USCA1 Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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No. 93-1534
SANDOR GARCIA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
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Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
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and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
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Juan Rafael Gonzalez-Munoz for appellant.
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Pedro A. Delgado Hernandez with whom Jorge L. Capo Matos was on
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brief for appellee.
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December 29, 1993
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COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. Appellant Sandor Garcia seeks
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to litigate a tort claim against his employer pursuant to the
Puerto Rico workers' compensation act even though he previously
received substantial benefits based on the same injury under the
Florida workers' compensation scheme. The district court granted
summary judgment for the employer, American Airlines, ruling that
the exclusive remedy provision contained in the Florida statute
protected the company from further liability. We affirm.
I. Background
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The relevant facts in this case are few and undisputed.
Plaintiff Garcia, a flight attendant based in Puerto Rico,
injured his back while working on a flight from San Juan to
Newark, New Jersey, in early 1991. From 1979 through the time of
the injury, American provided workers' compensation benefits to
its employees through a policy in Florida, pursuant to the
Florida Workmen's Compensation Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. 440.01-
440.60. Shortly after his accident, Garcia received a "Notice of
Injury" form from the airline and filed it with the Florida
Department of Labor. He ultimately received about $44,000 in
medical and disability payments under American's Florida policy.
In January 1992, Garcia filed this damages action in Puerto
Rico, alleging that American was subject to traditional tort
liability because it had failed to fulfill its obligation to
secure workers' compensation coverage for Garcia through the
Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund. Under the Commonwealth's
workers' compensation act, an employer who is required to
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participate, but does not, may be sued for damages by an injured
employee. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, 16.
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In response, American raised two primary defenses. First,
it argued that it was not obligated to provide workers'
compensation coverage for Garcia in Puerto Rico because less than
50% of his worktime was spent there. The airline thus was free
to insure its employees elsewhere and, because Garcia had
received substantial benefits under the Florida statute --
indeed, higher benefits than would have been available in Puerto
Rico -- American was immunized from further liability by that
act's exclusive remedy provision.1 Second, the airline argued
that, to the extent statutory immunity was not dispositive, the
matter raised an arbitrable minor dispute over which the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to the federal
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151-188.
The district court dismissed the complaint on statutory
immunity grounds, ruling that Puerto Rico would give effect to
the exclusive remedy provision contained in the Florida workers'
compensation act. The court summarized its conclusion as
follows:
The Court finds, therefore, that where an employee
spends over fifty (50) percent of his work time outside
of Puerto Rico, and is insured and compensated pursuant
to the workers' accident compensation laws of a state
which provides benefits superior to those granted in
Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico would have
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1 The Florida workers' compensation act states that an
employer's statutory liability for benefits shall be "exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer . . . ."
Fla. Stat. Ann. 440.11(1).
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no interest in barring the operation of the foreign
statute's exclusive remedy provision.
The court did not rule on American's argument concerning the
Railway Labor Act.2
On appeal, Garcia reiterates his contention that the Florida
exclusive remedy provision may not be given effect to bar his
claim for common law damages in Puerto Rico. Our review of the
district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. See
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Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 991 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.
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1993).
II. Discussion
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We begin with a few basic principles of workers'
compensation law to help to put this case into context. First,
it is well established that an injured worker may obtain
successive awards in different states, with total recovery
limited to the amount of the higher award. 4 A. Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law 85.00, at 16-18 (1992); see Thomas
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v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 286 (1980)
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(plurality); Industrial Comm'n of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S.
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622, 626 (1947). Thus, Garcia's receipt of benefits from Florida
does not automatically preclude an effort to obtain additional
benefits through his tort action in Puerto Rico.
Virtually all workers' compensation statutes, however,
contain an exclusive remedy provision, stating that an award of
statutory benefits forecloses any other type of compensation for
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2 We also find it unnecessary to address this issue.
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the injury, including damages in tort. Workmen's Compensation
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Law, 88.10, at 16-171.3 Employees trade their tort remedies
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"for a system of compensation without contest, thus sparing
[them] the cost, delay and uncertainty of a claim in litigation."
Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So.2d 363, 366 (Fla.
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1972). Conversely, workers' compensation statutes typically
allow a damages remedy against employers who fail to assume the
statutory compensation burdens. The theory behind these
provisions is self-evident. An employer who avoids sharing in
the burdens of the system is not entitled to enjoy its primary
benefit, the immunity from non-statutory liability. Florida's
and Puerto Rico's statutes each have both types of provisions.
This case involves a head-on collision between the
employee's right to successive workers' compensation remedies and
the immunity granted by individual jurisdictions to employers who
participate in their own workers' compensation programs.
Specifically, Garcia claims that he is entitled to bring a
damages suit in Puerto Rico -- where American was not insured --
despite the statutory immunity conferred on the airline in
Florida -- where it was insured.
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3 An exception to the rule allowing successive benefits
awards may exist when an exclusive remedy provision, in addition
to foreclosing other types of relief within the state,
specifically bars remedies available in other jurisdictions. See
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Workmen's Compensation Law 85.20-85.40; Thomas v. Washington
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Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 286-90 (1980) (plurality)
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(concurring opinion of White, J.). This exception is not
relevant here.
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Garcia's argument rests on several related contentions: (1)
that the Florida workers' compensation act is inapplicable to his
injury because no Florida interests were implicated; (2) that
American was obligated to insure him under the Commonwealth's
compensation scheme because he is a Puerto Rico resident whose
job is based there; (3) and, finally, that the inapplicability of
the Florida statute renders its exclusive remedy limitation
impotent, while the neglected obligation under Puerto Rico law
empowers him to sue American for damages.
We believe that each of these premises is flawed. As a
result, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
Garcia's tort action.
A. Applicability of Florida law.
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It is important to remember, as noted above, that more than
one workers' compensation statute can apply to a single
compensable injury, so long as each state has a "more-than-
casual" interest in the case. 4 Workmen's Compensation Law
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86.00, at 16-48. Florida law may apply to Garcia's injury,
therefore, even if another state -- or the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico -- has more substantial interests in his claim. "[T]he test
is not whether [Florida]'s interest is greater than that of any
other state, but only whether [Florida] has a valid interest."
Id. 86.34, at 16-60 (citing Dissell v. Trans World Airlines,
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511 A.2d 441, 444-45 & n.3 (Me. 1986)).
Garcia claims that Florida law is wholly inapplicable to his
injury, and that the exclusive remedy provision contained in the
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Florida workers' compensation statute therefore may not be
invoked to bar his damages lawsuit in Puerto Rico. Florida law
does not apply, he claims, because neither he, his job, nor his
injury has a Florida connection. He emphasizes that he is a
Puerto Rico resident based in Puerto Rico; that he entered into
his employment relationship with the airline, a Delaware
corporation, in Texas; and injured himself while traveling
between San Juan and Newark, New Jersey.
In support of his argument, Garcia relies heavily on a
Florida Supreme Court case, Wainwright v. Wainwright, 237 So.2d
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154 (1970), in which a Georgia resident employed by a Georgia
corporation sought benefits under the Florida workers'
compensation statute for an injury suffered in Georgia. The
court upheld the administrative denial of the claim and, in the
course of its opinion, noted that the statute could not be
applied "to other states in which . . . the State of Florida has
no interest and to cases over which the State of Florida has no
authority," id. at 156. Garcia maintains that the same factors
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upon which the Florida Supreme Court relied to reject the claim
in Wainwright exist here: an extraterritorial injury to a non-
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resident employee working for an out-of-state employer.
Garcia's argument, and his reliance on Wainwright, are
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misplaced. Unlike in Wainwright, neither the employer's business
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nor the employee's work are located exclusively outside Florida.
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American Airlines operates in Florida, and Garcia worked on
flights into and out of at least two Florida cities. See Sworn
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Statement of Jorge Olascoaga, Flight Service Supervisor, at 6.
Although Garcia is correct that Florida's contacts with his
injury are limited, this is at least in part because of the
inherently mobile nature of both his job and American's business.
The airline has 21,000 flight attendants spread across the
country, and no single state has a substantial relationship with
all of them.4
Moreover, even if these contacts were deemed insufficient to
trigger the coverage provisions of the Florida act directly,
Garcia nevertheless would be covered because of American's
voluntary assumption of liability under the Florida system. The
Florida statute permits an otherwise excluded employer to waive
the exclusion and bring itself or a specific injury within the
act's coverage by choosing to participate in the Florida worker's
compensation scheme. See Fla. Stat. Ann. 440.04(2).5 See
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Mandico v. Taos Construction, 605 So.2d 850, 852 (Fla. 1992) (per
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curiam); Blair v. Edward G. Gerrits, Inc., 193 So.2d 172, 174-75
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4 Not all flight attendants based in Puerto Rico are
residents of the Commonwealth. The Puerto Rico group includes
residents of Florida and the United States Virgin Islands.
5 Section 440.04(2) provides:
When any policy or contract of insurance specifically
secures the benefits of this chapter to any person not
included in the definition of "employee" or whose
services are not included in the definition of
"employment" or who is otherwise excluded or exempted
from the operation of this chapter, the acceptance of
such policy or contract of insurance by the insured and
the writing of same by the carrier shall constitute a
waiver of such exclusion or exemption and an acceptance
of the provisions of this chapter with respect to such
person . . . .
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(Fla. 1966); Rainwater v. Vikings Men's Hairstyling, 382 So.2d
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1313, 1314-15 (Fla. App. 1980). For more than a decade before
Garcia's accident, American voluntarily provided accident
insurance for its employees in Florida, and, in this case, it
specifically facilitated Garcia's application for benefits by
providing him with the required form.
Even more to the point, we think it decidedly inequitable
for Garcia to claim that Florida law is inapplicable now that he
has received all the benefits that law provides. Workers'
compensation systems are designed around a quid pro quo:
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employees secure "a practical and expeditious remedy for their
industrial accidents," Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U.S.
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469, 476 (1947), while employers secure "a limited and
determinate liability," id. Unlike in Wainwright, where the
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employer and the Florida Industrial Claims Commission both denied
the employee's claim for benefits, Garcia has received
substantial compensation under the Florida scheme. Indeed, it is
undisputed that the compensation he received exceeds the benefits
to which he would have been entitled under Puerto Rico law.
Garcia makes no offer to return the Florida benefits. Having
acquiesced in the applicability of Florida law when it suited his
interest, Garcia cannot fairly be allowed to disclaim its
application now.6
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6 Garcia's uncontested receipt of benefits in Florida is
perhaps the single most significant distinction from the
Wainwright case inasmuch as it shows American's intent to waive
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any possible exclusion from coverage under the Florida act. In
rejecting the request for benefits in Wainwright, the Judge of
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Determining that Florida law may be applied does not lead
inevitably, however, to the conclusion that the present action is
barred by the exclusive remedy provision in Florida's
compensation act. The Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected the
notion that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution
requires a second jurisdiction to defer to limiting provisions
contained in the workers' compensation legislation of the
jurisdiction in which an injured worker first received benefits.
4 Workmen's Compensation Law 88.12, at 16-183. See Thomas, 448
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U.S. at 279-80, 284-86; Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413-14
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(1955); McCartin, 330 U.S. at 628-30. This means that Garcia not
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only is permitted to seek additional benefits, but also that
Puerto Rico is free to disregard Florida's exclusive remedy
provision.
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Industrial Claims made a specific finding that there was no
waiver, and the state supreme court held that competent
substantial evidence supported that ruling. 237 So.2d at 156-57.
Moreover, in light of Garcia's acceptance of undisputed
benefits, we see no reason to dwell on the substantiality of
Florida's relationship to the injury. Given the policy of
successive awards, the only relevant concern is whether Florida's
exercise of jurisdiction would compromise the law of another
jurisdiction with more substantial contacts, in violation of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. See generally
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4 Workmen's Compensation Law 86.00-87.74; Allstate Ins. Co. v.
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Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-313 (1981); id. at 322-23 (concurring
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opinion of Stevens, J.); Dissell v. Trans World Airlines, 511
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A.2d 441, 443-45 (Me. 1986). This is, in essence, the issue
addressed in Section B infra. For contrasting circumstances,
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see, e.g., Johnson v. United Airlines, 550 So.2d 134, 135 (Fla.
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App. 1989) (court reversed dismissal of claim for benefits
because flight attendant's employment was "principally localized"
in Florida), and Dissell, 511 A.2d at 445 (over objection of
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airline, Maine benefits held applicable based on employee's
residence there).
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When a worker's second claim is for common-law damages
rather than additional benefits, however, most states, on grounds
of comity and policy, will respect the other jurisdiction's
exclusive remedy provision immunizing the employer from non-
statutory liability. 4 Workmen's Compensation Law, 88.00,
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88.10, at 16-171-183 (citing cases); see, e.g., Kelly v. Guyon
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Gen. Piping, Inc., 882 F.2d 108, 110 (4th Cir. 1989); Woodner v.
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Mathers, 210 F.2d 868, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The rationale
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underlying this uniform treatment is compelling. The central
purpose of compensation acts is "to substitute a limited but
certain remedy for the former remedy in tort -- a compromise
benefiting both employer and employee." 4 Workmen's Compensation
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Law, at 88.13, at 16-187 (citing Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105,
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141 A.2d 768 (1958)). When an employee who has received benefits
under such a compensation scheme later tries to get back into the
common-law damage system, he is essentially un-doing this
fundamental quid pro quo. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict
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of Laws 183, 184 (1971).7 Courts that give effect to foreign
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7 Comment c of 183 states, in part:
The grant of two or more awards to an injured employee
is not repugnant to the basic principle of workmen's
compensation which is to impose absolute but limited
liability upon the employer. For a State, on the other
hand, to subject a person who has been held liable in
workmen's compensation to further unlimited liability
in tort or wrongful death would frustrate the workmen's
compensation policy of the State in which the award was
rendered.
See also 184, comment b ("A person who accepts an award under
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the workmen's compensation statute of a given state may justly be
held bound by the provisions of that statute insofar as immunity
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exclusive remedy provisions therefore do so to effectuate broad
compensation principles. See Wilson, 141 A.2d at 778; Woodner,
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210 F.2d at 874.
Whether Puerto Rico would follow this course in the present
circumstances is the ultimate question we must answer. We
therefore turn to a review of the relevant Puerto Rico law.
B. Applying Puerto Rico law
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Garcia claims that Puerto Rico law requires American
Airlines to participate in the Commonwealth's insurance fund, and
that the airline's failure to do so makes it an uninsured
employer subject to a tort suit under section 16 of the Puerto
Rico Workmen's Accident Compensation Act, 11 P.R. Laws Ann. 16.
His receipt of benefits from Florida does not foreclose such a
suit, Garcia maintains, in light of "the Commonwealth's
unequivocal policy that all employers carrying business in Puerto
Rico must contribute to the financial feasibility of the Fund."
He asserts that allowing employers to escape liability by
obtaining insurance elsewhere would undermine the Commonwealth's
compensation framework.
In emphasizing Commonwealth policy, Garcia has put his best
foot forward. Courts that have rejected application of a foreign
state's exclusive remedy provision have done so because the forum
state's policy would be disadvantaged. See, e.g., Reid v.
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Hansen, 440 N.W.2d 598, 601-02 (Iowa 1989) (plaintiff's receipt
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from tort and wrongful death liability is concerned.")
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of benefits in Nebraska does not bar tort action under Iowa
statute); Davis v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 289 F. Supp. 835, 838
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(D. Ore. 1968) (Oregon's policy of providing incentive to elect
coverage in Oregon would be undercut by Idaho exclusive remedy
provision). If Garcia were correct that barring his suit would
conflict with Commonwealth compensation policy, his position
would have considerable force.
We can find no conflict, however. Puerto Rico's workers'
compensation act, like all such laws, reflects a primary interest
in ensuring that the burden resulting from an employee's work-
related injury falls upon his employer rather than the individual
or his community. See, e.g., Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S.
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39, 41 (1965); Delano v. City of South Portland, 405 A.2d 222,
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225 (Me. 1979). As the district court recognized, this interest
"has been amply satisfied by the benefits Garcia received through
Florida's workers' accident compensation system" -- benefits
exceeding those available under the Puerto Rico statute. Puerto
Rico's policy, like Florida's, immunizes employers who pay
statutory benefits from further liability. P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
11, 21. Because the two governments agree on the compensation
quid pro quo, Puerto Rico would have no reason to reject
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Florida's exclusive remedy provision unless it had an interest in
providing an incentive for American and similar employers to
insure their employees specifically in the Commonwealth.
Our reading of Puerto Rico policy, however, indicates that
the Commonwealth expressly has disclaimed an interest in covering
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employees who do most of their work outside Puerto Rico. In an
opinion and subsequent explanatory letter, the Commonwealth's
Secretary of Justice concluded that flight attendants who perform
more than 50% of their work elsewhere are excluded from the
coverage of the Commonwealth's labor laws and Section 16 of the
Bill of Rights of the Puerto Rico Constitution, which guarantees
various employment-related rights, including safe working
conditions and a reasonable minimum salary. See Op. Sec. Just.,
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No. 1977-22, Trans. (Oct. 21, 1977); Letter of Dec. 28, 1977,
Trans.8 In making this determination, the Secretary relied on
federal and Commonwealth caselaw indicating that "job situs" is
"fundamental and determinative" with respect to the applicability
of labor laws, Op. Sec. Just., Trans., at 6 (citing Oil, Chemical
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& Atomic Workers Int'l Union, et al. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S.
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407, 420-21 (1976) (job situs is controlling factor as to whether
state can apply its right-to-work laws); Green Giant Co. and
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Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 104 P.R.
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Dec. 489, 4 Off. Trans. 682, 697 (1975) (constitutional guarantee
of overtime compensation does not apply to Puerto Rico migrant
workers who work outside of Puerto Rico)).
Although the Secretary's opinion does not explicitly address
the workers' compensation statute, we are persuaded that its
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8 As in this case, the flight attendants whose employment
triggered the Justice Department inquiry were based in Puerto
Rico and lived there. Indeed, they were assigned to "turn around
flights" between Puerto Rico and New York, and thus Puerto Rico
is "the point of departure and the place toward which they return
within the framework of a period of twenty-four hours," Op. Sec.
Just., No. 1977-22, Trans., at 2 (Oct. 21, 1977).
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underlying rationale reaches that system. The Secretary's intent
that his determination be applied broadly is strongly suggested
by the explanatory letter, in which he concluded that even
employees of a Puerto Rico airline are excluded from coverage of
the Commonwealth's labor laws because they spend the majority of
their work time outside the jurisdictional limits of Puerto Rico.
See Letter of Dec. 28, 1977, Trans., at 2. We think it follows
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naturally from this inclusive approach that the opinions be
interpreted to encompass all legislation designed to govern the
employer-employee relationship, including the Puerto Rico
Workmen's Accident Compensation Act.
Puerto Rico, therefore, would have no reason to penalize
American Airlines for providing workers' compensation insurance
for Garcia under the Florida system rather than through the
Puerto Rico Insurance Fund, particularly since Florida provided
superior benefits. See generally Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Velez,
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376 F.2d 521, 524 (1st Cir. 1967) (intention by Puerto Rico
legislature that its workers' compensation act "not be used as a
vehicle to require the maintenance of duplicating compensation
insurance by an employer"). Accordingly, we agree with the
district court that American Airlines is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law because Puerto Rico would respect the
statutory immunity granted the company under Florida's worker's
compensation statute.
Affirmed.
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