Garcia v. Furlong

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 KYLE ABRAN GARCIA, Case No. 3:21-cv-00421-MMD-CSD

7 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 8 KEN FURLONG, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 12 Plaintiff Kyle Abran Garcia brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 13 (ECF No. 1-1.) Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of United States 14 Magistrate Judge Craig S. Denney recommending the Court dismiss this case without 15 prejudice because Garcia failed to timely file an amended complaint per the Court’s prior 16 order. (ECF No. 12 (“R&R”).)1 Garcia did not file an objection to the R&R though the 17 deadline for doing so has passed. As further explained below, the Court will dismiss this 18 case without prejudice. 19 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 20 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 21 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 22 23 1The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 24 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Where a party fails to object to a magistrate judge’s recommendation, the Court is not required to 25 conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 26 1116 (9th Cir. 2003) (“De novo review of the magistrate judges’ findings and recommendations is required if, but only if, one or both parties file objections to the 27 findings and recommendations.”) (emphasis in original); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, Advisory Committee Notes (1983) (providing that the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no 28 clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”). Because Garcia did not object to the R&R, the Court is not required to conduct de novo review and 2 order or comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 3 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to 4 keep court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th 5 Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining 6 whether to dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the 7 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its 8 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition 9 of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 10 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 11 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 12 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 13 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Garcia’s 14 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 15 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 16 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 17 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 18 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 19 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 20 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 21 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 22 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 23 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 24 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 25 “implicitly accepted pursuit of last drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 26 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 27 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 28 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 1 || case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 2 || F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed if Garcia 3 || continues not to comply with the Court’s orders, the only alternative is to enter an 4 || additional order setting another deadline. But without any sign that Garcia intends to file 5 || an amended complaint and seek leave to excuse his noncompliance with the Court’s prior 6 || order, issuing yet another order requiring compliance will only delay the inevitable and 7 || further squander the Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful 8 || alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 9 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 10 || weigh in favor of dismissal. 11 It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed in its entirety without prejudice 12 || based on Garcia’s failure to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Court’s 13 || January 5, 2022, order. 14 It is further ordered that the Report and Recommendation of United States 15 || Magistrate Judge Craig S. Denney (ECF No. 12) is accepted and adopted in full. 16 The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 17 It is further ordered that no other documents may be filed in this now-closed case. 18 || If Garcia wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new case and provide 19 || the Court with his current address. 20 DATED THIS 21* Day of March 2022.

22 MIRANDA M. DU 23 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28