Garcia v. Divine Healers, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 9, 2019
Docket4:17-cv-02427
StatusUnknown

This text of Garcia v. Divine Healers, Inc. (Garcia v. Divine Healers, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garcia v. Divine Healers, Inc., (S.D. Tex. 2019).

Opinion

□ Southern District of Texas ENTERED August 09, 2019 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT David J. Bradley, Clerk FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION VICTOR GARCIA Individually and § On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, § § Plaintiff, § v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:17-CV-02427 § DIVINE HEALERS, INC. d/b/a § HEALING HANDS HEALTHCARE, efal., — § § Defendants. § FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW After considering the evidence presented at trial, the arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. The following recitation of facts should be considered as findings of facts and recitation of the application of the law to the facts as conclusions of law. I. Introduction This is a suit for unpaid overtime brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). Plaintiffs, who are home healthcare workers, have sued Divine Healers Inc (“Divine Healers’’) and its owners, Steven Ayodele and Afolake Ayodele (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants paid Plaintiffs straight time for all hours worked, meaning Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs time and one half for any hours worked over 40 hours per week. The Court previously granted summary judgment on liability against Divine Healers, finding that Divine Healers violated the FLSA with respect to Plaintiffs through this pay practice [Doc. No. 81]. The parties conceded that Divine Healers was an “employer” and each Plaintiff was an “employee” of Divine Healers as defined by the FLSA. The Court held a bench trial in order to decide four sets of remaining, disputed questions: (1) whether the individual Defendants, Steven

Ayodele and Afolake Ayodele, are employers and therefore liable for the FLSA violations; (2) whether Defendants’ violation was willful; (3) the amount of damages in the form of unpaid overtime compensation due to each of Plaintiffs, which also includes the question as to whether liquidated damages are appropriate; and (4) the amount of Plaintiffs’ costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. Il. Applicable Law 1. Under the FLSA, employers must pay non-exempt employees overtime compensation equal to no less than one and one half their regular rates of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 2. “Under the FLSA, any employer who violates . . . the FLSA maximum hours statute, 29 U.S.C. § 207,” is liable. Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., L.L.C., 688 F.3d 247, 250 n.3 (Sth Cir. 2012); see also Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (Sth Cir. 1984) (“The overwhelming weight of authority is that a corporate officer with operational control of a corporation’s covered enterprise is an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid wages.”’). 3. The general statute of limitations for FLSA claims is two years. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). This case was filed on August 8, 2017. 4. The statute of limitations for willful violations of the FLSA is three years. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 5. “The FLSA provides that liquidated damages be awarded for FLSA violations in an amount equal to the actual damages.” Dacar v. Saybolt, L.P., 914 F.3d 917, 931 (Sth Cir. 2018) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). “A district court may, ‘in its sound discretion,’ refuse to award liquidated damages if the employer demonstrates good faith and reasonable grounds for believing it was not in violation.” /d. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 260). “Whereas the burden is on the

plaintiffs to show willfulness, [the defendant] bears the ‘substantial burden’ of proving the reasonableness of its conduct.” Jd. 6. “A willful violation occurs when the ‘employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited.’” /d. at 926 (quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988)). 7. “Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing a defendant’s willfulness.” Jd. 8. An award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff is mandatory. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court . . . shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”); Owens □□□ Marstek, L.L.C., 548 F. App’x 966, 973 (Sth Cir. 2013). 9. “The general rule establishes that FLSA claims . . . cannot be waived.” Bodle v. TXL Mortg. Corp., 788 F.3d 159, 164 (Sth Cir. 2015). 10. The FLSA defines “Employer” to include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 11. “To determine whether an individual or entity is an employer, the court considers whether the alleged employer: (1) possessed the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records.” Gray v. Powers, 673 F.3d 352, 355 (Sth Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). III. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1. Divine Healers employed Victor Garcia, Monica Garcia, Garmai Kalaplee, Catherine Kleinhans, Solange Ngolindjoli, Shikira Williams, Rosaelia Espinoza, Kila Wilson, and Christian Catalan (“Plaintiffs”) during some time period between August 8, 2014, and the

present. 2. From August 8, 2014, until the present, Divine Healers has been required to comply with provisions of the FLSA regarding wage and overtime payment to Plaintiffs. 3. From August 8, 2014, until the present, Divine Healers has been required to comply with United States Department of Labor regulations regarding wage and overtime payments to Plaintiffs. 4. From August 8, 2014, until the present, Plaintiffs were individual “employees” (as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)) who were engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 5. From August 8, 2014, until the present, Divine Healers has been an “employer” in relation to Plaintiffs, within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). 6. From August 8, 2014, until the present, Divine Healers has been engaged in an “enterprise” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(1). 7. From August 8, 2014, until the present, Divine Healers has been an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.
486 U.S. 128 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Nicholas Gray v. Michael Powers
673 F.3d 352 (Fifth Circuit, 2012)
Martin v. Spring Break '83 Productions, L.L.C.
688 F.3d 247 (Fifth Circuit, 2012)
Shannon Owens v. Marstek, L.L.C.
548 F. App'x 966 (Fifth Circuit, 2013)
Ambre Bodle v. TXL Mortgage Corporation, et
788 F.3d 159 (Fifth Circuit, 2015)
Dacar v. Saybolt, L.P.
914 F.3d 917 (Fifth Circuit, 2018)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Garcia v. Divine Healers, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garcia-v-divine-healers-inc-txsd-2019.