Garas v. Cook

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Garas v. Cook

122 A.D.3d 414, 994 N.Y.S.2d 540

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 6, 2014

Docket13406 20175/06

StatusPublished

This text of 122 A.D.3d 414 (Garas v. Cook) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Garas v. Cook, 122 A.D.3d 414, 994 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), entered May 2, 2013, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it is barred by collateral estoppel, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly found that plaintiff Garas’s claim against defendants is barred by collateral estoppel (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455 [1985]; Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 72 [1969]). The record demonstrates that Garas was afforded a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue of defendant Cook’s alleged negligence in the occurrence of the subject accident, in both the New Jersey Superior Court action, in which the court granted these defendants summary judgment, finding that Garas’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident, and in the Department of Motor Vehicle administrative hearing, in which the Administrative Law Judge came to the same conclusion.

We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur — Mazzarelli, J.E, Acosta, DeGrasse and Clark, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Sharon A.M. Aarons, J.), entered May 2, 2013, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it is barred by collateral estoppel, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The court properly found that plaintiff Garas’s claim against defendants is barred by collateral estoppel (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455 [1985]; Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 72 [1969]). The record demonstrates that Garas was afforded a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue of defendant Cook’s alleged negligence in the occurrence of the subject accident, in both the New Jersey Superior Court action, in which the court granted these defendants summary judgment, finding that Garas’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident, and in the Department of Motor Vehicle administrative hearing, in which the Administrative Law Judge came to the same conclusion.

We have considered plaintiffs remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur — Mazzarelli, J.E, Acosta, DeGrasse and Clark, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

122 A.D.3d 414, 994 N.Y.S.2d 540, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garas-v-cook-nyappdiv-2014.

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