Gange v. Government Of Guam

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 DISTRICT OF GUAM 7 8 MARIA A. GANGE, JESUS C. Civil Case No. 10-00018 CHARFAUROS, ANA A. 9 CHARGUALAF, and JESUS G. AGUIGUI, for themselves and on behalf of 10 all others similarly situated, 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 12 vs. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 13 GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, GUAM ANCESTRAL LANDS COMMISSION, by 14 and through its individual Commissioners, and DOES 1 THROUGH 300, inclusive, 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Before the court is Plaintiffs’ application for a temporary restraining order (“the TRO 19 Application”).1 See Docket No. 5. Also before the court is the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 20 complaint (“the Motion to Dismiss”) that Defendants included in their opposition to the TRO 21 Application. See Docket No. 16. 22 A. Denial of TRO Application 23 The TRO Application is DENIED. It seeks equitable relief to enjoin what is alleged to 24 be a taking of private property “without requiring advance payment of just compensation as 25 required by the [Fifth] Amendment of United States Constitution and the Organic Act of Guam.” 26 27 1 The TRO Application originally sought ex parte relief. In a prior order, though, the court denied the TRO 28 Application in that respect, because Plaintiffs failed to explain why the court should proceed ex parte. See Docket No. 1 Docket No. 5 at 2:2-4. But “[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of 2 private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be 3 brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 4 986, 1016 (1984). And “[t]he Fifth Amendment does not require that compensation precede the 5 taking.” Id. Here, a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to 6 the alleged taking. See 7 G.C.A. § 11311.1. Thus, the court cannot grant the relief sought in the 7 TRO Application.2 8 B. Order to Show Cause 9 Plaintiffs are ORDERED to show cause why this case should not be dismissed. They 10 assert three bases of jurisdiction: (1) diversity; (2) federal question; and (3) the original 11 jurisdiction of the District Court of Guam. See Docket No. 4 at ¶¶5-8. Diversity jurisdiction 12 clearly does not exist, because all parties to this case are, if anything, citizens of Guam. The 13 court has serious questions about the other two bases. 14 1. Federal question 15 Relying on the Williamson case, Defendants have argued that the federal question in this 16 case, if any, is not yet ripe. See Docket No. 16 at 2:15-4:16 (citing Williamson County Regional 17 Planning Com’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985)). Williamson remains 18 good law, even though it “all but guarantees that claimants will be unable to utilize the federal 19 courts to enforce the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation guarantee.” San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. 20 City and County of San Francisco, California, 545 U.S. 323, 351 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., 21 concurring) (emphasis added). 22 Plaintiffs have briefly argued that the case is ripe. See Docket No. 17 at 2:13-3:15. But 23 the court rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that Williamson and its progeny are limited to regulatory 24 takings. See,e.g.,Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 864 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th 25 Cir. 1989) (“Even in physical taking cases, compensation must first be sought from the state if 26 27 2 Also, the fact that Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent an alleged taking shows that—contrary to their reply—no taking has yet occurred. 28 1 || adequate procedures are available.”). The court also rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that Williamson 2 || and its progeny do not apply unless the case is predicated on Section 1983 of Title 42, United 3 || States Code, as no case appears to stand for such a rule.’ Nonetheless, the court would like to 4 || give Plaintiffs a chance to make a more considered ripeness argument. 5 2. Original jurisdiction of the District Court of Guam 6 Plaintiffs seem to suggest that this case is within the original jurisdiction of the District 7 || Court of Guam. See Docket No. 4 at 95; cf 48 U.S.C. § 1424(c). In their reply in support of 8 || their TRO Application, Plaintiffs suggest that their case is authorized by Guam’s inverse 9 |] condemnation law. See Docket No. 17 at 2:6-13 (citing 7 G.C.A. § 11311.1). Setting aside the 10 }| fact that the operative complaint does not cite Section 11311.1, the court does not see how this 11 }| case is within its original jurisdiction. 12 Cc Conclusion 13 Accordingly, the TRO Application is DENIED, and Plaintiffs are ORDERED to show 14 || cause why the court should not dismiss this case. Plaintiffs are specifically ORDERED to 15 | explain why the court should find (1) that some federal question in this case is ripe for 16 |] adjudication, and that this case should not be dismissed on prudential grounds under Williamson; 17 || and (2) that this case is within the court’s Section 1424(c) original jurisdiction. 18 Plaintiffs shall file their brief by 3 p.m. on Friday, September 2, 2010. Defendants shall 19 | file their response by 3 p.m. on Friday, September 16, 2010.

□ a '™ /s/ Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood 22 ‘a i Chief Judge □ YM Dated: Aug 23, 2010 23 Qa ag” 24 95 > The court does not follow Plaintiffs’ argument about Guam being an instrumentality of the United States. Of course, “Guam should be viewed as a federal instrumentality for some purposes.” Blas v. Government of Guam, 941 26 || F.2d 778, 779 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). But if Plaintiffs are claiming that their takings claim actually runs against the United States, then they need to avail themselves of the process prescribed by the Tucker Act; and, if not 27 □□ satisfied with the result, they can only file an action in the Court of Federal Claims (given the value of their claim). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491. 28 Page 3 of 3