Garcia v. County of Los Angeles

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 23, 2025
• Docket: 23-1872
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 23 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCISCO GARCIA, No. 23-1872 D.C. No. 2:20-cv-08528-JVS-KES Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM* COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; ALEX VILLANUEVA, Sheriff Los Angeles County, in individual capacity and official capacity; NURSE PEREZ, Registered Nurse, in individual capacity; PERALTA, Sheriff Deputy, in individual capacity; YHAMEL, Sheriff Deputy, in individual capacity; TIPTON, Grievance Officer, individual capacity; HINTON, Legal Unit Coordinator, individual capacity; URSO, Supervisor, individual capacity; GULSETH, Supervisor, individual capacity; JOHN DOE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 15, 2025**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: FRIEDLAND, MILLER, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Francisco Garcia appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First

Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Opta Corp., 875

F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2017) (judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(c)); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012)

(dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.

The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings on Garcia’s

access-to-courts and California Bane Act claims based on the confiscation and

destruction of his legal materials because Garcia failed to allege facts sufficient to

show actual injury to any nonfrivolous legal claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343, 348-53 (1996) (explaining that an access-to-courts claim requires a plaintiff to

show that defendants’ conduct caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal

claim); Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040-45 (9th Cir. 2018)

(setting forth requirements to establish a claim under the Bane Act).

The district court properly dismissed Garcia’s other access-to-courts,

retaliation, conditions-of-confinement, and Bane Act claims because Garcia failed

to allege facts sufficient to show that the denial of law library access and supplies

resulted in actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim, that defendants took adverse

2 23-1872 action because of Garcia’s protected conduct, that defendants were deliberately

indifferent to an excessive risk to Garcia’s health, or that defendants enacted

unconstitutional policies concerning law library access and COVID-19 conditions.

See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348-53 (setting forth requirements of an access-to-courts

claim); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (setting forth requirements

of an Eighth Amendment claim in the prison context); Lockett v. County of Los

Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020) (discussing requirements to establish

municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658

(1978), including showing a municipal policy that caused a constitutional

violation); Reese, 888 F.3d at 1040-45 (setting forth requirements to establish a

claim under the Bane Act); Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.

2005) (setting forth elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison

context).

The district court did not err in denying Garcia’s motion to certify a partial

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) because it properly

evaluated the relationship between Garcia’s claims and found no just reason for

delay. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[T]he court may direct entry of a final judgment

as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly

determines that there is no just reason for delay.”); Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422

F.3d 873, 877-83 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth requirements for certification under

3 23-1872 Rule 54(b)); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d 1515, 1519 (9th Cir. 1989)

(explaining that this court reviews de novo the district court’s evaluation of factors

such as the relationship between the claims, and for an abuse of discretion its

assessment of equitable concerns).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying as moot Garcia’s

discovery motions after dismissing all of Garcia’s claims. See Hallett v. Morgan,

296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining

that the district court’s discovery decisions will not be disturbed without “actual

and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s motions

for appointment of counsel because Garcia failed to demonstrate exceptional

circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting

forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement for

appointment of counsel).

AFFIRMED.

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