Gallardo v. Trump

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-2886
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GARRY DAVID GALLARDO, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02886 (UNA) ) )

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (“Compl.”),

ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”), ECF No. 2. For

the reasons explained below, the IFP application is granted only as to Plaintiff Garry David

Gallardo, and this matter is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff Gallardo is a federal prisoner designated to FCI Hazelton, and he attempts to bring

this matter as a class action on behalf of approximately 91 other fellow inmates, and yet more

unnamed plaintiffs, in contravention of Local Civil Rule 5.1(c), (g). See Compl. at 1–7.

At the outset, the Court denies the IFP Application as to all party Plaintiffs, excepting

Gallardo. Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) in an effort to properly

determine and evaluate the propriety and merits of cases that fall under that statute. See Chandler

v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Under the PLRA, all prisoner-

litigants are responsible for contributing to the filing fee. See Asemani v. U.S. Citizenship &

Immig. Srvs., 797 F.3d 1069, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)). And for the

Court to consider whether a plaintiff, prisoner or otherwise, qualifies to proceed IFP, that plaintiff must submit his own IFP application, individualized to his own financial circumstances, including

a sworn affidavit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Here, without IFP applications individually sworn, executed, and filed separately by each

Plaintiff, the Court lacks the information to assess the Plaintiffs’ respective financial statuses. This

is of particular importance for prisoner-plaintiffs, because the PLRA contains additional

requirements, like submission of a prisoner’s certified six-month trust account to pay in

installments, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), and it also contains certain restrictions. For example, it

bars certain prisoners from proceeding IFP under the “three-strikes rule” contained in § 1915(g),

see Asemani, 797 F.3d at 1072. Because only Gallardo has submitted and executed the pending

IFP Application, see ECF No. 2, and only Gallardo has filed a six-month trust account report, ECF

No. 3, only Gallardo––and none of the other intended Plaintiffs––can proceed any further in this

case.

In any event, the Complaint itself fails because Gallardo may not file a class action, or

otherwise bring claims on behalf of the other Plaintiffs. A pro se litigant can represent only himself

in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead

and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . ”); Georgiades v. Martin–Trigona, 729

F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (individual “not a member of the bar of any court . . . may appear

pro se but is not qualified to appear in [federal] court as counsel for others”) (citation and footnote

omitted).

Even Gallardo’s claims brought on behalf of himself lack merit. The Complaint asserts

Gallardo’s belief that Article III of the Constitution does not vest federal courts with jurisdiction

to adjudicate criminal cases. See generally Compl. This proposition is contrary to established

authority and patently frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact” is frivolous). The Court cannot exercise

subject matter jurisdiction over a frivolous complaint. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–

37 (1974).

For all of these reasons, the Court DISMISSES this case without prejudice. The Court

DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel and to Certify Class Action, ECF No. 4. A

separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: December 9, 2025 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge