Garcia, S. v. Fathree, W.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 22, 2025
• Docket: 1395 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S22018-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

STEPHANIE MARIE GARCIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : WILLIAM JAMES FATHREE : : Appellant : No. 1395 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 20, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County, Civil Division, at No(s): 2023-4-0242

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2025

William James Fathree appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

upon his conviction of indirect criminal contempt (“ICC”) of a protection from

abuse (“PFA”) order previously obtained by his former romantic partner,

Stephanie Marie Garcia. We affirm.

The trial court offered the following factual background:

[Appellant] and [Ms.] Garcia are the parents of three children. The parties are involved in contentious custody litigation regarding those children. In addition, a dispute regarding child support exists. All of the parties’ disputes are complicated because [Appellant] resides in Florida.

On August 8, 2023, [Ms.] Garcia filed a petition for relief under the [PFA] Act. [She] alleged that on August 7, 2023, [Appellant] followed her and sent a note that said: “You talk to another nigga, I will kill you, love you.” The PFA petition alleged a past history of violence that included choking, punching[,] and threatening ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S22018-25

behavior with a knife. The PFA petition also alleged that [Appellant] physically abused a child who was then [four] years of age.

A hearing was scheduled for August 18, 2023, [Appellant] failed to appear. As a result, the PFA complaint filed by [Ms.] Garcia was granted and the temporary order was made final for a period of three years.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/24, at 1-2 (cleaned up).

The final PFA order was served on Appellant on August 25, 2023. See

Final PFA Order 8/18/23. Pursuant to the order, Appellant was not permitted

to have any contact with Ms. Garcia “by telephone or any other means,

including through third persons.” Id. Thereafter, on August 12, 2024, Ms.

Garcia filed against Appellant alleging that he violated the terms of the PFA

order by sending a text message that stated: “Can we talk? I know I fucked

up and I want to make things right. I want to be in my kids [sic] lives. I miss

them. I am sorry for what I have done. I am moving back to Pennsylvania

next week.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/24, at 2.

At the ensuing hearing held on September 20, 2024, both Ms. Garcia

and Appellant testified.1 Ms. Garcia indicated that, despite not recognizing

the phone number from which the message originated, she was nevertheless

able to identify Appellant as the sender, asserting that “he is the only person

that would send a message like that.” See N.T., 9/20/24, at 4. In detail, Ms.

____________________________________________

1 The Lebanon County Office of the District Attorney prosecuted the ICC charge

at the hearing.

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Garcia explained that she could identify Appellant based on the message’s

context and her personal circumstances, i.e., given that she has no children

with anyone else, has no current or previous paramours that live outside of

the state except for Appellant, and maintains no other problematic relationship

that would give rise to such a message. Id. at 5-6.

When questioned by opposing counsel regarding her ability to ascertain

the sender of the text message with reasonably certainty, Ms. Garcia

reiterated that, although she did not recognize the number, she does not

communicate with anyone else, have any friends, or know anyone in Florida

besides Appellant.2 Id. at 10. Additionally, Ms. Garcia alleged that Appellant

changed his phone number often and used multiple Facebook accounts in

order to harass her. Id.

In contrast to Ms. Garcia’s statements, Appellant expressly denied

sending the message, testifying that, although the message was sent at a

time when he had the ability to send it, he did not. Id. at 12. Appellant

further averred that he neither desired to resume a relationship with Ms.

Garcia nor did he have any intention of relocating to Pennsylvania. Id. at 12.

Appellant indicated that the phone number associated with the message did

2 The text message purported to come from area code 305. See N.T., 9/20/24, at 10. We take judicial notice of the fact that 305 is the code associated with southern Florida, including the Miami area.

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not match his current number but conceded that his device supported the use

of a text-free application, though he denied ever having used one.3 Id. at 18.

Following the hearing, the trial court concluded that, based upon the

evidence presented, Appellant violated the PFA order by sending the text

message to Ms. Garcia from a new phone or by causing someone else to send

the message on his behalf. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/24, at 6. The trial

court did not impose incarceration or probation but instead ordered Appellant

to pay $250 toward the cost of reunification counseling to help facilitate the

re-establishment of a relationship with his children. Id. at 9.

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents the following

issue for our review: “Did the [trial c]ourt commit an error of law and/or

abuse of discretion by finding that the Appellant violated a PFA after hearing

testimony that [Ms. Garcia] did not know who sent the email/text to her?”

Appellant’s brief at 8.

Where a defendant is found to have violated a PFA order, the PFA Act

permits the court to “hold the defendant in indirect criminal contempt and

punish the defendant in accordance with the law.” See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6114(a).

To establish ICC, the following must be proven: “1) the order was sufficiently

3 A text-free application provides the user with a phone number that is available for sending and receiving texts from various types of electronic devices.

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clear to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the

contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act must have been one prohibited

by the order; and 4) the intent of the contemnor in committing the act must

have been wrongful.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 288 A.3d 126, 131

(Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

Ultimately, Appellant’s argument challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence presented to support his ICC conviction. Our standard of review for

is well-settled:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 320 A.3d 151, 155 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up).

Further, “[i]n addition to proving the statutory elements of the crimes

charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth must also establish

the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes.”

Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 857 (Pa.Super. 2010). As with all

other elements of the crime, “any indefiniteness and uncertainty in the

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identification testimony goes to its weight. Direct evidence of identity is, of

course, not necessary and a defendant may be convicted solely on

circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Smyser, 195 A.3d 912, 915

(Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up).

Appellant’s argument is not based on any of the statutory elements of

his ICC conviction, but rather on the sufficiency of the evidence presented to

establish that he was the perpetrator of the crime. Specifically, Appellant

asserts that the trial court’s conclusion that he authored the message lacked

sufficient evidentiary support, given Ms. Garcia’s testimony that she had not

previously associated the source of the message with Appellant. See

Appellant’s brief at 7.

Although Appellant denied sending the text message, the trial court did

not find his testimony credible and concluded that Ms. Garcia’s testimony

provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that he authored the

message. See Trial Court Opinion 10/23/24, at 6. It was for the trial court

to evaluate the credibility and import of the competing evidence, and we may

not re-weigh it and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. See

Boyd, 320 A.3d at 155.

Appellant’s challenge amounts to a complaint that there was no direct

evidence that he was the person who sent the text in question to Ms. Garcia.

However, as noted above, direct evidence is not required to establish any

element of a crime. Id. Upon review of the trial record in the light most

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favorable to Ms. Garcia, we discern ample circumstantial evidence to

demonstrate that Appellant either sent the text message himself or caused

someone else to send it on his behalf.

Specifically, Ms. Garcia testified that the message referenced her

children, whom she shares exclusively with Appellant. See N.T., 9/20/24, at

5. Moreover, the text message expressed the sender’s desire to be in those

children’s lives. Id. Ms. Garcia’s testimony further undermined the possibility

that someone else would have had the motive to send the message, as she

explained that she had no problems with anyone else in her life, had no other

paramours who would have possessed any reason to send her a threatening

message, and knew no one who would be returning to Pennsylvania other

than Appellant. Id. at 5-6.

Although the evidence did not preclude all possibility that someone other

than Appellant sent the message in question, such was not required. See,

e.g., Smyser, 195 A.3d at 916-17 (holding evidence of identity as the person

who used a computer to view child pornography was sufficient despite

testimony that other members of the household also had access to the

device). Ms. Garcia’s testimony, credited by the trial court, was enough to

allow it to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the

individual who initiated the text communication, thereby violating the clear

prohibitions of the PFA order. Accord Commonwealth v. Talley, 236 A.3d

42, 60 (Pa.Super. 2020) (ruling that, although the victim did not recognize

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the phone number from which she received threatening messages, the

defendant was properly identified to be the sender where, inter alia, she had

never received threatening messages prior to ending her relationship with the

defendant and the text messages referenced specific sexual acts that were

only known to them). Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency challenge to his

conviction for ICC must fail.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

P.J.E. Stevens joins this Memorandum.

P.J. Lazarus concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 08/22/2025

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