Callahan, J.
The plaintiff Carol Steinberg has filed this appeal from an order of the Superior Court granting the defendants’ motions to discharge two notices of lis pendens filed by the plaintiffs against real estate owned by the defendants at 672-704 and 720-738 Brooks Street, Bridgeport. The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that there was “probable [17]*17cause to sustain the validity of [their] claim” under the Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA); see General Statutes § 47-282 et seq.; as required by General Statutes § 52-325b (b).1 The issue raised by the plaintiff on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motions discharging the two notices of lis pendens.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On June 24, 1986, Brooks Street Associates (hereinafter BSA), as landlord, commenced summary process actions against the tenants, the plaintiffs in this action, by notices to quit. The respective summary process summonses and complaints were served on July 11,1986.2 In response, all the tenants filed essentially identical answers and special defenses. Of relevance to the present action is the tenants’ second special defense that relied on General Statutes § 47-290 (d) (3) of CIOA. That provision authorizes a court to enjoin summary process proceedings if it “finds that there is a substantial probability [18]*18that the owner or his successor in interest will create a common interest community within nine months from the date the action by the owner or tenant was instituted . . . . ” BSA responded to the tenants’ defense by claiming that the property was not going to be converted into “common interest communities” and therefore that CIOA did not apply.
Apparently in response to BSA’s summary process actions, Ana Garcia, then a tenant in one of the buildings owned by BSA, instituted the present action against BSA and its individual partners, Phillip Baroff, Leonard C. Plum, Louis I. Gladstone and Phillip J. Kuchma, on July 18, 1986. In the third count of her complaint, she claimed that the defendants intended to convert the Brooks Street buildings into common interest communities and that, in pursuit of that intent, they had violated, and would in the future violate, numerous provisions of CIOA.3 Later Brent Wildman, Richard Zbras, Paul and Dolores Lamoureux, Patricia Paul, Daniel and Diane O’Neil, Carol Steinberg, Ronald and Lucy Honcharik, and James Broadbin were joined as additional plaintiffs. Like Garcia, all of those joined as plaintiffs were living as tenants in the Brooks Street buildings owned by BSA at the time of the commencement of this action. Under General Statutes § 47-2924 of CIOA, the plaintiffs sought damages and also injunc[19]*19tive relief to restrain BSA from “maintaining or commencing any summary process proceedings.”
By notices dated September 9, 1986, the plaintiffs filed a notice of lis pendens against each of the subject properties to notify potential buyers and creditors of their continued interests and CIOA claims in the real estate. On September 15, 1986, the plaintiffs, after a hearing, also obtained a $65,000 real estate attachment covering the two properties in question.5 On September 23,1986, the defendants filed motions to discharge the two notices of lis pendens pursuant to General Statutes § 52-325a (c),6 arguing that there was no probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiffs’ claims under CIOA as required by General Statutes § 52-325b (b). The applicability of CIOA being the issue central to both the validity of the tenants’ special defenses in the summary process cases and to the defendants’ motions to discharge the plaintiff tenants’ notices of lis pendens, the two matters were, at the request and with the consent of all counsel, consolidated for purposes of a joint hearing.
On February 25,1987, the trial court rendered judgment in the summary process actions in favor of the landlord BSA. In so doing, the court rejected the tenants’ second special defense and determined that CIOA was not applicable to BSA’s plans for the buildings. Finding that CIOA did not apply in the present case, the court also granted the defendants’ motions to dis[20]*20charge the two notices of lis pendens filed against the real estate.7
Initially, Steinberg and the Honchariks filed this appeal from the order of the Superior Court discharging the two notices of lis pendens in the Appellate Court on March 4,1987. Subsequently, the Honchariks withdrew from this appeal leaving Steinberg as the sole plaintiff on appeal. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, we transferred the appeal to this court. We find that the propriety of the Superior Court’s discharge of the two notices of lis pendens is an issue on which we can no longer afford the plaintiff any practical relief. Stein-berg’s appeal, therefore, must be dismissed as moot.
Since the Superior Court discharged the two notices of lis pendens, all of the plaintiffs, none of whom appealed the decision of the Superior Court in their summary process matters, have moved out of the Brooks Street buildings and no longer wish to occupy the premises. Further, the plaintiff on appeal does not wish to pursue any other rights she may have under CIOA that would entitle her to an interest in the real estate itself.8 According to her reply brief and to concessions made at oral argument, the only relief sought [21]*21by Steinberg at this time is monetary damages pursuant to CIO A. In view of Steinberg’s concessions and because of the events that have transpired, a successful conclusion to her appeal would give her no relief since she no longer possesses or professes an interest in real estate that would be afforded any protection by a notice of lis pendens.
General Statutes § 52-325 (a) states that a notice of lis pendens may be filed by a party to an action that is “intended to affect real property.”9 Actions “intended to affect real property” are defined by § 52-325 (b) as follows: “(1) actions whose object and purpose is to determine the title or rights of the parties in, to, under or over some particular real property; [22]*22(2) actions whose object and purpose is to establish or enforce previously acquired interests in real property; (3) actions which may affect in any manner the title to or interest in real property, notwithstanding the main purpose of the action may be other than to affect the title of such real property.”
From the face of the statute it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is appropriate only where the pending action will in some way, either directly or indirectly, affect the title to or an interest in the real property itself. See Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 474 A.2d 113 (1983) (interpreting § 52-325 [b] [3], where the court relied on the plain meaning of the statute). Where, as here, a party to a pending action seeks only monetary damages that will not affect the title of the real estate owned by an adverse party, a notice of lis pendens is properly discharged as it no longer serves its purpose, which is to put potential buyers of the real estate and creditors of its owners on notice that the real estate may be subject to pending adverse interests that may affect the title or right to the property. See
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Callahan, J.
The plaintiff Carol Steinberg has filed this appeal from an order of the Superior Court granting the defendants’ motions to discharge two notices of lis pendens filed by the plaintiffs against real estate owned by the defendants at 672-704 and 720-738 Brooks Street, Bridgeport. The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that there was “probable [17]*17cause to sustain the validity of [their] claim” under the Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA); see General Statutes § 47-282 et seq.; as required by General Statutes § 52-325b (b).1 The issue raised by the plaintiff on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motions discharging the two notices of lis pendens.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On June 24, 1986, Brooks Street Associates (hereinafter BSA), as landlord, commenced summary process actions against the tenants, the plaintiffs in this action, by notices to quit. The respective summary process summonses and complaints were served on July 11,1986.2 In response, all the tenants filed essentially identical answers and special defenses. Of relevance to the present action is the tenants’ second special defense that relied on General Statutes § 47-290 (d) (3) of CIOA. That provision authorizes a court to enjoin summary process proceedings if it “finds that there is a substantial probability [18]*18that the owner or his successor in interest will create a common interest community within nine months from the date the action by the owner or tenant was instituted . . . . ” BSA responded to the tenants’ defense by claiming that the property was not going to be converted into “common interest communities” and therefore that CIOA did not apply.
Apparently in response to BSA’s summary process actions, Ana Garcia, then a tenant in one of the buildings owned by BSA, instituted the present action against BSA and its individual partners, Phillip Baroff, Leonard C. Plum, Louis I. Gladstone and Phillip J. Kuchma, on July 18, 1986. In the third count of her complaint, she claimed that the defendants intended to convert the Brooks Street buildings into common interest communities and that, in pursuit of that intent, they had violated, and would in the future violate, numerous provisions of CIOA.3 Later Brent Wildman, Richard Zbras, Paul and Dolores Lamoureux, Patricia Paul, Daniel and Diane O’Neil, Carol Steinberg, Ronald and Lucy Honcharik, and James Broadbin were joined as additional plaintiffs. Like Garcia, all of those joined as plaintiffs were living as tenants in the Brooks Street buildings owned by BSA at the time of the commencement of this action. Under General Statutes § 47-2924 of CIOA, the plaintiffs sought damages and also injunc[19]*19tive relief to restrain BSA from “maintaining or commencing any summary process proceedings.”
By notices dated September 9, 1986, the plaintiffs filed a notice of lis pendens against each of the subject properties to notify potential buyers and creditors of their continued interests and CIOA claims in the real estate. On September 15, 1986, the plaintiffs, after a hearing, also obtained a $65,000 real estate attachment covering the two properties in question.5 On September 23,1986, the defendants filed motions to discharge the two notices of lis pendens pursuant to General Statutes § 52-325a (c),6 arguing that there was no probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiffs’ claims under CIOA as required by General Statutes § 52-325b (b). The applicability of CIOA being the issue central to both the validity of the tenants’ special defenses in the summary process cases and to the defendants’ motions to discharge the plaintiff tenants’ notices of lis pendens, the two matters were, at the request and with the consent of all counsel, consolidated for purposes of a joint hearing.
On February 25,1987, the trial court rendered judgment in the summary process actions in favor of the landlord BSA. In so doing, the court rejected the tenants’ second special defense and determined that CIOA was not applicable to BSA’s plans for the buildings. Finding that CIOA did not apply in the present case, the court also granted the defendants’ motions to dis[20]*20charge the two notices of lis pendens filed against the real estate.7
Initially, Steinberg and the Honchariks filed this appeal from the order of the Superior Court discharging the two notices of lis pendens in the Appellate Court on March 4,1987. Subsequently, the Honchariks withdrew from this appeal leaving Steinberg as the sole plaintiff on appeal. Pursuant to Practice Book § 4023, we transferred the appeal to this court. We find that the propriety of the Superior Court’s discharge of the two notices of lis pendens is an issue on which we can no longer afford the plaintiff any practical relief. Stein-berg’s appeal, therefore, must be dismissed as moot.
Since the Superior Court discharged the two notices of lis pendens, all of the plaintiffs, none of whom appealed the decision of the Superior Court in their summary process matters, have moved out of the Brooks Street buildings and no longer wish to occupy the premises. Further, the plaintiff on appeal does not wish to pursue any other rights she may have under CIOA that would entitle her to an interest in the real estate itself.8 According to her reply brief and to concessions made at oral argument, the only relief sought [21]*21by Steinberg at this time is monetary damages pursuant to CIO A. In view of Steinberg’s concessions and because of the events that have transpired, a successful conclusion to her appeal would give her no relief since she no longer possesses or professes an interest in real estate that would be afforded any protection by a notice of lis pendens.
General Statutes § 52-325 (a) states that a notice of lis pendens may be filed by a party to an action that is “intended to affect real property.”9 Actions “intended to affect real property” are defined by § 52-325 (b) as follows: “(1) actions whose object and purpose is to determine the title or rights of the parties in, to, under or over some particular real property; [22]*22(2) actions whose object and purpose is to establish or enforce previously acquired interests in real property; (3) actions which may affect in any manner the title to or interest in real property, notwithstanding the main purpose of the action may be other than to affect the title of such real property.”
From the face of the statute it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is appropriate only where the pending action will in some way, either directly or indirectly, affect the title to or an interest in the real property itself. See Stratton v. Ward, 39 Conn. Sup. 195, 474 A.2d 113 (1983) (interpreting § 52-325 [b] [3], where the court relied on the plain meaning of the statute). Where, as here, a party to a pending action seeks only monetary damages that will not affect the title of the real estate owned by an adverse party, a notice of lis pendens is properly discharged as it no longer serves its purpose, which is to put potential buyers of the real estate and creditors of its owners on notice that the real estate may be subject to pending adverse interests that may affect the title or right to the property. See Kukanskis v. Griffith, 180 Conn. 501, 507, 430 A.2d 21 (1980); 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Lis Pendens § 1. Accordingly, since Steinberg no longer claims any interest or right in the real estate itself, no practical relief can follow from the reinstatement of the two notices of lis pendens discharged by the trial court. Therefore, we conclude, without deciding the merits of Steinberg’s CIOA claim, that this appeal must be dismissed as moot.10 See Sadlowski v. Manchester, 206 Conn. 579, 583, 538 A.2d 1052 (1988); Board of Education v. Board of Labor Relations, 205 Conn. 116, 124-25, 530 A.2d [23]*23588 (1987); Murray v. Lopes, 205 Conn. 27, 30, 529 A.2d 1302 (1987); State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 112, 445 A.2d 304 (1982); Waterbury Hospital v. Connecticut Health Care Associates, 186 Conn. 247, 249, 440 A.2d 310 (1982); Scalo v. Mandanici, 179 Conn. 140, 146-47, 425 A.2d 1272 (1979); Harkins v. Driscoll, 165 Conn. 407, 409, 334 A.2d 901 (1973); Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944); Rollins v. Holcomb, 122 Conn. 664, 666, 190 A. 260 (1937).
Our present holding obviously does not bar any claim for money damages under CIO A. The plaintiffs are free to pursue the CIOA counts of their complaint and the $65,000 bond substituted for their original attachment still exists to satisfy any damages they may be able to prove.
The plaintiff Steinberg’s appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.