Gambrell v. Stancil

• Court: District Court, D. Colorado
• Decided: August 25, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-01853
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Judge Nina Y. Wang

Civil Action No. 24-cv-01853-NYW-SBP

CARL GAMBRELL, ALEXANDER HINKLE, JAWAD KHOUIR, ZACHARY MONDRAGON, DOMINIC PELLICANE, FRITZ SCHNEIDER, JOSHUA COYLE, and ALBERT GRANADOS, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

MOSES STANCIL, in his official capacity, AMANDA RETTING, in her official capacity, and KIMBERLY KLINE, in her official capacity,1

Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss First Amended Class Action Complaint Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (the “Motion” or “Motion for Partial Dismissal”). [Doc. 25]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the related briefing,

1 Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal references “interim Chief of Behavioral Health Jason Guidry” and asserts that, under Rule 25, he is “automatically substituted for former Chief of Behavioral Health Kimberly Kline.” [Doc. 25 at 1 n.1]. Plaintiffs agree that “Ms. Kline is no longer employed by [CDOC]” and state that “[u]pon information and belief, her job is now being handled by an interim appointment.” [Doc. 29 at 2 n.1]. To be sure, under Rule 25 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when a government official leaves their position, “[t]he officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). However, no Party has moved to update the caption in this case, and it is unclear to the Court whether Mr. Guidry remains the interim Chief of Behavioral Health. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that on or before September 8, 2025, the Parties shall file a joint motion to amend the case caption that reflects the current officeholder. and applicable case law, and it concludes that oral argument would not materially assist in resolving the Motion. For the reasons set forth in this Order, the Motion for Partial Dismissal is respectfully DENIED. BACKGROUND

A person who commits an offense and is sentenced under Colorado’s Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (“SOLSA”) is “required as a part of the sentence to undergo treatment.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1004(3); [Doc. 21 at ¶ 9].2 Participation in sex offender treatment is a condition precedent to an offender’s eligibility for parole. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1006(1)(a); [Doc. 21 at ¶ 9]. The Colorado Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) offers sex offender treatment through the Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program (“SOTMP”). [Doc. 21 at ¶ 1]. However, CDOC offers SOTMP treatment at just two of its facilities: Fremont Correctional Facility and Territorial Correctional Facility. [Id. at ¶ 12]. SOTMP is also understaffed, with 26 of 41 therapist positions currently vacant and a 53% vacancy rate

for SOTMP staff overall. [Id. at ¶ 15]. According to Plaintiffs, CDOC fails to properly fund or staff SOTMP, expand its treatment locations, or permit more flexible treatment options, such as telehealth therapy. [Id. at ¶ 74]. This has created a backlog of inmates who are eligible for, but denied access to, SOTMP treatment: in 2023, CDOC admitted 828 inmates who had been referred to SOTMP and graduated only about 160 inmates from the program that year. [Id. at ¶ 78].

2 The Court draws these facts from the First Amended Class Action Complaint (the “First Amended Complaint”), [Doc. 21], presumes they are true for purposes of the Motion for Partial Dismissal, and limits its recitation of the facts to those relevant to the issue raised therein. Plaintiffs Carl Gambrell (“Mr. Gambrell”), Alexander Hinkle (“Mr. Hinkle”), Jawad Khouir, Zachary Mondragon, Dominic Pellicane, Fritz Schneider, Joshua Coyle, and Alberto Granados (together, “Plaintiffs”) have been convicted of sex offenses and are currently incarcerated within CDOC facilities. [Id. at ¶¶ 36–43]. Each Plaintiff is

incarcerated pursuant to an indeterminate sentence of a number of years to life. [Id.]. All Plaintiffs are classified as “S5R,” which means that they are eligible and ready for sex offender treatment. [Id. at ¶ 44]. However, all Plaintiffs have been denied an opportunity to participate in that treatment. [Id. at ¶¶ 36–43]. Plaintiffs Khouir, Pellicane, Schneider, Coyle, and Granados have been told that the CDOC’s limited resources are precluding their treatment opportunity. [Id. at ¶¶ 38, 40–43]. Two Plaintiffs in particular—Mr. Gambrell and Mr. Hinkle—pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement through which “the State guaranteed and promised to provide [them] with, timely and coextensive with incarceration, the offense-specific treatment necessary to become eligible for parole.” [Id. at ¶¶ 152, 159]. Mr. Gambrell’s and Mr. Hinkle’s

requests for sex offender treatment have been denied, and they assert that the denial of access to treatment amounts to a breach of their plea agreements. [Id. at ¶¶ 156–57, 163–64]. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on July 2, 2024, [Doc. 1], and filed the First Amended Complaint on October 1, 2024, naming three Defendants: Moses Stancil, the Executive Director of the CDOC; Amanda Retting, the CDOC’s SOTMP administrator and the CDOC representative on the Sex Offender Management Board; and Kimberly Kline,3 the CDOC’s Chief of Behavioral Health and chair of the Sex Offender Management Board

3 See supra note 1. (collectively, “Defendants”). [Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 22–24]. Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of themselves and a proposed class comprised of “[a]ll inmates with indeterminate sentences under SOLSA who are coded S5-R, who are past their parole eligibility date, and who have been denied access to SOTMP treatment.” [Id. at ¶ 105]. They bring three

causes of action: (1) a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants (“Claim I”), [Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 136–41]; (2) a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, asserted by all Plaintiffs against all Defendants (“Claim II”), [id. at ¶¶ 142–49]; and (3) a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on an alleged breach of plea agreements, raised by Mr. Gambrell and Mr. Hinkle against all Defendants (“Claim III”), [id. at ¶¶ 150–70]. Defendants move to dismiss only Claim III—the due process claim arising out of an alleged breach of Mr. Gambrell’s and Mr. Hinkle’s plea agreements. See [Doc. 25]. In their view, the claim should be dismissed because it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477 (1994). [Doc. 25 at 5]. The Motion is fully briefed, see [Doc. 29; Doc. 36], and the Court considers the Parties’ arguments below.4

4 On December 17, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Defendants’ Reply or, in the Alternative, For a Sur Reply (the “Motion to Strike”), arguing that Defendants improperly raised new arguments in their Reply. [Doc. 40 at 4–8]. Defendants oppose the Motion to Strike, arguing that “the reply brief merely responds to arguments made in the response brief.” [Doc. 42 at 2]. The Court respectfully disagrees with Defendants’ assertion and finds that their Reply in Support of Partial Motion to Dismiss (“Reply”) goes beyond simple responsive arguments and raises a new ground for dismissal not articulated in their Motion for Partial Dismissal. See [Doc. 36 at 8–9 (arguing that Plaintiffs “have not stated a claim against CDOC for breach of contract” because, inter alia, they “have not alleged facts that might demonstrate the Defendants were a party to the agreements”)]. However, it is well established that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief may be deemed waived. White v. Chafin, 862 F.3d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir. 2017). In its discretion, the Court elects to simply disregard the new arguments raised in Defendants’ Reply rather than LEGAL STANDARD Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept as true all

well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). The plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, “and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). ANALYSIS “[A] § 1983 action will not lie when a state prisoner challenges ‘the fact or duration of his confinement,’ . . . and seeks either ‘immediate release from prison,’ or the

‘shortening’ of his term of confinement.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 482, 489 (1973)). Nor may a state prisoner seek money damages under § 1983 based on the alleged unconstitutionality of his conviction or sentence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 478. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the

striking the brief or permitting a sur-reply. Accordingly, the Motion to Strike is respectfully DENIED. action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at 486–87 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court later reiterated that an action under § 1983 “is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81–82. “Thus, for § 1983 claims necessarily challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence, Heck delays the rise of the cause of action until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999). Defendants argue that the challenged due process claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey because a finding that Defendants breached Mr. Gambrell’s or Mr. Hinkle’s plea agreement “would cast doubt on [those] Plaintiffs’ underlying convictions and/or sentences.” [Doc. 25 at 6]. They contend that “enforcing the terms of [the] plea agreements through specific performance . . . necessarily would imply the invalidity of their underlying convictions or sentences,” so the due process claim “is not cognizable under § 1983.” [Id. at 10]; see also [id. at 4, 6]. However, Defendants do not explain why Mr. Gambrell’s or Mr. Hinkle’s success on their due process claim would necessarily invalidate their convictions or sentences.

See generally [id.]. As Plaintiffs highlight in their Response to Defendant[s’] Partial Motion to Dismiss First Amended Class Action Complaint Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), see [Doc. 29 at 4, 11], Mr. Gambrell and Mr. Hinkle seek specific performance of their plea agreements, not rescission of them, see [Doc. 21 at ¶ 165]. Plaintiffs contend that their claim for specific performance is not barred by Heck because a ruling in their favor would “not undermine Plaintiffs’ conviction[s] or sentence[s] in any way.” [Doc. 29 at 11–13 (emphasis omitted)]. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that a judgment in their favor would only require Defendants to grant Mr. Gambrell and Mr. Hinkle access to the treatment contemplated in their plea agreements, which would at most permit them to be considered

for parole. [Id. at 12–13]. The Court respectfully agrees with Plaintiffs. Under Preiser, Heck, and their progeny, claims under § 1983 are barred when the plaintiff “seek[s] to invalidate the duration of their confinement—either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. But § 1983 “remains available for procedural challenges where success in the action would not necessarily spell immediate or speedier release for the prisoner.” Id. In Wilkinson, two inmates challenged the parole procedures applicable to their incarceration, one challenging parole-eligibility procedures and the other challenging

parole-suitability procedures. Id. at 76–77. They sought, in pertinent part, injunctive relief directing prison officials to grant them new parole hearings. Id. at 77. The Supreme Court found these claims cognizable under § 1983 because although the plaintiffs sought relief “that [would] render invalid the state procedures used to deny parole eligibility . . . and parole suitability,” they did not seek any injunctive relief “ordering [their] immediate or speedier release into the community.” Id. at 82. And, the Court explained, success on their claims would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or sentences— it would simply mean new parole eligibility review for one plaintiff and a new parole hearing for the other. Id. Defendants do not meaningfully distinguish Wilkinson from this case, arguing only that Wilkinson “does not concern the breach of a plea agreement; rather, it was brought by two inmates who challenged the application of new and harsher parole guidelines to their pre-guidelines sentences.” [Doc. 36 at 7]. But despite any factual differences

between Wilkinson and this case, the analysis and holding of Wilkinson still guide the Court here. Like Wilkinson, this is not a case where the requested relief would necessarily “demand[] immediate release or a shorter period of detention.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 79; see, e.g., Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487–88 (action challenging alleged unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits and seeking restoration of credits was appropriately raised in habeas, as it challenged “the very duration of [the inmates’] physical confinement” and effectively demanded immediate release or shorter detention). As alleged in the First Amended Complaint and provided by Colorado law, sex offender treatment is a statutorily mandated prerequisite to parole eligibility. [Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 9–10, 152, 159]; Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-11.7-105(1), 18-1.3-1004(3). But participation in or

completion of treatment will not necessarily result in an inmate’s release on parole. Rather, the parole board must still determine (1) “whether the sex offender has successfully progressed in treatment”; (2) whether the offender would “pose an undue threat to the community if released under appropriate treatment and monitoring requirements”; and (3) “whether there is a strong and reasonable probability that the person will not thereafter violate the law.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1006(1)(a); see also People v. Tucker, 194 P.3d 503, 504 (Colo. App. 2008) (“[SOLSA’s] overall statutory scheme . . . makes it clear that the board’s decision to release offenders on parole contains elements of discretion, . . . provided that the discretion accords with the requirements of [SOLSA].”). In other words, a judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor would not necessarily result in their immediate or speedier release. It would, at most, give Mr. Gambrell and Mr. Hinkle the opportunity to complete the treatment that remains a statutorily required condition

precedent to parole. [Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 9–10]. Under Wilkinson, such a claim is cognizable under § 1983. See 544 U.S. at 82; see also Marshall v. Milyard, 415 F. App’x 850, 854– 55 (10th Cir. 2011) (reversing dismissal of § 1983 claim based on loss of good-time credits because “[i]n most cases, parole in Colorado remains discretionary even after a prisoner accrues sufficient credits to become eligible for it,” so restoration of good-time credits would afford the plaintiff “only speedier consideration for discretionary parole, rather than ensure speedier release”); Bartley v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 258 F. App’x 1, 2 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n inmate may challenge state parole procedures in an action under § 1983 when success would merely mean becoming eligible for a discretionary grant of parole.”); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The only benefit that a victory in this case

would provide [the plaintiffs] . . . is a ticket to get in the door of the parole board, thus only making them eligible for parole consideration according to the terms of their sentences. If [the plaintiffs] win, it will in no way guarantee parole or necessarily shorten their prison sentences by a single day.”). While a favorable determination might ultimately lead to Mr. Gambrell’s or Mr. Hinkle’s successful progression through treatment and eventual release on parole, “that outcome is hardly inevitable.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 534 (2011). Nor would Plaintiffs’ success on this claim “necessarily imply the invalidity of [their] conviction[s] or sentence[s].” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. The Supreme Court was “careful in Heck to stress the importance of the term ‘necessarily.’” Skinner, 562 U.S. at 534 (quotation omitted). A judicial determination that Defendants breached the plea agreements would not necessarily call the validity of those agreements into question, as any such determination would be based on Defendants’ alleged conduct since the

execution of the plea agreements, not the agreements’ validity at the time of execution. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009) (“[T]here is nothing to support the proposition that the Government’s breach of a plea agreement retroactively causes the defendant’s agreement to have been unknowing or involuntary. . . . [W]hen one of the exchanged promises is not kept[,] . . . the contract [is] broken,” and “[t]he party injured by the breach will generally be entitled to some remedy. . . . [T]hat is not the same thing as saying the contract was never validly concluded.”). Moreover, as mentioned above, Plaintiffs do not seek recission of their plea agreements, but specific performance. [Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 165, 170]. A ruling in Plaintiffs’ favor on this claim can exist in harmony with their valid convictions and sentences.

The cases Defendants rely upon do not change the Court’s analysis. Defendants primarily rely on Paige v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, a non-binding case that appears incompatible with subsequent Supreme Court precedent. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.” (quotation omitted)). In Paige, the plaintiff brought a claim similar to the one at issue here, alleging that Oklahoma’s promises of “sex offender therapy and eligibility for parole” had not been upheld, and the state had breached the plaintiff’s plea agreement. No. 06-cv-01057-C, 2007 WL 1139822, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 17, 2007), aff’d, 248 F. App’x 35 (10th Cir. 2007). The magistrate judge found that the claim was barred by Heck because it necessarily implied the invalidity of the plaintiff’s convictions. Id. This determination was supported by a citation to the Supreme Court case of Mabry v. Johnson, wherein the Supreme Court stated that “when

the prosecution breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand.” Id. (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 604, 509 (1984))]. The district judge accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, id. at *1, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, relying on the same language from Mabry, see 248 F. App’x at 37. However, in Puckett, the Supreme Court expressly stated that the Mabry Court’s statement “was dictum.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 138 n.1. According to the Puckett Court, Mabry’s “conclusion that the conviction cannot stand is only sometimes true (if that is the remedy the court prescribes for the breach). And even when the conviction is overturned,

the reason is not that the guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary.” Id. The Supreme Court “disavow[ed] any aspect of the Mabry dictum that contradicts” the holding in Puckett. Id. Thus, Paige is at odds with subsequent binding precedent in Puckett, and the Court cannot rely on it.5

5 Webber v. Weaver, 6 F. App’x 706 (10th Cir. 2001), another case cited by Defendants, is also distinguishable. In that case, the plaintiff entered into a plea agreement in which the state agreed to drop certain charges against him. Id. at 707–08. However, in contravention of the plea agreement, the state later reinitiated proceedings on the charges it agreed to drop. Id. at 708. The plaintiff entered into a second plea agreement on those reinitiated charges, and after sentencing, he brought a § 1983 claim alleging a breach of the first plea agreement. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded that this challenge was barred by Heck because if the plaintiff prevailed on his claim that the state breached the first plea agreement, “that result would necessarily imply that his current sentence The connection between Plaintiffs’ allegations of a breach of their plea agreements and their potential release on parole “is too tenuous here to achieve [Defendants’] legal door-closing objective.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78. Because a judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor would not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or sentences and would not necessarily demand release or a shorter period of incarceration, Heck does not bar Mr. Gambrell’s and Mr. Hinkle’s due process claim for breach of their plea agreements. See id. at 82. Accordingly, the Motion for Partial Dismissal is respectfully DENIED. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that: (1) Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss First Amended Class Action Complaint Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [Doc. 25] is DENIED; (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Defendants’ Reply or, in the Alternative, For a Sur Reply [Doc. 40] is DENIED; and (3) On or before September 8, 2025, the Parties shall file a joint motion to amend the case caption to reflect the appropriate Defendant in lieu of Kimberly Kline, in her official capacity as CDOC Chief of Behavioral Health.

DATED: August 25, 2025 BY THE COURT:

United States District Judge

was invalid.” /d. In contrast, Plaintiffs here do not challenge the validity of their plea agreements, only Defendants’ alleged breach thereof. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137.

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