Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Coker

135 S.W. 179, 1911 Tex. App. LEXIS 881
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 11, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 135 S.W. 179 (Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Coker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Coker, 135 S.W. 179, 1911 Tex. App. LEXIS 881 (Tex. Ct. App. 1911).

Opinion

BOOKHOUT, J.

On August 31, 1909, J. W. Coker, as plaintiff, filed suit in the Fifteenth judicial district court of Grayson county, Tex, against the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio and the Houston & Texas Central Railroad Companies, as defendants, to recover damages on account of personal injuries received by him while a passenger on one of defendant’s trains on September 2, 1907, between Galveston and Houston. While upon said train as a passenger, as aforesaid, he charges that on account of the gross negligence of the defendant his train was caused to collide with another train, causing him to be thrown against the seats, floor, etc., of the coach and sustain serious and permanent injuries. Defendant answered by general demurrer and general denial and plea of contributory negligence. The cause was tried on December 10, 1909, and a judgment and verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $8,000 was recovered. Defendant duly filed its motion for a new trial, which was overruled, whereupon' defendant gave notice of appeal, filed its bond, and duly perfected the appeal.

The first and second assignments are grouped, and are as follows: “First. The court erred in overruling defendant’s motion to quash citation. Second. The court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion to amend citation.”

. It is contended that a citation which fails to contain the name of the court in which defendant was required to appear and answer did not comply with the requirements of the statutes, and, defendant having interposed a timely objection, the same should have been sustained; that neither the original citation or the copy thereof served upon defendants shows in what court said cause is pending, nor did the copy thereof served upon defendant show in what court the defendant is required to appear. There were two defendants in the suit, the Houston & Texas Central Railroad Company and the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company. The first-named defendant was served through its local agent, in Grayson county, Tex. The citation served on that defendant required it to appear before the Fifteenth judicial district court of Grayson county, Tex. The citation and copy to the last-named defendant omitted the words “Fifteenth judicial district.” The return of the officer showed that a certified copy of plaintiff’s original petition was delivered to the defendant the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Company at the same time of the service of the citation; the citation having been served in Harris county, Tex. The original petition set forth that the suit was filed in the Fifteenth judicial district. The Fifteenth judicial district was the only one that convened in Grayson county on the first Monday in October, 1909, .the date said citation required said defendants to appear and answer.

Upon the presentation of the motion of the defendant to quash the citation, the plaintiff filed a motion to have the citation corrected. Before the action of the court upon 'the motion to quash citation came on to be considered, the motion of plaintiff for an order authorizing and requiring the clerk to amend said citation was, by the court, sustained, and thereupon the clerk, under the orders of the court, proceeded to amend, and did amend both said original citation and the copy thereof served on said defendant by interlining the words, “Fifteenth judicial,” before the words “district court,” in the following part of said citations, “To appear before the district court of Grayson county,” so that after said correction the same read, “To appear before the Fifteenth judicial district court of Grayson county.” After said correction the court overruled defendant’s motion to quash the citation and service.

There was no error in this action of the court. It being shown that a certified copy of plaintiff’s original petition was delivered to the defendant at the time the citation was served upon it, and said original petition showing that the suit was filed in the Fifteenth district court, defendant was thereby notified of the court in which it was required to appear and answer. That was the only court that convened at Sherman on the first Monday in October, the date the defendant was cited to appear, and defendant was not misled as to the court in which it was required to appear and answer. The *181 mistake in said citation in not stating in winch district court in Grayson county the suit was filed was purely a clerical error, and the court was authorized to permit its amendment at any time before trial; especially when no injury is shown to have accrued to the opposite party. Cartwright v. Chabert, 3 Tex. 261, 49 Am. Dec. 742; Austin & Clapp v. Jordan, 5 Tex. 130; Andrews v. Ennis, 16 Tex. 46; Irvin v. Bevil, 80 Tex. 339, 16 S. W. 23.

Error is' assigned to the sixth paragraph of the court’s charge, reading as follows: “In this connection you are instructed that if you believe from the evidence plaintiff had received an injury or injuries prior to the injuries he received, if any, on the occasion in question, you cannot allow him anything by reason of said former injuries, by reason of any physical or mental suffering, if any, had by him in the past, or by reason of any physical or mental suffering you may believe by the evidence will be occasioned him in" the future, or by reason of any loss of time, or of any value for diminished capacity to labor and earn money in the future, which you may believe from the evidence has resulted or will result by reason of any former, injury or injuries received by plaintiff; if, however, you believe from the evidence that plaintiff had received a former injury or injuries, but you further believe from the evidence that said former injury or injuries were aggravated on said occasion, then you will allow plaintiff for those items of damages above enumerated which you believe from the evidence directly resulted from such aggravation, if any.”

The proposition presented is that neither the pleading nor the proof raises the issue of the aggravation of plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff’s contention was that he had not been injured prior to the time of the wreck, and that all injuries from which he was suffering at the time of the trial were caused on account of the wreck. It was therefore error for the court to instruct the jury upon this question of aggravation.

The petition alleged, among other injuries, which he sustained, that plaintiff “was thrown with great force, and violence, by reason of which he received serious, painful, and permanent injuries. Said injuries consisting of the wounding, contusing, and mashing and cutting of his abdomen, and the walls, linings, and partitions thereof, and the tearing and bruising of the entrails and the protrusion thereof.”

The plaintiff testified as follows: “I also sustained a rupture or hernia, as doctors call it, right down at the lower part of my bowels. A rupture is a breaking of the walls of the abdomen. The break seems to be a circle — circular, I presume about an inch in diameter- or something like that. I wear a truss. My entrails or viscera pass through here on the outside to a great extent if I don’t have a truss • on. They have pushed through lots of times. My bowels have pro-; truded from the cavity. It protrudes to thq extent that it comes down in the scrotum; hasn’t gotten back. The rupture is above the scrotum. Of course, when it comes down in the scrotum — when it comes out it makes a bulge there. The bulge would be as large as a large size hen egg, possibly a little larger. I should say that it is painful.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bowles v. Lindley
411 S.W.2d 751 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1967)
Hoke v. Poser
384 S.W.2d 335 (Texas Supreme Court, 1964)
Poser v. Gene Mohr Chevrolet Company
377 S.W.2d 732 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1964)
James River National Bank v. Haas
15 N.W.2d 442 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1944)
Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Hendricks
154 S.W.2d 899 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1941)
Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Ector
116 S.W.2d 683 (Texas Supreme Court, 1938)
Texas & N. O. R. v. Churchill
74 S.W.2d 1030 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1934)
Mattice v. Babcock
20 P.2d 207 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1932)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
135 S.W. 179, 1911 Tex. App. LEXIS 881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/galveston-h-s-a-ry-co-v-coker-texapp-1911.