Garcia v. Defrates

Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In Re the Matter of:

LORENA GARCIA, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

DUSTIN EARL DEFRATES, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 26-0031 FC

FILED 09-17-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. FC2023-004367

The Honorable J. Justin McGuire, Judge Pro Tempore

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Jaburg & Wilk, PC, Phoenix By Laurence B. Hirsch, Ilya Prokopets, David N. Farren Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Dustin Earl DeFrates, Scottsdale Respondent/Appellant

Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 After Dustin Earl DeFrates (“Father”) and Lorena Garcia (“Mother”) settled their dissolution case, the superior court entered a decree using parenting and property-division terms prepared by Mother. The court found that Father waived his right to provide input on the final terms based on a deadline prescribed by the settlement agreement. We hold that the deadline provision is ambiguous, and that the parties’ conduct did not clarify the ambiguity. We therefore construe the provision against Mother as its drafter and conclude that the court erred by finding waiver. We vacate the decree and remand for all proceedings necessary for entry of a decree consistent with the parties’ settlement agreement.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The parties married in 2011 and have two children together. In 2023, Mother filed for dissolution.

¶3 In March 2025, the parties entered a settlement agreement under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 69 (the “Rule 69 Agreement”). The parties notified the court that they would “work on preparing and agreeing to final documents (Consent Decree, Property Settlement Agreement, Parenting Plan) pursuant to the process set forth in” the Rule 69 Agreement once the court adopted that agreement. The Rule 69 Agreement articulated the plan as:

We [Mother] will prepare the first draft of the final documents. [Father] will provide comments, in redline, within 14 calendar days of receipt of the draft documents. If [Father] does not timely provide comments, [Father] and [Mother] agree that any objection to the draft documents by [Father] is automatically waived and the draft documents provided by [Mother] will be considered final and will be lodged by the Court as final orders.

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Decision of the Court

The court promptly approved and adopted the Rule 69 Agreement. The court then granted several inactive-calendar continuances to permit the parties to finalize the settlement documents.

¶4 On May 9, 2025, Mother (through counsel) emailed Father (who was then unrepresented) a draft Parenting Plan, asked him to “review and provide us with your comments, redlines and proposed revisions as per the terms of settlement filed with the Court,” and informed him that “[w]e will be forwarding you drafts of the Appointment Order for the Parenting Coordinator and the Property Settlement Agreement under separate cover for your further review.” Father responded by email on June 11, stating that he would “begin my review this week.” He later provided his feedback on the draft Parenting Plan, which Mother incorporated in a revised draft that she emailed to him on July 24. She asked him to provide his feedback on the revised draft within ten days. In a separate email also sent on July 24, she asked him to review and sign a draft Order Appointing the Parenting Coordinator “soon.”

¶5 Meanwhile, Mother sent Father a draft Property Settlement Agreement on July 3. Father did not respond. In her July 24 email sending the revised draft Parenting Plan, Mother noted Father’s lack of feedback on the draft Property Settlement Agreement and stated that she was “await[ing]” it. Father provided no response to either the revised draft Parenting Plan, the draft Order Appointing the Parenting Coordinator, or the draft Property Settlement Agreement.

¶6 On August 19, Mother emailed Father that due to his unresponsiveness, she had moved forward with drafting a Consent Decree, which she provided “for your review and comment,” and she intended to lodge the settlement documents with the court “later this week.” Father responded immediately, asserting that he would need time to have his civil counsel review the draft Property Settlement Agreement. Accusing Mother of timing-based gamesmanship, he explained that he had missed the email transmitting the draft Property Settlement Agreement due to his summer travel, the email’s provision the day before a holiday, and the high volume of emails he receives. He further explained that he had seen the email sending the revised draft Parenting Plan but had deliberately delayed his review because he intended to look at it in a “block[]” with the propertysettlement terms. He did not discuss that Mother’s email sending the revised draft Parenting Plan referenced her earlier provision of the draft Property Settlement Agreement.

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Decision of the Court

¶7 The next week, Father emailed Mother to say that he had edits for both the revised Parenting Plan and the draft Property Settlement Agreement. The parties also scheduled a phone call to discuss the matter. Father emailed Mother his redlined versions of the Parenting Plan, Property Settlement Agreement, and Consent Decree on September 2.

¶8 Meanwhile, on August 29, Mother moved the superior court to enter her draft Consent Decree incorporating her versions of the Parenting Plan and the Property Settlement Agreement. She argued that Father had waived his objection rights by failing to act within fourteen days of receiving each of her drafts. Father objected and moved the court to enter his versions of the same documents, arguing that the settlement agreement’s fourteen-day deadline began to run only once he received the full set of the settlement documents.

¶9 The court granted Mother’s motion, finding that “Father waived any objections to Mother’s submitted documents by failing to timely object, pursuant to the terms of their [Rule 69 A]greement.” The court entered the decree in substantially the form Mother provided. The court summarily denied Father’s motion for post-judgment relief under Rule 83.

¶10 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father argues that he provided his objections to Mother’s draft settlement documents timely under the terms of the Rule 69 Agreement, and that the superior court therefore erred by finding waiver. Mother argues otherwise. Mother further argues that Father’s waiver was immaterial because, given that both parties provided their draft documents to the court, the court implicitly found that Mother’s drafts were more faithful to the Rule 69 Agreement’s terms.

¶12 To start, we decline Mother’s invitation to impute to the court an unstated analysis. To be sure, we do not see (and Father does not claim) that either party invoked Rule 82(a)’s requirement for express findings, so we may infer findings reasonably supported by the evidence. See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 82(a); Coronado Co. v. Jacome’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 129 Ariz. 137, 139 (App. 1981). But we may engage in such extrapolation only where implied findings would comport with the express findings and serve as necessary grounds to sustain the judgment. Id. We should not resort to inference where it is clear the court intended to rule only on its stated grounds. See

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id.; see also Rinegar v. Rinegar, 231 Ariz. 85, 89, ¶ 19 (App. 2012). That is the case here. The court found that Father waived his right to object to Mother’s documents because he failed to act timely. The court therefore did not reach any substantive analysis, and we will not speculate that it silently did so.

¶13 Accordingly, we examine only whether the court correctly construed the Rule 69 Agreement to find waiver. We review the court’s interpretation of the Rule 69 Agreement de novo. See Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 126, 129, ¶ 10 (App. 2019) (Rule 69 agreements are contracts); Grosvenor Holdings, L.C. v. Figueroa, 222 Ariz. 588, 593, ¶ 9 (App. 2009) (contracts are reviewed de novo on appeal). We hold that the court erred by finding waiver under the agreement.

¶14 The goal of contract interpretation is to effectuate the parties’ intent. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 148, 152 (1993). If the contract language is unambiguous, the inquiry ends. Grosvenor Holdings, 222 Ariz. at 593, ¶ 9. If the language is ambiguous, however, the parties’ intent must be discerned by examining external evidence. Associated Students of Univ. of Ariz. v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 120 Ariz. 100, 104 (App. 1978). “Language is ambiguous when it can reasonably be construed in more than one sense and such construction cannot be determined within the four corners of the instrument.” Id. Where language is ambiguous, “[t]he acts of the parties themselves, before disputes arise, are the best evidence of the meaning of [the] doubtful contractual terms.” United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 266 (App. 1983). But if the parties’ intent cannot be determined, we will resort to construing the ambiguous language against its drafter. MT Builders, L.L.C. v. Fisher Roofing, Inc., 219 Ariz. 297, 302, ¶ 10 (App. 2008).

¶15 Here, the Rule 69 Agreement provided that the parties would prepare final settlement documents in the form of a Parenting Plan, a Property Settlement Agreement, and a Consent Decree. The Rule 69 Agreement further specified that Father would waive his right to object to Mother’s “first draft of the final documents” if he did not act within 14 days of “receipt of the draft documents.” The parties dispute whether this language means Father’s response deadline began only when he received a complete set of the multiple settlement documents, or whether it means he had staggered response deadlines tied to his receipt of each part of the set. We hold that the language is reasonably susceptible to either reading, and the parties’ intent cannot be determined within the confines of the contract. See Associated Students, 120 Ariz. at 104. Accordingly, we examine the parties’ pre-dispute conduct. See United Cal. Bank, 140 Ariz. at 266.

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¶16 The parties’ conduct did not clarify their intent. When Mother sent Father the initial draft Parenting Plan, she asked him to respond “as per the terms of settlement” and described her intent to separately send him other documents for his “further review.” She did not define what she understood “the terms of settlement” to mean, but her reference to “further review” arguably suggested she expected piecemeal responses. And Father did ultimately provide a separate response to the draft Parenting Plan. But he did so well after fourteen days of his receipt, and Mother made no reference to a fourteen-day deadline either before or after Father responded.1 Indeed, she integrated his feedback into the draft without comment almost eleven weeks after her initial missive. Similarly, when Mother again suggested her expectation of separate responses by describing herself as “await[ing]” Father’s feedback on the draft Property Settlement Agreement, she did not refer to any deadline or other requirement underlying her expectation. And at that point, three weeks had passed since Father received the draft. Mother then waited more than three additional weeks to confront Father about delay—and even at that point did not mention any specific contractual deadline. Nor did she cite the Rule 69 Agreement or its deadline in asking Father to “review and comment” on the draft Consent Decree she provided for the first time.

¶17 In sum, the parties’ conduct was not sufficiently consistent to show their intent under the Rule 69 Agreement. To be sure, in some ways they acted as though they intended a piecemeal settlement-finalization process. Specifically, Mother suggested several times that she expected separate responses, and Father met that expectation one time. But in other ways, the parties acted as though the Rule 69 Agreement did not apply to Mother’s trickled-out drafts. Mother let months pass without ever mentioning or attempting to enforce the agreement’s deadline. On this record, we cannot say that the parties’ conduct resolved the contract ambiguity. We cannot discern the parties’ intent.

¶18 We therefore resort to construing the Rule 69 Agreement’s deadline provision against the contract drafter. See MT Builders, 219 Ariz.

1 When Mother integrated Father’s feedback, she called for him to respond

to the revised draft Parenting Plan within ten days. Father argues that Mother’s use of a non-fourteen-day deadline shows she did not believe the contractual deadline applied. But Mother was prescribing a deadline for second-round revisions—a matter outside of the contract’s contemplation. Her statement therefore has no bearing on the inquiry before us. The same is true of her call for Father to respond “soon” to the parenting-coordinatorappointment document that the settlement agreement did not mention.

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at 302, ¶ 10. Because Mother was the drafter, we must read the agreement to mean that Father’s deadline to respond to the draft settlement documents did not start running until he had the complete set. That occurred when he received the draft Consent Decree on August 19, and he provided feedback on all the documents exactly fourteen days later.2 Because Father’s response was timely, the superior court erred by entering Mother’s drafts based on waiver.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We vacate the decree and remand for all proceedings necessary for entry of a decree consistent with the parties’ settlement agreement. We deny Mother’s request for attorneys’ fees on appeal.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR

2 We note that even under Mother’s view of the deadline, Father timely

objected to the Consent Decree and Mother prematurely moved for its entry.