Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Michalke

Texas Supreme Court

Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Michalke

38 S.W. 31, 90 Tex. 276, 1896 Tex. LEXIS 477

CourtTexas Supreme Court

DecidedDecember 17, 1896

StatusPublished

Cited by16 cases

This text of 38 S.W. 31 (Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Michalke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Michalke, 38 S.W. 31, 90 Tex. 276, 1896 Tex. LEXIS 477 (Tex. 1896).

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Opinion

GAINES, Associate Justice.

are of the opinion that the application for the writ of error in this case should he refused. In upholding, however, the ruling of the Court of Civil Appeals—that the first charge requested hy the plaintiff and given hy the court was not error—we deem it proper to say that we do not question the right of a railway company, as a general rule, to erect the structures necessary for the prosecution of its business and to leave standing cars upon its side tracks, near a street or road crossing. But we think that the circumstances of a case may he such that, as a matter of fact, it may be negligence to do so. It has been so held hy this court. (Receivers v. Stewart, 17 S: W. Rep., 33.) There ■was evidence in this case from which in our opinion the jury were authorized to infer negligence. We do not understand the Court of Civil Appeals to differ with us, with reference to this question; but as their opinion does not point out the circumstances in evidence which take dhe case out of the general rule, we think it best to say this much in order to prevent a misconception of our ruling.

Writ of error refused.

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GAINES, Associate Justice.

are of the opinion that the application for the writ of error in this case should he refused. In upholding, however, the ruling of the Court of Civil Appeals—that the first charge requested hy the plaintiff and given hy the court was not error—we deem it proper to say that we do not question the right of a railway company, as a general rule, to erect the structures necessary for the prosecution of its business and to leave standing cars upon its side tracks, near a street or road crossing. But we think that the circumstances of a case may he such that, as a matter of fact, it may be negligence to do so. It has been so held hy this court. (Receivers v. Stewart, 17 S: W. Rep., 33.) There ■was evidence in this case from which in our opinion the jury were authorized to infer negligence. We do not understand the Court of Civil Appeals to differ with us, with reference to this question; but as their opinion does not point out the circumstances in evidence which take dhe case out of the general rule, we think it best to say this much in order to prevent a misconception of our ruling.

Writ of error refused.

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38 S.W. 31, 90 Tex. 276, 1896 Tex. LEXIS 477, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/galveston-harrisburg-san-antonio-railway-co-v-michalke-tex-1896.

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