Gallagher v. Waynesboro Mutual Telephone Co.

130 S.E. 232, 143 Va. 383, 1925 Va. LEXIS 274
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedNovember 12, 1925
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 130 S.E. 232 (Gallagher v. Waynesboro Mutual Telephone Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gallagher v. Waynesboro Mutual Telephone Co., 130 S.E. 232, 143 Va. 383, 1925 Va. LEXIS 274 (Va. 1925).

Opinion

Prentis, P.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff was injured while using a telephone furnished her at her residence by the defendant company, and sued for serious permanent injury affecting her hearing in the left ear. At the trial the defendant demurred to the plaintiff’s evidence, in which demurrer the plaintiff joined, the court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment thereon in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff is here assigning error.

The pertinent facts are that the defendant owns and operates a telephone system in the town of Waynesboro, the plaintiff being one of its subscribers. There are certain telephone lines which appear to be privately owned and controlled by certain farmers of Augusta county. These farmers’ lines are carried to the corporate limits of the town of Waynesboro and are there connected with the wires of the defendant which run into its switchboard. The defendant is required by law and in the public interest to connect with these lines and to interchange service therewith.

Howard Bush was one of some fifteen or sixteen farmers [385]*385•who had grounded lines so coming into Waynesboro and was furnished service at the rate of $5.00 per year. These lines outside of the city limits were built and controlled exclusively by their owners, and the defendant company had no control whatever over them. In connecting these county lines (ground circuit) with its own line (metallic circuit) the defendant employed every known and improved device to protect its subscribers from any injury which might result from lightning or other dangerous currents of electricity. No negligence whatever is shown with respect to the equipment, maintenance and operation of the defendant’s line, and the affirmative evidence negatives any such negligence. .

The plaintiff, because partially deaf in her right ear, had the company install a telephone with an unusually large bell. On the occasion of her injury she called through the central office for connection with the telephone of Bush, to talk with Mrs. Bush. She pressed the receiver very tightly to her left ear, and then sustained the injury complained of. Mrs. Bush at the other end of the connection heard nothing unusual except the plaintiff’s scream. There was no blowing out of any of the protective fuses on the defendant’s lines, neither the telephone at the residence of the plaintiff nor that at the residence of Bush was in any degree injured or affeeted, both were used within half an hour afterwards and were then found to be in perfect condition.

As to the Bush line, these facts appear: He lived within a mile of the corporate limits of Waynesboro, on the road running from Waynesboro to New Hope. He was one of the owners of the farmers’ line, known as the Central Point line, which had been connected with the Waynesboro exchange for many years. His [386]*386home was a quarter of a mile from the road, to which his lane extended. The 'wires of the Central Point farmers’ line were on poles on one side of the Waynesboro — New Hope road, but Bush built a pole line in his lane so as to connect with the Central Point wires on the highway. This line in his lane belonged to him. About two years before the plaintiff was injured, Bush, desiring to obtain electric lights at his house, put an electric light wire on poles in his lane so as to connect with the electric light line owned by the Staunton Light Company, and at some time before the injury he changed the location of his telephone wire and put it on the same poles that already carried the electric light wire. At one point he placed these wires only about seventeen inches apart. It is fairly apparent that these wires were so located at the time of the plaintiff’s injury. There is nothing to indicate that the defendant company had any information whatever as to the location of these wires so improperly placed by Bush. Bush afterwards removed the telephone wire from these electric light poles because there had been considerable trouble and complaint about noises occasioned by the proximity of the telephone wire to the electric light wire.

The sole suggestion as to the cause of the injury which can be found in the record is that in some way it was because of the dangerous proximity of this electric light wire to the telephone wire in Bush’s lane.

It is fundamental, of course, that a plaintiff in such an action can only recover by showing that the defendant’s negligence is the cause of the injury, and unless this is sufficiently proved there can be no recovery. Some reliance appears to be placed by the plaintiff upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but [387]*387this does not apply where the injury is due to a defective appliance which is neither managed, operated, owned or controlled by the defendant.

In Peters v. Lynchburg Traction Co., 108 Va. 333, 61 S. E. 745, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1188, in which the plaintiff was injured by a shock while turning off an incandescent electric light in his kitchen, it was held that he could not recover of the company which furnished the current of electricity, because he was himself the owner of the electric outfit on his premises. It was shown there that the defendant company had neither the ownership nor control of the appliances on the plaintiff’s premises, the house having been wired by the owner, and the electric equipment being his own property.

In Fickeisen, Adm’r, v. Wheeling Electric Co., 67 W. Va. 335, 57 S. E. 788, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 893, these were the salient facts: The Wheeling Company sold and delivered to the Bridgeport Company, at a point where the wires of the two companies joined, the electricity used by the latter company in lighting the streets of Bridgeport. A wire of the Bridgeport Company which carried the electric current along a street in Bridgeport was grounded, and one who came in contact with it was killed by the current. It was held that the Wheeling Company was not liable in the action for the death of such person; the reason therefor being that when the Wheeling Company delivered the electricity to the Bridgeport Company, its responsibility ceased because it had no ownership, management or control of any of the wires or appliances of the Bridgeport Company.

This is clearly the actual and legal situation here, as is stated in the case of Commonwealth v. Staunton Telephone Co., 134 Va. 291, 114 S. E. 600, where [388]*388this is said: “In addition it was customary for many years for farmers located in Augusta county to build their lines and install their own telephones, and to have their private lines connected with the lines of the city company at the corporate limits of the city. The city company had no responsibility with reference to the maintenance of these lines outside of the corporate limits of the city.”

These cases illustrate and enforce the same rule: Perry v. Ohio Valley, etc., Co., 70 W. Va. 697, 74 S. E. 993; Pressley v. Bloomington, etc., Co., 271 Ill. 622, 111 N. E. 511; Sullivan v. New York Tel. Co., 157 App. Div. 642, 142 N. Y. Supp. 735; Scott v. Rome, etc., Co., 22 Ga. App. 474, 96 S. E. 569; Minneapolis Gen. Elec. Co. v. Cronon, 166 Fed. 651, 92 C. C. A. 345, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 816; Hoffman v. Leavenworth, Light, etc., Co., 91 Kan. 450, 138 Pac. 632, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 574; San Antonio Gas, etc., Co. v. Ocon, 105 Tex. 139, 146 S. W. 162, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046; 9 R. C. L.

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Bluebook (online)
130 S.E. 232, 143 Va. 383, 1925 Va. LEXIS 274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gallagher-v-waynesboro-mutual-telephone-co-va-1925.