Garcia v. Auto Nation North

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 12, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1037
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA1037 Garcia v Auto Nation North 03-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1037 City and County of Denver District Court No. 24CV764 Honorable Kandace C. Gerdes, Judge

Roy Garcia,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Auto Nation North,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Brown and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 12, 2026

Roy Garcia, Pro Se

Michael G. McKinnon, Littleton, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Plaintiff, Roy Garcia, appeals the judgment in favor of

defendant, Auto Nation North (Auto Nation). We affirm.1

I. Background

¶2 In September 2024, Garcia attempted to purchase a car from

Auto Nation and executed a purchase agreement. But rather than

providing currency, a credit card, or other financing, Garcia wrote,

“Pay to the order of Auto Nation North without recourse” on the

reverse side of the purchase agreement. Because the purchase

agreement was not a negotiable instrument, Auto Nation refused to

complete the sale of the vehicle or permit Garcia to take possession

of the vehicle.

¶3 Garcia then initiated this action. His complaint alleged a

breach of contract and violations of the Truth in Lending Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1635(a); the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, §§ 6-1-101

1 On December 8, 2025, Garcia filed a motion seeking several forms

of relief, including compelling a decision in this appeal. On December 22, that motion was denied as improper under C.A.R. 27. On January 29, 2026, Garcia filed a motion to “vacate” the December 22 order and renew his December 8 motion. To the extent the January 29 motion seeks a decision in this appeal, we deny it as moot due to the decision entered today. To the extent the January 29 motion raises issues not raised in the opening brief, we decline to consider them and deny the motion.

1 to -1812, C.R.S. 2025; the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 3-603

(A.L.I. & Unif. L. Comm’n 2022); the Fair Debt Collection Practices

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692h; the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15

U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); § 11-51-201(17), C.R.S. 2025; and “the Equal

Opportunity Credit Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(9).” After Auto Nation

filed its answer, Garcia filed a motion for summary judgment under

UCC section 3-603(a). The trial court denied Garcia’s motion,

finding that “[d]isputed issues of material fact preclude the entry of

summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.”

¶4 The court conducted a bench trial on May 30, 2025, and

issued a written judgment that stated:

This action came for trial to the Court on May 30, 2025. The issues were duly tried and the Court rendered a decision for Defendant on all claims brought by Plaintiff. The Court, at the conclusion of the May 30, 2025 trial, delivered an oral ruling, incorporated herein by this reference.

¶5 Garcia then appealed. In June 2025, this court advised

Garcia that “[i]f appellant intends to include transcripts of any

hearing or trial included in the record on appeal, the appellant

must file a designation of transcripts with the trial court and an

advisory copy with the appellate court within 7 days of the date of

2 filing the appellant’s notice of appeal.” Garcia never designated the

trial transcript as part of the appellate record; thus, we are without

the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law following the

trial.

¶6 In October 2025, Garcia filed a motion to supplement the

record, “to enforce a transcript fee waiver, and to address

concealment of court records.” He asserted the following:

• “The district court issued an order signed by Chief

Justice Christopher Jay Baumann on August 4, 2025,

waiving all e-service fees, including transcript fees.”

• “Despite this order, the transcript office demands

payment and a signed agreement to pay fees before

releasing the transcripts.”

• “The Appellant cannot comply without violating the

district court’s order and federal public policy.”

• “It is known within the court system that certain

transcripts were not included in the record, raising

serious concerns about concealment of court records.”

¶7 Garcia asked this court to take the following actions:

3 • “Order supplementation of the appellate record to include

all trial transcripts without delay.”

• “Enforce the district court’s fee waiver order, mandating

transcript production without any payment or fee.”

• “Declare that any demand for transcript fees violates

Public Law 73-10, House Resolution 192, and

established public policy.”

• “Investigate and address any violations of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2071, 2076, and 1946 related to concealment or

withholding of court records.”

• “Provide any additional relief the Court deems just and

proper to ensure a fair and complete appellate process.”

¶8 This court denied Garcia’s motion:

The federal law cited by appellant does not apply to this case. Further, the district court’s order waiving the filing fee did not waive transcript fees. CJD 98-01 does not permit a court to waive filing fees in a civil case. Further, “there is no right to transcripts at state expense in a civil action.” Almarez v. Carpenter, 477 P.2d 792, 794 ([Colo.] 1970).

¶9 On appeal, Garcia contends that the trial court erred by (1)

denying his motion for summary judgment; (2) “violating the

4 doctrine of stare decisis and the Code of Conduct for United States

judges by ignoring binding precedent”; (3) misinterpreting the term

“funds” and failing to recognize Garcia’s status as a holder in due

course, affecting enforceability of the instrument; (4) failing to

recognize Garcia’s perfected security interest recorded with the

Colorado Secretary of State; (5) applying UCC section 3-603(b)

regarding tender and wrongful dishonor; (6) failing to properly apply

the Colorado Consumer Protection Act; and (7) admitting

undisclosed, unauthenticated, and fraudulent evidence in violation

of discovery rules.

II. Denial of Garcia’s Motion for Summary Judgment

¶ 10 Garcia’s contention that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for summary judgment is not properly before us. “[A] denial

of a motion for summary judgment is not a final determination on

the merits and, therefore, is not an appealable order.” Tisch v.

Tisch, 2019 COA 41, ¶ 47 (quoting Karg v. Mitchek, 983 P.2d 21, 25

(Colo. App. 1998)). Nor is such a denial appealable after a final

judgment. Karg, 983 P.2d at 25. Thus, we need not address the

merits of Garcia’s argument regarding the trial court’s denial of his

motion for summary judgment.

5 III. Garcia’s Remaining Contentions

¶ 11 Garcia’s remaining contentions relate to evidence presented at

the trial. But Garcia has not provided us with the trial transcript.

“It is incumbent upon the moving party to designate all those

portions of the record necessary for the appeal.” Hock v. N.Y. Life

Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 1242, 1252 (Colo. 1994); C.A.R. 10(d)(3) (“The

appellant must include in the record transcripts of all proceedings

necessary for considering and deciding the issues on appeal.”). This

gap in the record has consequences for our decision-making

because, if relevant transcripts are not included in the record on

appeal, we must presume that the trial court’s findings and

conclusions are supported by the evidence. See Digit. Landscape

Inc. v. Media Kings LLC, 2018 COA 142, ¶ 81; Hock, 876 P.2d at

1252 (“An appellate court must presume that the trial court’s

findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence when the

appellant has failed to provide a complete record.”). Applying that

presumption, we affirm the court’s judgment.

IV. Disposition

¶ 12 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.