Gamble v. Nelson International

861 P.2d 1021, 124 Or. App. 90, 1993 Ore. App. LEXIS 1733
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedOctober 20, 1993
Docket91-05124; CA A77464
StatusPublished

This text of 861 P.2d 1021 (Gamble v. Nelson International) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gamble v. Nelson International, 861 P.2d 1021, 124 Or. App. 90, 1993 Ore. App. LEXIS 1733 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinions

De MUNIZ, J.

Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board, contending that the Board erred in failing to assess attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1) for SAIF’s withdrawal of its “disclaimer of responsibility” before a hearing had been held.

Claimant filed a claim for a back injury and received a “disclaimer of responsibility” from SAIF, pursuant to ORS 656.308(2),1 in which SAIF contended that claimant’s subsequent employer was responsible for the claim. Claimant [93]*93requested a hearing, and shortly before the hearing, SAIF withdrew its disclaimer. The only question on review is whether claimant’s attorney is entitled to fees for having been instrumental in obtaining the withdrawal of the disclaimer.

ORS 656.386(1) provides, in part:

“In all cases involving accidental injuries where a claimant finally prevails in an appeal to the Court of Appeals or petition for review to the Supreme Court from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation, the court shall allow a reasonable attorney fee to the claimant’s attorney. In such rejected cases where the claimant prevails finally in a hearing before the referee or in a review by the board itself, then the referee or board shall allow a reasonable attorney fee. If an attorney is instrumental in obtaining compensation for a claimant and a hearing by the referee is not held, a reasonable attorney fee shall be allowed. ” (Emphasis supplied.)

There are two reasons why we conclude that the emphasized language does not authorize an insurer-paid attorney fee in [94]*94this case. Under the circumstances of this case, SAIF’s “disclaimer” of responsibility, pursuant to ORS 656.308(2), is not a denial. Although SAIF could have chosen to deny the claim in the same document, see OAR 438-05-053, it did not. The disclaimer is not subject to the procedures of ORS 656.262(6). It serves only to notify the claimant that the claim may be compensable against another employer or insurer. We conclude that it does not trigger the provisions of ORS 656.319 regarding the request for hearing, and does not provide a basis for the assessment of attorney fees under ORS 656.386(1).

Additionally, as the Supreme Court has held, an assessed fee is available under ORS 656.386(1) only if the claimant finally prevails “from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation.” Shoulders v. SAIF, 300 Or 606, 611, 716 P2d 751 (1986). When the issue in the case does not concern the compensability of the claim, the statute is inapplicable. See Short v. SAIF, 305 Or 541, 545, 754 P2d 575 (1988); Multnomah County School Dist. v. Tigner, 113 Or App 405, 408, 833 P2d 1294 (1992); Mercer Industries v. Rose, 103 Or App 96, 98, 795 P2d 615, rev den 311 Or 150 (1991). SAIF’s disclaimer did not create an issue concerning the compensability of the claim.

In 1991, the legislature added the emphasized language to ORS 656.386(1), in response to our decision in Jones v. OSCI, 107 Or App 78, 810 P2d 1318, mod 108 Or App 230, 814 P2d 558 (1991), in which we had held that, in order to recover an assessed fee under ORS 656.386(1), the claimant must have prevailed after a hearing. We read the new language as making the statute applicable to cases in which a hearing is not held; however, we do not read it as a general expansion of the terms of the statute so as to provide a basis for an assessed fee in any case in which an attorney is instrumental in obtaining compensation for the claimant, even if the other requirements of the statute, as interpreted by the cases, have not been satisfied. See SAIF v. Allen, 124 Or App 183, 861 P2d 1018 (1993).

In order to obtain an assessed fee under ORS 656.386(1), the claimant must still prevail from an order or decision denying a claim for compensation. Here, SAIF only disclaimed responsibility for the claim. Despite the fact that [95]*95claimant’s attorney may have been instrumental in obtaining SAIF’s withdrawal of its disclaimer, that is not a service for which an assessed fee is available under the statute.2

Affirmed.

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Related

SAIF Corp. v. Allen
861 P.2d 1018 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1993)
Shoulders v. SAIF Corp.
716 P.2d 751 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1986)
Short v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
754 P.2d 575 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1988)
Jones v. Oregon State Correctional Institution
810 P.2d 1318 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1991)
Jones v. OREGON STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION
814 P.2d 558 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1991)
Mercer Industries v. Rose
795 P.2d 615 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1990)
Multnomah County School District v. Tigner
833 P.2d 1294 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
861 P.2d 1021, 124 Or. App. 90, 1993 Ore. App. LEXIS 1733, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gamble-v-nelson-international-orctapp-1993.