Gallegos v. Maxson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 26, 2026
• Docket: 25-2124
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID EARL RAY GALLEGOS, No. 25-2124 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-01257-DGE-DWC v. MEMORANDUM*

PETER L. MAXSON, Jr., CMHUS; MICHAEL M. SILVA, Sergeant; BRITTANY A. RICHARDS, CMHC3,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington David G. Estudillo, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 24, 2026 Pasadena, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and TRAUM, District Judge.**

David Earl Ray Gallegos, a Washington state prisoner, appeals from the

district court’s summary judgment for defendant prison officials in his 42 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Anne R. Traum, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation. § 1983 civil rights action. Gallegos claims that Defendants violated the Eighth

Amendment by failing to take reasonable steps to assist him during a mental health

emergency. He contends on appeal that the district court erred in granting

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because (1) factual disputes remain

regarding Defendants’ actions during his mental health emergency and (2) the

district court sua sponte dismissed his deliberate indifference claim on different

grounds than those raised in Defendants’ summary judgment motion. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Dees v.

County of San Diego, 960 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2020). We “must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . and draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009)).

1. To establish deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, a

prisoner must show that a prison official “(1) exposed [the prisoner] to a

substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) was deliberately indifferent to [the

prisoner’s] constitutional rights.” Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239,

1248 (9th Cir. 2016). The prisoner must provide evidence that the prison official

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Even assuming Gallegos faced a substantial risk of serious harm and the officers were aware of that risk, Gallegos’s claim fails

because the record lacks any evidence suggesting that the officers disregarded the

risk of harm that Gallegos faced.

The record shows that after Gallegos exhibited distress, Defendants sent him

to a cell alone and then took prompt and reasonable steps to assist him, by

immediately summoning help from Brittany Richards, a mental health professional,

and by reporting to Gallegos’s cell within minutes after they sent him there. Any

contention that Defendants disregarded a substantial risk by not adequately

informing Richards of Gallegos’s condition is unsupported by evidence in the

record, and there is no evidence to suggest that the steps Defendants took to address

the risk were unreasonable. The district court did not err by granting summary

judgment to Defendants on Gallegos’s deliberate indifference claim.

2. Gallegos also contends that the district court abused its discretion by sua

sponte dismissing his deliberate indifference claim. Gallegos argues that because

Defendants’ summary judgment motion characterized Gallegos’s claims as

allegations of verbal harassment, which the district court did not address, the court

must have ruled sua sponte. But a district court may grant summary judgment on

legal and factual grounds not raised by the parties, so long as the parties have had an

opportunity to address them, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f), and Gallegos fails to explain

how he was prevented from presenting the merits of his case. Gallegos also asserts that he would have submitted his full deposition transcript had Defendants’ summary

judgment motion been clearer, but he does not explain how the additional portions

would have altered the outcome. Accordingly, any error was harmless.

AFFIRMED.