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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
Nos. 24-CV-0023 & 24-CV-0685
ELIZABETH GALVIN, APPELLANT,
V.
RUPPERT NURSERIES, INC., APPELLEE.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (2020-CA-004445-B)
(Hon. Donald W. Tunnage, Trial Judge)
(Argued March 13, 2025 Decided August 28, 2025)
Paul A. Cunningham, with whom Neill C. Kling, of the bar of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, was on the briefs, for appellant.
William A. Goldberg for appellee.
Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and SHANKER, Associate Judges.
SHANKER, Associate Judge: In 2020, appellant Elizabeth Galvin contracted
with a tree nursery company, appellee Ruppert Nurseries, Inc., to obtain and install
six trees on her property in northwest Washington, D.C. When Ms. Galvin was
dissatisfied with the trees, she refused to pay the remaining balance on the contract.
Ruppert sued Ms. Galvin for breach of contract and Ms. Galvin asserted 2
counterclaims of breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and violations of the D.C.
Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA).
At a bench trial, the parties presented competing theories about Ruppert’s
obligations under the contract. In Ruppert’s view, the contract obligated it only to
select and install six trees on Ms. Galvin’s property and maintain those trees for a
six-week monitoring period. Because the parties agreed that Ruppert had selected,
installed, and monitored the six trees, Ruppert argued that it had fulfilled its
contractual obligations, triggering Ms. Galvin’s obligation to pay Ruppert, which
she had not done. Ms. Galvin told a different story. In her telling, Ruppert was
required to install trees that would create “evergreen screening,” meaning that the
trees would fill gaps in her existing landscaping design to achieve a privacy fence at
the edge of her property. Because the trees did not achieve that evergreen screening
goal, and two of the trees died within a year of installation, Ms. Galvin argued that
Ruppert breached the contract, along with the contract’s duty of good faith and fair
dealing, the implied warranty of merchantability, and the CPPA.
The trial court ruled in favor of Ruppert on its contract claim against
Ms. Galvin and on almost all of Ms. Galvin’s counterclaims against Ruppert. The
sole claim on which the court ruled for Ms. Galvin was her implied warranty of 3
merchantability claim, as it related to one of the six trees. Throughout its findings
and conclusions, the trial court rejected Ms. Galvin’s theory of the case—that
Ruppert was required to create evergreen screening to Ms. Galvin’s liking—and
instead concluded that Ruppert was required only to deliver and install the six trees
and monitor them for six weeks.
Ms. Galvin appealed. She raises seven issues that branch into eight sub-
issues, all of which are rooted in the three species of claims involved in this case:
contract, CPPA, and implied warranty of merchantability. We address the issues
under that framework, and, for the following reasons, we affirm on all grounds.
I. Background
At the core of this case is the contract between Ms. Galvin and Ruppert and
their conflicting theories about Ruppert’s obligations and performance under the
contract. In Ruppert’s view, the contract required it to buy, install, and monitor six
trees on Ms. Galvin’s property, with no warranty on plant material supplied and
installed by Ruppert. In Ms. Galvin’s view, the trees were supposed to achieve a
particular purpose on her property by filling gaps in her existing landscape design,
achieving “evergreen screening.” When the trees did not accomplish that purpose
(with some trees shedding leaves and others dying), Ms. Galvin refused to pay the
remaining balance on the contract. 4
A. Factual Background
In July 2020, Ms. Galvin signed a contract with Ruppert under which Ruppert
would “furnish all labor, tools, materials, equipment and insurance necessary” to
install six trees: three southern magnolias, one cryptomeria, one dogwood, and one
hemlock. The installation included, among other things, “[b]ackfilling voids around
trees with native soil,” pruning “at time of installation,” and “costs to obtain
permits,” and all work was to “be in accordance with the Landscape Specification
Guidelines [(LSGs)] for the Baltimore Washington Metropolitan Area.” The
contract specified that there was “[n]o warranty on plant material supplied and
installed by Ruppert Nurseries as part of this contract.” Moreover, the contract stated
that Ms. Galvin “acknowledge[d] that plants [were] being planted into locations that
are considered low light conditions” and that “[l]ower branches and shaded sides of
trees will thin out overtime in these situations.” At the top of the contract, the “Re:”
line identified the contract as “Galvin Evergreen Screening No Warranty.” The total
contract price, $345,800, was split into two payments: a fifty percent deposit “due at
contract signing” and the remaining balance “due upon completion.” Ms. Galvin
paid the fifty percent deposit when she signed the contract.
When Ms. Galvin initially contacted Ruppert, she explained that her neighbor
had “cut down all of the screening that was on their land but was essential to the 5
privacy in that corner of our property” and that she was “eager to restore as much of
that as possible, probably with substantial evergreens of the most suitable variety.”
Ms. Galvin then hired a landscape architect, Holt Jordan, to work with Ruppert’s
arborist to visit the tree nurseries and select the trees for the project. Mr. Jordan
personally inspected some of the trees for the project and designed the plan
(including selecting the types of trees to be planted and the planting location for
those trees). During the design and planning phase, Ruppert explained that planting
the trees in the summer was not a concern, as the trees would transfer well with
“proper care and maintenance before and after planting.” The southern magnolias
were sourced from a nursery in Florida and were transported via truck to Ruppert
prior to installation. The other three trees (the cryptomeria, dogwood, and hemlock)
were all grown in Maryland, and all three of those species are grown and frequently
planted in the area.
Ruppert installed the six trees in late July 2020. After installation,
Ms. Galvin’s landscaper expressed that he was “happy with the trees,” which seemed
“to look as [if] they’ve always been there,” and Ms. Galvin agreed that the “trees do
look wonderful.” Ruppert then handed off maintenance responsibilities to
Ms. Galvin in early August. Approximately a week later, Ms. Galvin noticed “a
considerable amount of Magnolia leaves which had been shed under all three of the 6
trees.” When Ruppert requested that Ms. Galvin pay the remaining contract balance
because it had finished installing and monitoring the trees, Ms. Galvin refused.
In late August, Ms. Galvin, through her attorney, sent a letter to Ruppert
stating that she would “delay payment” of the remaining contract balance “while
assessing whether the tree(s) were fit for their ordinary purpose at the time of
planting and properly planted” given “the rapid decline in the state of the tree(s)
provided and planted.” Ms. Galvin admitted that she “took the risk that healthy trees
properly planted, might not flourish over time.” By September, the dogwood tree
was dead, with the hemlock tree dying approximately ten months after installation.
An existing maple tree on Ms. Galvin’s property that was close to the planting zone
also died.
B. Procedural Background
After Ms. Galvin refused to pay the remaining balance on the contract and
negotiations proved unfruitful, Ruppert sued Ms. Galvin for breach of contract.
Ms. Galvin counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and violations
of the CPPA. After a bench trial, the trial court made the following conclusions. 7
1. Ruppert’s Breach of Contract Claim Against Ms. Galvin
The court concluded that there was a valid contract between Ruppert and
Ms. Galvin. The contract required Ruppert to install six trees, transfer maintenance
to Ms. Galvin, monitor the trees for six weeks, and complete all work in accordance
with the LSGs. The court acknowledged Ms. Galvin’s dissatisfaction with the trees
based on her understanding of evergreen screening, but it declined to read the
contract as requiring Ruppert to ensure evergreen screening because the contract
“did not provide a metric for defining an end result or anything outside of the
delivery and installation of six trees.” In the trial court’s view, Ruppert fulfilled its
contractual obligations by delivering, installing, and monitoring the six trees.
Further, the court concluded that the contract obligated Ms. Galvin to pay the
remaining value of the contract at the end of the six-week monitoring period, which
she had not done.
2. Ms. Galvin’s Defenses & Counterclaims
Ms. Galvin alleged that Ruppert breached the contract by damaging an
existing maple tree on her property; she claimed that Ruppert harmed the maple’s
roots when it installed the new trees nearby. According to Ms. Galvin, the root
damage allowed the maple to contract armillaria root disease, which ultimately killed
the tree. As to this claim, the court found that Ms. Galvin “did not meet her burden 8
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the [m]aple tree died of
[a]rmillaria,” which, in the court’s view, was “dispositive.” In rejecting
Ms. Galvin’s claim that Ruppert breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the
court was “unable to find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a willful
imperfect performance” or an “interference with [Ms. Galvin’s] ability to perform
her obligations under the contract.”
The court then reached Ms. Galvin’s counterclaim for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability, concluding that “four of the six trees are alive and were
alive well past what was stated had there been a warranty in this contract [of] one
year.” The court further concluded that Ms. Galvin had not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the hemlock was defective. But regarding the
dogwood, which had died in September 2020, the court found that Ruppert breached
the implied warranty of merchantability. The court rejected Ruppert’s argument that
the trees were merchantable if they were alive when they were installed, because
trees can contain latent defects.
Ms. Galvin had also asserted CPPA claims. Applying a clear-and-
convincing-evidence burden of proof, the court concluded that Ruppert did not
violate the CPPA by failing to provide the evergreen screening that Ms. Galvin
wanted, as the contract contained nothing explicit about evergreen screening. The 9
court also concluded that Ruppert had disclosed the risks of transplanting the trees
during the summer and therefore Ms. Galvin’s CPPA claim based on omission or
misrepresentation of those risks failed.
In sum, the trial court found in Ruppert’s favor on every claim and
counterclaim except for Ms. Galvin’s counterclaim that Ruppert breached the
implied warranty of merchantability as to the dogwood tree. Ms. Galvin moved for
reconsideration and relief under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e), which the trial court denied
because Ms. Galvin merely sought to “re-litigate issues already addressed” by the
court. 1 This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
“After a bench trial, we review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo.” DCA Capitol Hill LTAC, LLC v. Capitol Hill
1 Ms. Galvin argues in somewhat cursory fashion that the trial court erred in denying her motion for reconsideration and other relief. She argues that Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e) allowed her to reargue previously articulated positions to correct legal errors. But Ms. Galvin’s argument relies on the same alleged legal errors that she raises with respect to her other claims. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in those respects, we similarly conclude that the trial court did not err in denying her motion for reconsideration and other relief. Cf. In re Derricotte, 885 A.2d 320, 324 (D.C. 2005) (“A trial court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion in order to correct manifest errors of law or fact.”). 10
Grp., 332 A.3d 518, 530 (D.C. 2025). “The proper interpretation of a contract term
is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Id. (citation modified).
Our review under the clear-error standard reflects the deference we must give
to the trier of fact’s decision because the trier of fact is “usually in a superior position
to appraise and weigh the evidence.” Sanchez v. Sundely LLC, 322 A.3d 529, 539
(D.C. 2024) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123
(1969)). “Nevertheless, a factfinder clearly errs if, after reviewing the evidence, we
are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Id. (citation modified).
We have not addressed whether, for an implied warranty of merchantability
claim, a determination that goods are fit for the ordinary purpose for which they are
used is a factual finding or a legal conclusion. In two breach-of-warranty cases
involving bench trials, we reviewed for clear error the determination whether the
warranties had been breached. District Concrete Co., Inc. v. Bernstein Concrete
Corp., 418 A.2d 1030 (D.C. 1980) (explaining that whether defective concrete was
poured was a factual finding); Ford Motor Co. v. Keating, 262 A.2d 600, 601 (D.C.
1970) (reviewing for clear error a finding that a car part was defective). We need
not decide the question here and assume that we review de novo whether goods are
fit for their ordinary purpose. 11
III. Analysis
Ms. Galvin raises an array of issues on appeal. We discuss her assertions of
error within the framework of the parties’ claims in the trial court: (a) Ruppert’s
breach of contract claim and Ms. Galvin’s breach of contract counterclaim,
(b) Ms. Galvin’s CPPA claims, and (c) Ms. Galvin’s claim for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability.
A. Breach of Contract
Ms. Galvin argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Ruppert fulfilled
its contractual obligations because, in her view, Ruppert did not comply with the
LSGs. She also contends that the court erred in failing to rule on her defense that
Ruppert repudiated the contract by failing to provide adequate assurance of
performance. Ruppert maintains that the trial court correctly concluded that
Ms. Galvin breached the contract and that her claim based on adequate assurances
relies on a premise that the trial court rejected—that Ruppert was responsible for
providing Ms. Galvin with an evergreen screen.
Under District of Columbia law, “a party asserting breach of contract must
prove four elements: (1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or
duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by 12
breach.” CorpCar Servs. Hous., Ltd. v. Carey Licensing, Inc., 325 A.3d 1235,
1244-45 (D.C. 2024) (citation modified). The trial court determined that (1) there
was a valid contract between Ms. Galvin and Ruppert that (2) obligated Ms. Galvin
to pay the full contract price after Ruppert completed its performance, that
(3) Ms. Galvin breached by not paying the remaining balance after the trees were
installed and the monitoring period concluded, and that (4) Ruppert had been
damaged as a result of the nonpayment.
We begin with Ms. Galvin’s argument that the trial court erred as a matter of
law by “failing to recognize [Ruppert’s] explicit obligation to comply with the
[LSGs].” Based on the LSGs, Ms. Galvin argues that Ruppert breached the contract
in several different ways, which she asserts the trial court did not address. But the
trial court began by recognizing Ruppert’s obligation under the LSGs, referencing
the contract’s provision that “all work shall be in accordance with the landscape
specification guidelines.” Although the court did not proceed point-by-point with
respect to the LSGs, it generally indicated that Ms. Galvin did not establish
Ruppert’s failure to comply with the LSGs by a preponderance of the evidence, and
it specifically stated that the evidence did not show by a preponderance that drainage
issues were obvious or that the maple tree died from armillaria caused by Ruppert’s
actions. We are satisfied that the court sufficiently considered Ms. Galvin’s 13
arguments regarding the LSGs and find no clear error in the trial court’s appraisal of
the evidence.
Ms. Galvin also takes issue with the trial court’s explanation that the contract
“did not provide a metric for defining an end result,” but that statement is consistent
with the contract’s silence on whether the trees would provide evergreen screening.
We discern no error in this statement by the trial court.
Next, Ms. Galvin argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by
concluding that Ruppert could prevail on its contract claim despite not having
provided Ms. Galvin with adequate assurances of its performance. Ms. Galvin relies
on D.C. Code § 28:2-609, a provision of the District’s Uniform Commercial Code,
which allows a party to a contract to “demand adequate assurance of due
performance” if “reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the
performance of either party.” D.C. Code § 28:2-609(1). After demanding adequate
assurance, the party may, if commercially reasonable, “suspend any performance for
which he has not already received the agreed return.” Id. Ms. Galvin contends that
she demanded adequate assurances that the trees would provide the evergreen screen
when she sent a letter to Ruppert in August 2020, complaining of the “rapid decline”
of the trees and indicating that she would delay payment “while assessing whether
the trees were fit for their ordinary purpose at the time of planting.” Ms. Galvin 14
maintains that she did not receive “assurance of due performance” within thirty days
of her letter, which she argues was a “repudiation of the contract.” See D.C. Code
§ 28:2-609(4).
Although the trial court did not specifically address this theory, we conclude
that Ms. Galvin’s argument stems from an interpretation of the contract that the trial
court expressly rejected. For Ms. Galvin to have reasonably sought adequate
assurances, the contract must have required Ruppert to ensure that the trees would
provide evergreen screening. But the court rejected that interpretation, concluding
that the contract “did not provide a metric for defining an end result or anything
outside of the delivery and installation of six trees.” And this conclusion is supported
by the contract itself, which required Ruppert to “furnish all labor, tools, materials,
equipment and insurance necessary” to install six trees, without any reference to the
trees’ purpose or any guarantee that the trees would provide an evergreen screen.
Although Ms. Galvin points to the “Galvin Evergreen Screen” language in the
header of the contract, that language did not appear anywhere else in the document.
Because the contract required Ruppert to install six trees—and it is undisputed
that Ruppert installed those six trees in July 2020—Ms. Galvin had no “reasonable
grounds for insecurity” as to Ruppert’s performance when she demanded adequate
assurance in August 2020. Thus, Ruppert did not repudiate the contract even if it 15
failed to provide adequate assurances to Ms. Galvin. The trial court therefore did
not err in denying Ms. Galvin’s breach of contract claim against Ruppert or in
concluding that Ms. Galvin breached the contract by withholding the remaining
payment.
B. CPPA
Ms. Galvin contends that the trial court erred in rejecting her claim that
Ruppert violated various provisions of the CPPA, specifically D.C. Code
§ 28-3904(a), (d), (e), and (f). Her CPPA claims are based on two theories: (1) the
trees did not provide evergreen screening despite Ruppert having indicated that they
would and (2) Ruppert misrepresented or omitted the risks involved with planting
the trees in the summer.
The CPPA protects consumers against false, deceptive, or unfair business
practices. Earth Island Inst. v. Coca-Cola Co., 321 A.3d 654, 663 (D.C. 2024). It
is a broad consumer protection statute, meant to “assure that a just mechanism exists
to remedy all improper trade practices.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(b)(1). It “establishes
an enforceable right to truthful information from merchants about consumer goods
and services,” and is to be “construed and applied liberally” to effectuate that
purpose. D.C. Code § 28-3901(c). 16
1. Burden of Proof
Throughout trial, Ms. Galvin maintained that she had to prove the punitive
damages aspect of her CPPA claims by clear and convincing evidence and that
Ruppert’s conduct was intentional. But Ms. Galvin hedged, simultaneously arguing
that the “underlying [CPPA] violations” were not intentional and she needed to
prove those violations only by a preponderance of the evidence.
The trial court recognized this tension, asking Ms. Galvin, “[I]f the cause of
action is CPPA and if you’re going to prove your cause of action with
non-intentional conduct, . . . how is it that the violation, the cause of action is then
further evidence that it was malicious enough to satisfy punitive damages?”
Ms. Galvin’s counsel explained that although the violations were unintentional, “in
doing these things, [Ruppert] sought to deprive Ms. Galvin of her rights under the
statute,” which was “willful and outrageous” and “intentional.” Ultimately, the trial
court applied the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to Ms. Galvin’s CPPA
claims. On appeal, Ms. Galvin argues that the court should have applied a lower
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to her CPPA claims. Ruppert counters by
arguing that Ms. Galvin’s CPPA claims were in fact for intentional
misrepresentations, such that she had to prove her claims by clear and convincing
evidence. We agree. 17
Although we recently held that CPPA claims based on unintentional
misrepresentations may be proved by only a preponderance of the evidence, District
of Columbia v. Facebook, No. 23-CV-0550, 2025 WL 2166018, at *6-7 (D.C. July
31, 2025), Ms. Galvin’s CPPA claims were based on intentional misrepresentations
because Ms. Galvin argued that Ruppert acted willfully, outrageously, and
intentionally and sought to deprive her of her rights under the statute. In light of her
assertions of intentional misrepresentations, Ms. Galvin had to prove her CPPA
claims by clear and convincing evidence, as the trial court concluded. Osbourne v.
Capital City Mortg. Corp., 727 A.2d 322, 325-26 (D.C. 1999) (“[T]he clear and
convincing evidence standard applies to claims of intentional misrepresentation
under the CPPA.”).
2. Misrepresenting Tree Characteristics
Ms. Galvin argues that Ruppert violated two provisions of the CPPA by
misrepresenting that the trees could provide an evergreen screen when the trees
could not. It is a violation of the CPPA for any person to engage in an “unfair or
deceptive trade practice,” including representing that “goods or services have,”
among other things, “characteristics,” “uses,” or “benefits” that they do not have.
D.C. Code § 28-3904(a). It is similarly a violation to represent that “goods” are of 18
a “particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if in fact they are of another.”
Id. § 28-3904(d).
We begin with Ms. Galvin’s contention that the trial court improperly focused
on her subjective state of mind instead of the reasonable consumer standard.
Ms. Galvin is correct that “whether a trade practice is misleading under the CPPA
generally is ‘a question of fact for the [factfinder] and not a question of law for the
court.’” Center for Inquiry Inc. v. Walmart, Inc., 283 A.3d 109, 120 (D.C. 2022)
(quoting Saucier v. Countrywide Home Loans, 64 A.3d 428, 445 (D.C. 2013)). But
the trial court acknowledged the reasonable-consumer standard, stating that “a claim
of an unfair trade practice” is properly “considered in terms of how the practice
would be viewed and understood by a reasonable consumer.” As the factfinder in a
bench trial, the court then contrasted how a reasonable consumer would have
understood Ruppert’s conduct (as not guaranteeing any tree characteristics) with
Ms. Galvin’s subjective desire (for evergreen screening). In making that distinction,
the trial court properly applied the reasonable-consumer standard, essentially
concluding that Ms. Galvin’s subjective understanding of the contract was not
consistent with an objectively reasonable understanding of the contract.
The trial court likewise did not err in rejecting Ms. Galvin’s CPPA claims
based on Ruppert’s alleged misrepresentations. As explained above in Part III.A., 19
the court’s finding that Ruppert had not represented that the trees would provide an
evergreen screen, in part because that representation was not included in the contract,
is supported by the evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court on this ground.
3. Misrepresenting or Omitting Risks of Tree Installation
Ms. Galvin argues that Ruppert violated the CPPA by misrepresenting or
omitting the risks of installing the trees during the summer, including the risks to
Ms. Galvin’s existing trees on the property, specifically the maple tree that died after
Ruppert installed a tree nearby. Under the CPPA, people and businesses are
prohibited from “misrepresent[ing]” any “material fact which has a tendency to
mislead.” D.C. Code § 28-3904(e). That prohibition extends beyond literal
falsehoods and includes any omissions, “innuendo[s],” or “ambiguit[ies]” that have
a tendency to mislead reasonable consumers. Id. § 28-3904(f-1). We consider an
alleged violation of the CPPA “in terms of how the practice would be viewed and
understood by a reasonable consumer.” Saucier, 64 A.3d at 442 (citation modified).
“Importantly, we have recognized that whether a trade practice is misleading under
the CPPA generally is a question of fact for the [factfinder] and not a question of
law for the court.” Center for Inquiry, 283 A.3d at 120 (citation modified).
The trial court found that Ruppert disclosed the risk of transplanting trees in
the summer to Ms. Galvin and her landscaping team. Specifically, the court pointed 20
to an email wherein Ruppert communicated “the risk associated with summer
planting” and its belief that any risk could be mitigated by “proper care and
maintenance before and after transplanting.” Clearly flowing from these findings is
the conclusion that Ruppert did not omit any material facts that would have misled
a reasonable consumer. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision on this CPPA
claim.
C. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
That leaves Ms. Galvin’s implied warranty of merchantability counterclaim.
Ms. Galvin argues that the trial court committed legal errors in analyzing whether
Ruppert breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Ruppert argues that the
trial court did not err because the trees were merchantable when they were installed.
In the District, there is an implied warranty of merchantability in contracts for
the sale of goods if the seller is the merchant of the goods sold. D.C. Code
§ 28:2-314(1). To be merchantable, goods must be “fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used.” Id. § 28:2-314(2)(c). Ms. Galvin argues that the trees
should have been fit for the ordinary purpose of providing an “immediate and lasting
evergreen screen[ ].” The trial court rejected this ordinary purpose for the trees,
instead concluding that the ordinary purpose of trees is to live and thus the implied
warranty would be breached only if the trees died. 21
Assuming that we review de novo whether the trees were fit for their ordinary
purpose, we agree that the contract supports the conclusion that the ordinary purpose
of the trees was to live, not to provide evergreen screening. The contract itself
contains only one reference to evergreen screening when identifying the project,
without defining the term, setting forth any parameters, or guaranteeing that the trees
would achieve any particular visual effect. Moreover, even if Ms. Galvin had opted
for a one-year replacement warranty on the trees, that warranty would have covered
only trees that died, not trees that failed to achieve a particular aesthetic purpose.
Thus, we conclude that the ordinary purpose of the trees was to live, such that the
implied warranty would be breached only if the trees died. We therefore affirm the
trial court on this claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
So ordered.