Gallagher v. Board of Selectmen

225 N.E.2d 342, 352 Mass. 307, 1967 Mass. LEXIS 803
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedApril 3, 1967
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 225 N.E.2d 342 (Gallagher v. Board of Selectmen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gallagher v. Board of Selectmen, 225 N.E.2d 342, 352 Mass. 307, 1967 Mass. LEXIS 803 (Mass. 1967).

Opinion

Whittemore, J.

This is an appeal to the Superior Court under Gr. L. c. 40A, § 21, from the decision of the board of selectmen of Falmouth pursuant to § 21 of the zoning bylaw granting a special permit for a hotel. The judge in the Superior Court ruled that the board of selectmen had not exceeded its authority and that no modification of the decision was required. The case is here by appeal from the ensuing final decree.

On January 27, 1965, in another appeal under c. 40A, § 21, the Superior Court had ruled that the action of the selectmen authorizing a permit for a motel on the same premises was invalid. This court in Gallagher v. Board of Appeals of Falmouth, 351 Mass. 410, 412-415, sustained the final decree in that case on jurisdictional grounds. We stated our view, however, that the by-law did not authorize a motel.

The day after the January 27,1965, decision was entered in the Superior Court, the same applicant filed the application for a hotel, using a copy of the same foundation and plot plan that had been used in the prior proceedings except that the letter “M” in the title was changed to “H.”

Before the board and in the Superior Court the treasurer of the applicant showed two sketch elevations, which he himself had prepared, one for the motel as it would have been and the other for the hotel as it would be according to his thinking at that time. The essential difference was that the doors of the rooms in the “hotel” would open on an interior corridor rather than directly to the outside of the building. The floor space being the same, the space avail[309]*309able for the thirty-six rooms, each with bath, would be reduced in the “hotel” by the area of the corridor. In describing the building the applicant testified in the Superior Court that there would be a lobby in which there would be a man on duty at all times to prevent rowdyism. In the lobby would be a tennis “pro” shop and lockers for the use of the tennis players. "When asked if there would be a dining room he answered, “We have not applied for any dining room.”

The appellees contend that all the requirements of § 21 of the by-law had been met; that is, the application was for a permit for a hotel, due notice was given and due hearing held, and the selectmen considered the effect of the proposed hotel on the neighborhood and the town. The board’s decision and the evidence in the Superior Court supported the conclusion that the “permit . . . would not result in substantial injury. ’ ’

The appellants contend only that the application was not for a hotel, but for a motel. We agree. The proposed building was essentially the structure called a “motel” by all concerned in the prior case and ruled by this court to be such.2 The appellees urge that the interior corridor is the determinative feature, and that we should alter our construction of the by-law. We are not disposed to do so. The word “hotel” in the application and in the board’s decision is, in the present circumstances, not controlling. The appellees urge that some buildings may be so unlike [310]*310motels and so like hotels in design and general accommodations as to be appropriately classed with hotels even though they lack dining rooms. We need not explore the contention. What is proposed is not such a structure.

The lobby, with attendant, appears on the evidence to be the kind of office that every motel requires, with the addition only of accommodations to serve the tennis courts required by the terms of the board’s grant of the permit.3

We think it not without significance that the applicant, when testifying in the Superior Court, repeatedly called the building a motel.4 This, to be sure, was after a reference to the approval by the State Department of Public Health of a plan showing “sewage disposal system for a 40 unit motel.” Nevertheless the applicant’s characterization tends to show what this building was intended to be notwithstanding a change to avoid the effect of an adverse court decision.

[311]*311We rule that the application and the board’s decision related to a motel. The grant of the permit is invalid. The final decree is reversed. A decree is to enter in the Superior Court to the effect that the decision of the board exceeded its authority and is annulled.

So ordered.

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Related

Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals
415 N.E.2d 840 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1981)
Board of Appeals v. Z & K Enterprises, Inc.
301 N.E.2d 578 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1973)
Selvetti v. Building Inspector of Revere
233 N.E.2d 915 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1968)

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Bluebook (online)
225 N.E.2d 342, 352 Mass. 307, 1967 Mass. LEXIS 803, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gallagher-v-board-of-selectmen-mass-1967.