Gallion v. Romeo

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 14, 2020
Docket2:20-cv-00120
StatusUnknown

This text of Gallion v. Romeo (Gallion v. Romeo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gallion v. Romeo, (E.D. Wis. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

LEO T. GALLION,

Plaintiff, Case No. 20-CV-120-JPS v.

NICHOLAS J. ROMEO, MARK S. ORDER DILLMAN, and MATT MCELROY,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Leo T. Gallion, who is incarcerated at Fox Lake Correctional Institution, proceeds in this matter pro se. He filed a complaint alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. (Docket #1). This matter comes before the court on Plaintiff’s petition to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee (in forma pauperis). (Docket #2). Plaintiff has been assessed and has paid an initial partial filing fee of $11.10. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The court shall screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. “Malicious,” although sometimes treated as a synonym for “frivolous,” “is more usefully construed as intended to harass.” Lindell v. McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109– 10 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, the plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead specific facts and his statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint’s allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). In considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should follow the principles set forth in Twombly by first, “identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id. If there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must, second, “assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of N. Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is obliged to give the plaintiff’s pro se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Defendants Nicholas J. Romeo (“Romeo”) and Mark S. Dillman (“Dillman”) are Milwaukee police officers, and Defendant Matt McElroy (“McElroy”) is a district attorney. (Docket #1 at 1, 3). Plaintiff claims that Romeo and Dillman illegally seized him and various items of evidence from him. (Docket #1 at 2, 4). Plaintiff further asserts that McElroy is prosecuting him, apparently in connection with that seizure, with “no proof or evidence[.]” Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any plausible claims for relief. Plaintiff states only the legal conclusion that Defendants have violated his constitutional rights. He does not offer any meaningful factual allegations which would support his claims; Plaintiff does not describe Defendants’ actual conduct at all. Further, Plaintiff cannot proceed against McElroy at all. Prosecutors are “absolutely immune from suit for all actions and decisions undertaken in furtherance of his prosecutorial duties.” Field v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976)). Thus, Plaintiff cannot sue McElroy for prosecuting him, no matter what he believes the state of the evidence to be. The Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to expound upon his allegations against Romeo and Dillman, and to remove McElroy from the pleading. If he chooses to offer an amended complaint, Plaintiff must do so no later than February 28, 2020. If he does not do so, this action will be dismissed. Plaintiff should be aware that an amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the original complaint. See Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1056–57 (7th Cir. 1998). In Duda, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that in such instances, the “prior pleading is in effect withdrawn as to all matters not restated in the amended pleading[.]” Id. at 1057 (citation omitted); see also Pintado v.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Gallion v. Romeo, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gallion-v-romeo-wied-2020.