section 8-73-
108(5)(e)(VII) (disqualifying claimants terminated for violating a
company rule, where such violation could have resulted in serious
damage to the employer’s interests). Specifically, the hearing officer
found that Employer’s “policies require all employees . . . to
immediately report any incident of harassment including sexual
harassment,” and Garcia deferred reporting alleged harassment for
seven months. The hearing officer found that Garcia’s delay in
reporting “could have caused damage to [Employer’s] interests.”
Lastly, because the hearing officer determined that Garcia was at
fault for her job termination, she wasn’t otherwise entitled to receive
benefits.
¶6 Garcia appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Panel,
which affirmed.
2 II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
¶7 Under section 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2025, we may not disturb
factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and may only
set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in
excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the
factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision is
erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is “probative,
credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a
reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular
finding.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App.
1977).
¶8 Section 8-73-108(5)(e) provides that a claimant shall be
disqualified from receiving benefits if her employment separation
occurred for “any” of several specifically enumerated reasons. See
M&A Acquisition Corp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2019 COA 173,
¶ 21. It is well established that “the statute contemplates that
hearing officers and the Panel will consider all potentially applicable
. . . disqualifying provisions.” Id. at ¶ 14. To determine what
caused a claimant’s job termination, the hearing officer considers
3 the totality of the evidence. Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775
P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989).
¶9 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)’s disqualification provisions “must be
read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide benefits
to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their own.”
Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo. App.
1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the hearing officer’s
findings may support a conclusion that the employee engaged in
conduct described in section 8-73-108(5)(e), a claimant may still be
entitled to benefits if the totality of the circumstances establishes
that her job separation occurred through no fault of her own. Id.
In this context, “fault” requires a volitional act or “the exercise of
some control or choice by the claimant in the circumstances
resulting in the separation such that the claimant can be said to be
responsible for the separation.” Id. A claimant’s responsibility or
“fault” for her job separation is an ultimate legal conclusion to be
based on the established findings of evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.
B. Disqualification Under Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI)
¶ 10 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI) disqualifies a claimant from
receiving benefits if her employment was terminated for “[d]eliberate
4 disobedience of a reasonable instruction of an employer or an
employer’s duly authorized representative.” In determining the
reasonableness of an employer’s instruction, the hearing officer
applies an objective standard. Rose Med. Ctr. Hosp. Ass’n v. Indus.
Claim Appeals Off., 757 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Colo. App. 1988).
¶ 11 The hearing officer found (and the Panel affirmed) that, in July
2024, Garcia “alluded” to Employer’s accountant, Richard Acker,
that a manager had sexually harassed her. The hearing officer also
found that when the owner and her supervisors followed up and
asked Garcia to provide additional details — including the specific
behavior at issue — she refused. Garcia doesn’t challenge either
finding, and substantial evidence supports both.
¶ 12 At the hearing, Acker testified that, on July 17, 2024, Garcia
mentioned to him multiple “instances” involving the then-general
manager, Wyatt Abrams, behaving inappropriately toward her.
However, Acker explained, Garcia provided him no examples or
other details of that behavior. Also at the hearing, the owner, Carla
Abrams, and managers Areceli Arambula and Patrick Powers, all
testified that they attended a meeting on July 31, 2024, in which
Ms. Abrams attempted to investigate the allegations Garcia reported
5 to Acker. All three witnesses testified that Garcia refused to provide
any further account of the alleged harassment — she would not
identify any specific behavior in connection with her general
harassment allegations.
¶ 13 Substantial evidence further supports the hearing officer’s
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
25CA1045 Garcia v ICAO 01-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1045 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 27609-2024
Danielle Garcia,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and JF & G Investments LP,
Respondents.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Grove and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026
Danielle Garcia, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Campbell Killin Brittan & Ray LLC, Phillip A. Parrott, Lara W. Gabrys, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent JF & G Investments LP ¶1 Danielle Garcia appeals the denial of her claim for
unemployment benefits. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Garcia waited tables at Great Scott’s Eatery 2 (Employer) for
approximately two years until Employer terminated her
employment. Shortly thereafter, a deputy for the Division of
Unemployment Insurance (Division) denied Garcia’s claim for
unemployment benefits. Garcia appealed that decision, and the
Division scheduled the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding
the reasons for Garcia’s job separation.
¶3 Upon reviewing the evidence introduced at the hearing, the
hearing officer found that Employer terminated Garcia for
“performance and attendance concerns,” failing “to follow
[Employer’s] policies and procedures relating to reports of alleged
harassment,” and failing to obey a reasonable instruction.
¶4 The hearing officer ruled that Garcia was disqualified from
receiving benefits pursuant to section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI), C.R.S.
2025 (disqualifying claimants terminated for deliberate
disobedience of a reasonable instruction). When Garcia reported
sexual harassment, the hearing officer determined, she deliberately
1 refused a reasonable instruction to provide details regarding the
allegations.
¶5 The hearing officer also ruled that Garcia was disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to section 8-73-
108(5)(e)(VII) (disqualifying claimants terminated for violating a
company rule, where such violation could have resulted in serious
damage to the employer’s interests). Specifically, the hearing officer
found that Employer’s “policies require all employees . . . to
immediately report any incident of harassment including sexual
harassment,” and Garcia deferred reporting alleged harassment for
seven months. The hearing officer found that Garcia’s delay in
reporting “could have caused damage to [Employer’s] interests.”
Lastly, because the hearing officer determined that Garcia was at
fault for her job termination, she wasn’t otherwise entitled to receive
benefits.
¶6 Garcia appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Panel,
which affirmed.
2 II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
¶7 Under section 8-74-107, C.R.S. 2025, we may not disturb
factual findings “supported by substantial evidence” and may only
set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel acted without or in
excess of its powers; (2) the decision was procured by fraud; (3) the
factual findings don’t support its decision; or (4) the decision is
erroneous as a matter of law. Substantial evidence is “probative,
credible, and competent, of a character which would warrant a
reasonable belief in the existence of facts supporting a particular
finding.” Rathburn v. Indus. Comm’n, 566 P.2d 372, 373 (Colo. App.
1977).
¶8 Section 8-73-108(5)(e) provides that a claimant shall be
disqualified from receiving benefits if her employment separation
occurred for “any” of several specifically enumerated reasons. See
M&A Acquisition Corp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2019 COA 173,
¶ 21. It is well established that “the statute contemplates that
hearing officers and the Panel will consider all potentially applicable
. . . disqualifying provisions.” Id. at ¶ 14. To determine what
caused a claimant’s job termination, the hearing officer considers
3 the totality of the evidence. Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 775
P.2d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 1989).
¶9 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)’s disqualification provisions “must be
read in light of the express legislative intent . . . to provide benefits
to those who become unemployed through ‘no fault’ of their own.”
Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo. App.
1998) (quoting § 8-73-108(1)(a)). Thus, even if the hearing officer’s
findings may support a conclusion that the employee engaged in
conduct described in section 8-73-108(5)(e), a claimant may still be
entitled to benefits if the totality of the circumstances establishes
that her job separation occurred through no fault of her own. Id.
In this context, “fault” requires a volitional act or “the exercise of
some control or choice by the claimant in the circumstances
resulting in the separation such that the claimant can be said to be
responsible for the separation.” Id. A claimant’s responsibility or
“fault” for her job separation is an ultimate legal conclusion to be
based on the established findings of evidentiary fact. Id. at 618-19.
B. Disqualification Under Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI)
¶ 10 Section 8-73-108(5)(e)(VI) disqualifies a claimant from
receiving benefits if her employment was terminated for “[d]eliberate
4 disobedience of a reasonable instruction of an employer or an
employer’s duly authorized representative.” In determining the
reasonableness of an employer’s instruction, the hearing officer
applies an objective standard. Rose Med. Ctr. Hosp. Ass’n v. Indus.
Claim Appeals Off., 757 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Colo. App. 1988).
¶ 11 The hearing officer found (and the Panel affirmed) that, in July
2024, Garcia “alluded” to Employer’s accountant, Richard Acker,
that a manager had sexually harassed her. The hearing officer also
found that when the owner and her supervisors followed up and
asked Garcia to provide additional details — including the specific
behavior at issue — she refused. Garcia doesn’t challenge either
finding, and substantial evidence supports both.
¶ 12 At the hearing, Acker testified that, on July 17, 2024, Garcia
mentioned to him multiple “instances” involving the then-general
manager, Wyatt Abrams, behaving inappropriately toward her.
However, Acker explained, Garcia provided him no examples or
other details of that behavior. Also at the hearing, the owner, Carla
Abrams, and managers Areceli Arambula and Patrick Powers, all
testified that they attended a meeting on July 31, 2024, in which
Ms. Abrams attempted to investigate the allegations Garcia reported
5 to Acker. All three witnesses testified that Garcia refused to provide
any further account of the alleged harassment — she would not
identify any specific behavior in connection with her general
harassment allegations.
¶ 13 Substantial evidence further supports the hearing officer’s
finding that Employer discharged Garcia, in part, for failing to obey
Abrams’s request for basic details concerning the allegations.
Indeed, Abrams, Arambula, and Powers all testified that Employer
discharged Garcia immediately following her refusal to provide the
requested information.
¶ 14 Finally, Garcia does not challenge — and we perceive no error
in — the hearing officer’s findings that (1) Employer’s request for
details was objectively reasonable; and (2) in refusing to provide the
requested details, Garcia exercised control over the circumstances
surrounding her discharge and was therefore at fault for the same.
C. Additional Issues
¶ 15 Garcia makes multiple arguments relating to her
disqualification under subsection (5)(e)(VII). However, because we
perceive no basis to disturb the disqualification under subsection
6 (5)(e)(VI), we need not and do not reach Garcia’s arguments
regarding subsection (5)(e)(VII).1
¶ 16 Garcia also indicates that the hearing officer failed to reference
the hearing transcript in her order. However, Garcia provides no
legal authority for the proposition that the hearing officer erred in
this respect, and we discern no such requirement in the applicable
statutes and regulations. Thus, we reject this argument.
¶ 17 We similarly reject Garcia’s argument that the hearing officer
erred by failing to address all hearing testimony in her order. The
hearing officer didn’t have any obligation to do so. See Tilley v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 924 P.2d 1173, 1177 (Colo. App. 1996) (A
hearing officer need not address “specific evidence . . . [that] he or
she does not find persuasive.”).
1 Though the hearing officer found that Employer fired Garcia for
three infractions (i.e., (1) performance and attendance concerns; (2) failure to comply with policies regarding reporting sexual harassment; and (3) failing to obey a reasonable instruction), she determined that subsection (5)(e)’s disqualification factors covered only two of those infractions. Nonetheless, the hearing officer ruled that Garcia was entirely disqualified from receiving benefits, and the Panel affirmed. Garcia doesn’t challenge this, and we discern no controlling case law on point. Accordingly, in the context of this case, we assume, without deciding, that a claimant may be wholly disqualified from receiving benefits if subsection (5)(e) covers any of multiple circumstances causing job separation.
7 ¶ 18 Finally, Garcia argues that the hearing transcript doesn’t
accurately reflect the material in the audio recording. However,
Garcia provides no specific examples of such inaccuracies, nor does
she identify any harm she suffered as a result. Accordingly, we
don’t consider this argument. C.A.R. 35(c) (“The court may
disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of
the parties.”).
III. Disposition
¶ 19 We affirm the Panel’s order.2
2 To support its contention that the hearing officer properly
assessed evidence and witness credibility, employer’s answer brief cites an unpublished decision of this court, which violates our formal policy prohibiting parties from citing such cases (with exceptions that don’t apply for this citation). See Colo. Jud. Branch, Court of Appeals Policies, Policy Concerning Citation of Opinions Not Selected for Official Publication (2025), https://perma.cc/Z88K-5U7F. We trust that this violation of our policy won’t be repeated.