Gale v. Hession

486 So. 2d 260, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 6621
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 9, 1986
DocketNo. 85-147
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 486 So. 2d 260 (Gale v. Hession) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gale v. Hession, 486 So. 2d 260, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 6621 (La. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

GUIDRY, Judge.

This is an action to annul a statutory will dated September 30, 1976 for lack of testamentary capacity. The plaintiff in this proceeding is Bessie G. Dixon Gale, the decedent’s sole legatee and named executrix under earlier testaments. The defendants are Eugene C. Gilder, dative testamentary executor of the Succession of Bonnie Hession Ellis, and William Hession, who, along with Bessie G. Dixon Gale, is named as legatee under the testament sought to be annulled. The trial court held that the testatrix lacked the requisite testamentary capacity at the time of the making of the will of September 30, 1976 and declared same invalid. Defendant, William Hession, appeals from that judgment.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in finding that plaintiff-ap-pellee met her burden of proving the incapacity of the testatrix on September 30, 1976, the date the will was ' confected.

FACTS

Bonnie Hession Ellis died on February 9, 1983, leaving no forced heirs. Upon her death, Mrs. Ellis left three wills. The first will was an olographic will dated January 17, 1967, in which Mrs. Ellis bequeathed all of her property to her cousin, Bessie G. Dixon Gale, plaintiff herein. The second will, a statutory will dated April 17, 1967, contained essentially the same provisions as the first will. Gale was again designated as the sole legatee and as executrix. The third will, which is at issue in the present case, is a statutory will dated September 30, 1976. In that will, Mrs. Ellis left half of all her property to Gale and the other half to William M. Hession, another cousin.

[262]*262Mrs. Ellis executed the third will while hospitalized in the American Legion Hospital in Crowley, Louisiana. Her hospitalization lasted from September 25, 1976 until October 8, 1976, at which time she was transferred to the psychiatric ward of Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital in Lafayette. She remained at Lourdes for approximately ten days. Upon her release, Mrs. Ellis was placed in a nursing home in Lafayette where she remained until her death on February 9, 1983.

On November 10, 1976, Hession filed a petition for the interdiction of Mrs. Ellis, declaring that she had “been so confused and disoriented that it became necessary to hospitalize her for a period of time and then to temporarily place her in a nursing home so that she can be constantly watched”, and that she was “absolutely unable to understand any matters pertaining to business”. Mrs. Ellis was interdicted on March 1, 1977. Hession was thereafter appointed as curator.

Following Mrs. Ellis’ death, Gale petitioned the district court to have the September 30, 1976 will declared invalid because of Mrs. Ellis’ lack of testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed. Gale additionally sought to have either of the 1967 wills admitted to probate and declared to be Mrs. Ellis’ last will and testament. Hession reconvened, seeking to have the September 30, 1976 will admitted to probate and declared to be Mrs. Ellis’ last will and testament.

By judgment dated November 2, 1984, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff, holding that the September 30, 1976 will was invalid due to Mrs. Ellis’ lack of testamentary capacity. The judgment further admitted to probate Mrs. Ellis’ will of April 17, 1967. Hession appealed.

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

We note from the outset that the question of testamentary capacity is a question of fact. The trial court’s factual findings in this regard will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly and manifestly erroneous. Succession of Caprito v. Mayhew, 478 So.2d 243 (La.App.3rd Cir.1985), writ denied, 481 So.2d 1331 (La.1986); Succession of Price v. Price, 448 So.2d 839 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1984).

The law applicable to a determination of testamentary capacity was set forth by the Supreme Court in Succession of Lyons, 452 So.2d 1161 (La.1984), as follows:

“The capacity to make a will is tested at the time the will is made. LSA-C.C. art. 1472. To make a donation mortis causa, a person must be of sound mind. LSA-C.C. art. 1475. The question is whether the testator understood the nature of the testamentary act and appreciated its effects. Succession of Moody, 227 La. 609, 80 So.2d 93 (1955). The burden of proving lack of testamentary capacity is upon the party alleging it. Succession of Schmidt, 219 La. 675, 53 So.2d 834 (1951); Succession of Riggio [405 So.2d 513 (La.1981) ], supra.
There is a presumption in favor of testamentary capacity....”

The court in Lyons also addressed the issue concerning the appropriate standard of proof required to overcome the strong presumption in favor of testamentary capacity. The Supreme Court found the criminal standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” inappropriate.2 In determining the proper burden of proof to be the intermediate standard of “clear and convincing evidence”, the court in Lyons stated:

“... (such) burden of proof requires more than a “preponderance of the evidence” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt”. The existence of the disputed fact must be highly probable, that is, much more probable than its non-ex[263]*263istence. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437 (La.1976). This standard is usually employed “where there is thought to be special danger of deception, or where the court considers that the particular type of claim should be disfavored on policy grounds.” McCormick on Evidence, Section 340(b), p. 798 (2nd ed. 1972).”

Sufficient soundness of mind can be determined from a showing that the testator knew what he was doing, knew what he had, and knew what he wanted to do with it. Holcomb v. Baker, 459 So.2d 158 (La.App.2d Cir.1984), writ denied, 462 So.2d 196 (La.1984). The capacity of a testator both prior to and subsequent to the making of his testament is competent evidence to be considered in determining testamentary capacity, since the actions, conduct and physical and mental condition of the testator before and after execution of the will are of probative value in deciding testamentary capacity. Succession of Brown, 251 So.2d 465 (La.App.1st Cir.1971); Succession of Keel, 442 So.2d 691 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983).

With these established principles in mind, we consider whether the trial court correctly found that plaintiff established by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Ellis lacked testamentary capacity on September 30, 1976.

Hazel Truax and Anatole Latióla, both friends and long-time neighbors of Mrs. Ellis, testified regarding Mrs. Ellis’ deteriorating mental condition commencing in the summer of 1976. Both testified that during that time Mrs. Ellis told them stories of “little people” with capes who would enter her house and demand that she cook for them. Both testified that Mrs. Ellis actually prepared elaborate meals for these imaginary “little people”. They stated that Mrs. Ellis was sincere in her belief as to the existence of these “little people”. Truax also related an incident when Mrs. Ellis ran over to her house in the nude and other incidents when Mrs. Ellis spoke of conversations which she had had with her deceased parents. Truax and Latióla both testified that Mrs. Ellis’ condition seemed to worsen with the passage of time and that Mrs.

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Related

Succession of Ellis
486 So. 2d 260 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1986)

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486 So. 2d 260, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 6621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gale-v-hession-lactapp-1986.