Galina V. Andreyev v. Marcella Trotsiouk, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01394
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GALINA V. ANDREYEV, Case No. 2:25-cv-01394-DC-CSK 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED 13 v. COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND 14 MARCELLA TROTSIOUK, et al., (ECF No. 15) 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Galina V. Andreyev is representing herself in this action and has filed a 18 Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”).1 SAC (ECF No. 15). The Court previously granted 19 Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), dismissed the First Amended 20 Complaint, and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. 9/8/2025 Order (ECF No. 13). For the 21 reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the SAC be dismissed without leave to 22 amend for failure to state a claim. 23 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 24 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 25 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 26 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 2 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an 3 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 4 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual 5 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and 6 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490 7 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 8 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 9 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 10 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). 11 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 12 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 13 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 14 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 15 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 16 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 17 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 18 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 19 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 20 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 21 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 22 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 23 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 24 II. DISCUSSION 25 Plaintiff brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants Marcello 26 Trotsiouk, Igor Trotsiouk, Sheriff Jim Cooper, Sheriff Deputy Howz (#61), Sheriff Deputy 27 Larson (#129), Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office, Sacramento County Adult Protective 28 Services Director/Supervisor Jane Doe 1, Sacramento County Adult Protective Services 1 Worker Natalie, Sacramento County Adult Protective Services, and Dr. Mykhaylo 2 Babenko. SAC at 2, 6. Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: (1) violation of due 3 process and familial association pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants 4 Sheriff Deputy Larson (#129), Sheriff Deputy Howz (#61), Sacramento County Sheriff’s 5 Office, Sacramento County Adult Protective Services, Marcello Trotsiouk, and Igor 6 Trotsiouk; (2) retaliation and abuse of process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 7 Defendant Marcello Trotsiouk and Igor Trotsiouk; (3) Monell2 liability against Defendants 8 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office and Sacramento County Adult Protective Services; 9 (4) failure to train and supervise against Defendant Sheriff Cooper; (5) individual liability 10 against Defendants Sheriff Deputy Howz (#61) and Sheriff Deputy Larson (#129); and 11 (6) conspiracy to violate civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants 12 Marcello Trotsiouk, Igor Trotsiouk, Sheriff Deputy Howz (#61), Sheriff Deputy Larson 13 (#129), Sacramento County Adult Protective Services, and Dr. Babenko. Id. at 12-13. 14 For relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, injunctive relief, and other forms of relief. 15 Id. at 14. 16 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 17 Plaintiff’s SAC does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as required 18 by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims and the 19 grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 20 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v. 21 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A review of Plaintiff’s SAC reveals it consists 22 of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements” of her causes of action and fails to state a claim 23 for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 24 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 25 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 26 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks 27

28 2 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 1 omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a 2 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 3 266, 271 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To state a cognizable 4 § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right protected by the Constitution 5 and laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a 6 person who acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Florer v. 7 Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2011). An individual 8 defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant's 9 personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between 10 the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen 11 v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th 12 Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable 13 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 14 1. Defendants Marcello Trotsiouk, Igor Trotsiouk, and Dr. Babenko 15 Plaintiff raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Marcello 16 Trotsiouk, Igor Trotsiouk, and Dr. Babenko, who each are alleged to be private actors. 17 See SAC at 8-12. Plaintiff alleges these Defendants “colluded with” Defendants Sheriff 18 Deputy Howz (#61), Sheriff Deputy Larson (#129), Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office, 19 and Sacramento County Adult Protective Services in “misusing public authority and court 20 processes to isolate Plaintiff from her mother” despite Plaintiff being granted visitation 21 rights of her mother through a state court conservatorship. Id. at 9-12. Plaintiff further 22 alleges these Defendants acted “under color of state law or in joint action” by depriving 23 Plaintiff of her constitutional rights by blocking Plaintiff from seeing her mother despite a 24 valid court order, retaliating against Plaintiff for exercising her rights, and conspiring to 25 “misuse state authority.” Id. at 12-13. 26 Generally, private parties do not act under color of state law. Price v. Hawaii, 939 27 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 28 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a private entity’s action may be “under color of state 1 law” where there is “significant” state involvement in the action. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 2 423, 444 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff may demonstrate joint action by 3 proving the existence of a conspiracy or by showing that the private party was a willful 4 participant in joint action with the State or its agents.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 5 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To prove a conspiracy 6 between a state actor and a private actor, a plaintiff must show “an agreement of 7 meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights.” Id. at 441 (internal quotation marks 8 and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a meeting of the minds 9 between Defendants Marcello Trotsiouk, Igor Trotsiouk, and Dr. Babenko and the state 10 actors in preventing Plaintiff from visiting her mother. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do 11 not indicate Defendants Marcello Trotsiouk, Igor Trotsiouk, and Dr. Babenko are subject 12 to liability under Section 1983 as private actors. 13 Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against 14 Defendants Marcello Trotsiouk, Igor Trotsiouk, and Dr. Babenko be dismissed without 15 leave to amend because Plaintiff has already been provided with an opportunity to 16 amend and further amendment would be futile. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 17 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 18 2. Defendants Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office and Sacramento 19 County Adult Protect Services 20 The SAC brings Section 1983 claims against Defendants Sacramento County 21 Sheriff’s Office and Sacramento County Adult Protective Services based on municipal 22 liability. Plaintiff generally alleges that these Defendants acted under color of state law 23 and “maintained policies or customs of disregarding valid [power of attorney], ignoring 24 elder isolation, and failing to enforce court orders.” SAC at 12-13. 25 “In order to establish municipal liability [under Monell], a plaintiff must show that a 26 ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 27 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). To impose 28 liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was deprived of a constitutional 1 right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to 2 plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the 3 constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 4 Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994)). The complaint must identify the 5 particular policy that plaintiff alleges caused his constitutional injury. See Lee v. City of 6 Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 7 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for “their own 8 illegal acts,” and therefore to impose liability on a local government, plaintiffs must prove 9 that an “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury) (citations 10 omitted). Further, the policy at issue must be the result of a decision of a person 11 employed by the entity who has final decision or policymaking authority. Monell, 436 12 U.S. at 694. There must be a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the 13 injury, and a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that his injury resulted from a 14 permanent and well-settled practice. Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070. Here, the SAC does 15 not allege any facts that could support a Monell claim. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations 16 are insufficient to establish municipal liability under Section 1983. See Western Mining 17 Council, 643 F.2d at 624. Because Plaintiff fails to identify any particular policy these 18 Defendants were following when Plaintiff’s alleged constitutional rights were violated, the 19 Complaint fails to establish any viable basis for municipal liability. 20 Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against 21 Defendants Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office and Sacramento County Adult 22 Protective Services be dismissed without leave to amend because Plaintiff has already 23 been provided with an opportunity to amend and further amendment would be futile. See 24 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06. 25 3. Defendants Sheriff Deputy Howz (#61) and Sheriff Deputy Larson 26 (#129) 27 The SAC alleges three Section 1983 claims against Defendants Sheriff Deputy 28 Howz (#61) and Sheriff Deputy Larson (#129) for violation of due process and familial 1 association (Claim 1), individual liability (Claim 5); and conspiracy to violate civil rights 2 (Claim 6). Plaintiff alleges these Defendants failed to enforce a court order on April 18, 3 2024 and told Plaintiff she could not enter Defendant Marcella Trotsiouk’s residence to 4 see her mother because Defendant Marcella Trotsiouk had refused Plaintiff from 5 entering her residence. SAC at 9, 10. Plaintiff further alleges these Defendants “falsely 6 represented that [Defendant Igor Trotsiouk] held a valid power of attorney” and did not 7 exercise due diligence to verify the validity of his power of attorney. Id. at 10. Under the 8 Fourteenth Amendment, “official conduct that shocks the conscience in depriving [family 9 members] of [a liberty interest in the companionship and society of a family member] is 10 cognizable as a violation of due process.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th 11 Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s general 12 allegations to not rise to the level that “shocks the conscious” based on the asserted 13 allegations. Moreover, there are no allegations establishing “the existence of an 14 agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional right” to establish a 15 conspiracy under Section 1983. See Mendocino Env't Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 16 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 17 Accordingly, the Court recommends Defendants Sheriff Deputy Howz (#61) and 18 Sheriff Deputy Larson (#129) be dismissed without leave to amend. 19 4. Defendant Sheriff Jim Cooper 20 Plaintiff generally alleges Section 1983 claims against Defendant Sheriff Cooper 21 based on a failure to train and supervise theory. SAC at 12-13. Plaintiff alleges 22 Defendant Sheriff Cooper failed to supervise and train his deputies who refused to 23 enforce court orders. Id. at 13. “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of 24 his subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 25 violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is no respondeat superior liability 26 under Section 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). There are no 27 allegations that Defendant Sheriff Cooper was personally involved in the alleged 28 violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and Plaintiff’s general allegation that Defendant 1 Sheriff Cooper failed to supervise and train deputies is insufficient to impose supervisor 2 liability on Defendant Sheriff Cooper under Section 1983. 3 Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against 4 Defendant Sheriff Cooper be dismissed without leave to amend because Plaintiff has 5 already been provided with an opportunity to amend and further amendment would be 6 futile. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06. 7 5. Defendants Sacramento County Adult Protective Services 8 Director/Supervisor Jane Doe 1 and Sacramento County Adult 9 Protective Services Worker Natalie 10 Although named in the SAC, there are no allegations raised against Defendants 11 Sacramento County Adult Protective Services Director/Supervisor Jane Doe 1 and 12 Sacramento County Adult Protective Services Worker Natalie, nor does Plaintiff allege a 13 specific claim against these Defendants. See generally SAC. Accordingly, dismissal of 14 these Defendants is appropriate for failure to state a claim. 15 Accordingly, the Court recommends Defendants Sacramento County Adult 16 Protective Services Director/Supervisor Jane Doe 1 and Sacramento County Adult 17 Protective Services Worker Natalie be dismissed without leave to amend. 18 B. Leave to Amend 19 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se 20 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and 21 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). If the 22 court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, it has 23 discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-30. Leave 24 to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could 25 be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato, 70 F.3d at 26 1106 (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some 27 notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 28 complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (citation omitted). However, if, after 1 careful consideration, it is clear that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the 2 || court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06. 3 Here, Plaintiff has amended her complaint twice. See ECF Nos. 12, 15. The Court 4 | also provided Plaintiff a detailed explanation of the deficiencies in her First Amended 5 | Complaint. See 9/8/2025 Order. Despite this, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the 6 | deficiencies and allege sufficient facts to state a claim against any defendant. 7 || Accordingly, the Court finds that further amendment would be futile. The SAC should 8 | therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato, 9 | 70 F.3d at 1105-06. 10 | Ill. CONCLUSION 11 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED: 12 1. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15) be DISMISSED 13 without leave to amend; and 14 2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 16 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 17 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 18 | written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 19 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 20 | reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 21 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 22 | may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 23 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 25 || Dated: February 4, 2026 CO i S \U 26 CHI SOO KIM 27 | 4 andri304.25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28