Galphin v. Bennett

48 S.E.2d 713, 213 S.C. 216, 1948 S.C. LEXIS 88
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedJuly 27, 1948
Docket16113
StatusPublished

This text of 48 S.E.2d 713 (Galphin v. Bennett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Galphin v. Bennett, 48 S.E.2d 713, 213 S.C. 216, 1948 S.C. LEXIS 88 (S.C. 1948).

Opinion

Baker, C J.:

This action was commenced by appellant on or about August 20, 1946, to obtain the possession of two lots of land, one lot containing one acre, the other one and one-half acres, and the buildings thereon, both being situate in Holly Hill Township, Orangeburg County, South Carolina. Appellant *218 claims the right of possession under a lease from the owners of the fee, dated May 2, 1946. Respondent claims the right to the possession under the renewal provision contained in a lease between the ov/ners of the fee and one Julian S. Beatty, dated March 2, 1936, under an assignment of said lease, and agreement with the said Julian S. Beatty dated September 1, 1936. Under this assignment and agreement, the respondent, on December 1, 1936, went into the possession of the leased premises, and has remained" in the possession thereof since that time.

Let the option and lease from the owners of the fee to Julian S. Beatty, and the assignment and agreement of Julian S. Beatty, to the respondent, attached to the complaint in this action and marked respectively Exhibits “A” and “C” be reported herewith, omitting the description of the parcels or lots of land, and the signatures.

Beatty failed to exercise the option to renew granted to him under the lease, (Exhibit “A”) on or before March 10, 1946, but on February 6, 1946, the respondent wrote to Addie C. Wells, one of the original lessors, apprising her that it was his desire to extend the lease for an additional ten-year period. Miss Wells acknowledged the receipt of the letter, and advised the respondent that he did not have the right to renew the lease, and that she and her sisters (the other owners of the fee) declined to extend the lease. Thereafter, on May 2, 1946, the Misses Wells (the owners of the fee) leased the two lots to the appellant, for a period of five, years. The appellant demanded the possession of the lots of land, the respondent refused the demand, and this action was then commenced.

All of the foregoing facts were set out in the complaint of the appellant, and it was further alleged that the indebtedness of Beatty to the respondent had been extinguished, to which allegation we will hereinafter make reference.

The respondent demurred to the complaint on two grounds, but it was agreed that only the second ground *219 would be considered, which raises the issue whether or not respondent was entitled to the benefit of the renewal provision of the original lease between the owners of the fee and Julian S. Beatty.

The Circuit Judge, in sustaining the demurrer, held that the respondent acquired, by the assignment from Beatty, the original lessee, all of his rights under the lease from the original lessors, including the right to extend the same. This conclusion is warranted by the language of the instrument, as well as the general law. While it may be inferred from the language of the instrument that the assignment was for the purpose of securing an indebtedness from the assignor to the assignee, yet it was, nevertheless, an assignment subject only to the right in the assignor to have a reconveyance of the premises (the lease) upon the performance by the assignor of the conditions of the assignment and the payment of the sums therein mentioned.

It is alleged in the complaint that the rents and profits received by the respondent from the premises prior to February 6, 1946, when respondent gave notice of desire to extend the lease for the second ten-year period, were more than sufficient to cover all of the payments he was entitled to receive under the assignment, and all his expenses in connection therewith, but it does not follow that his rights thereunder cease, or that the original lessor could take advantage thereof. On the contrary, Beatty, the original lessee, and the assignor, is the only party accorded by the terms of the assignment the right to a reconveyance thereof, and if the original assignor saw or sees fit to waive his rights to a re-assignment, or did not and does not consider the lease of such value to him as to wish to recoup it, the original lessors have no ground for complaint. They are only being asked to carry out that which they agreed to do.

The only defeasance clause in the assignment, which is really the right of the assignor to have the lease (the assignment says “the premises”) reconveyed to him is in favor of *220 the assignor or original lessee, and no other. There is no suggestion that the lessors have any right to be relieved of their contract by the fulfillment of the conditions of the assignment. It may be that the assignee would be a trustee of the assignor in the exercise of any rights under the lease after fulfillment of the terms of the assignment,' but only the assignor as the beneficiary would have the right to an accounting for revenues derived from the use of the property, or a reconveyance of the lease.

It follows that the Circuit Judge was correct in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint.

The exceptions are overruled and the case remanded to the Circuit Court for entry of judgment accordingly.

Stuices and Tayeor, JJ., concur. EishburnE and Oxner, JJ., dissent.

Exhibit “A”

Ida I. Wells, et al. to (Option and Lease)

Julian S. Beatty

State of South Carolina,

County of Orangeburg.

This indenture made and concluded at Holly Hill, South Carolina, this 2nd day of March, 1936, by and between Ida I. Wells, I. Pauline Wells, Addie C. Wells and Ethel E. Wells, the Lessors, Parties of the First Part, and Julian S. Beatty, the Lessee, Party of the Second Part.

Witnesseth: That the Lessors have rented and leased and by these Presents do grant, bargain and lease unto the Lessee: (Two lots of land described.)

To have and to hold the said premises unto the said Lessee, his Heirs, Executors, Administrators and Assigns, for the term of ten (10) years, commencing March 10, 1936, *221 upon the terms and for the consideration hereinafter expressed.

And the said Lessee does hereby agree to pay as rent therefor the sum of Twelve and 50/100 ($12.50) Dollars per month for each of the lots or parcels of land, making a total of Twenty-five and no/100 ($25.00) Dollars per month, the first payment shall be due on the 10th day of April, 1936, and subsequent payments shall be due on the 10th day of each successive month during the term of this lease or any extension thereof.

And it is further agreed that the Lessee may engage in any lawful undertaking, business or enterprise upon the premises, and may erect such buildings and structures and install such equipment in and upon said premises, as he may deem in his discretion to be expedient, and upon the termination of this indenture or any extension thereof, said Lessee may remove any machinery, equipment or fixtures, placed by him upon the premises, or in any building erected thereon, but may not remove any building or structure of a permanent nature erected thereon during the term of this lease.

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Bluebook (online)
48 S.E.2d 713, 213 S.C. 216, 1948 S.C. LEXIS 88, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/galphin-v-bennett-sc-1948.