Gale v. Harby

20 Fla. 171
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJune 15, 1883
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 20 Fla. 171 (Gale v. Harby) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gale v. Harby, 20 Fla. 171 (Fla. 1883).

Opinion

Mu. Justice Westcott

delivered. the opinion of the court.

The subject matter of this controversy is a tract of land in Madison county, Florida. All of the parties, plaintiffs and defendants, except J. Leroy Gale and her husband, Frank P. Gale, and Sarah E. Ward and her husband, John E. Ward, maintain that the property is the subject of a trust under, and is controlled by the will of Andrew Hampton, who died in the State of Georgia, in the year 1840, and that under this will and a deed from Rachel Griffin, the daughter of Andrew Hampton, who had, as they allege, a life estate under the will, the present existing equitable interest in the land is divisible into six parts, one of which goes to each of the children of Hardy Griffin and Rachel Griffin. That is to say, one part each to Ella L. Harby and William L>. Griffin, children of Hardy and Rachel Griffin, one part to J. Leroy Gale, who is the sole heir of J. L. Griffin, a son of Hardy and Rachel, one part to Joseph L. Lelia and Eugene Griffin, heirs at law of A. A. Griffin, a son of Hardy and Rachel, one part to Lucia Jones and Hattie Vandiver, children of Mary E. Whitlock, a daughter of Hardy and Rachel Griffin, one part to S. Janie Hines, a child óf S. Janie McGehee, who was a daughter of Hardy and Rachel Griffin. Plaintiffs seek a partition of the land according to this view, and such is the prayer of the bill. ■ The defendant, Leroy P. Gale, on the other hand insists that the laud was the property of A. A. Griffin and Joseph L. Griffin, children of Hardy and Rachel Griffin, that they held it as tenants in common, and that she as the sole heir of Joseph L. Griffin is entitled to one-half [174]*174of the laud. The general claim oí' plaintiffs is that certain trust property, in which the}' had a sixth interest as above set forth, under the will of their grandfather, Andrew Hampton and the deed of their mother Rachel, was invested in this land, and that the land was paid for by the proceeds of the trust property and its use. The land was conveyed by Thomas J. Linton to A. A. and Joseph L. Griffin, and the deed is absolute upon its face, A. A. and Joseph L. Griffin giving a mortgage to pay the balance of the purchase money. The defendant insists that no part of the trust fund entered into the purchase and that it was made upon the credit of her father and her uncle, A. A. Griffin, who afterwards satisfied the mortgage by the results of a joint use and cultivation of the land. The plaintiffs insist that a large cash payment consisting of the trust fund, was made by A. A. and J. L. Griffin, and that the payment of the mortgage was made from funds realized from the after cultivation of the land by slaves belonging to the trust fund, and that both Joseph L. and A. A. Griffin, the grantees, and the grantor Union, acknowledged at the time of the execution of the deed by Linton that A. A. and Joseph L. Griffin acted as trustees in the purchase, and that neither the}r nor their representatives up to the time of the institution of this suit ever denied that they were trustees.

The Circuit Court sustained the view of the plaintiffs, and made a decree accordingly, from which only two of the defendants, J. Leroy Gale and her husband,-appealed, which appeal is entered after a severance as to the interests of E. P. Gale and wife.

The first ground of appeal is that the merits of the cause are with the appellants.

The will of Andrew Hampton and the relationship of the parties to him is not denied. The interest which went [175]*175to Rachel Griffin, his daughter, or to her children must he fixed by it. As to this matter the testator directed, “ that all my estate, both real and personal, be divided into nine equal lots or shares, and my executors shall set apart by lotteiy one of said lots or shares to each family of my grandchildren.” The testator directed that the fathers of his grandchildren should have the “emoluments and profits” of the property, given to their children during their lives (the fathers) and that “ should any of my grandchildren marry or become of lawful age then and in that case their father or fathers may give to them a portion or share of their property if they think proper to do so, otherwise it will remain together until their father’s death, then to be equally divided between such grandchildren, share aud share alike.” The testator, as to the property given to the children of Rachel Griffin, which is the origin of the trust here, directed “ that the following exceptions bear in relation to every part of my estate, that is to say, the portion or part of my estate that I bequeath to the children of my beloved daughters Rachel and Mary, to be held in trust by my executors, and the said executors to use and control in any manner that they think most conducive to the interest of the children of the said Rachel and Mary, free from the control of their present husbands, or any future husband they may have, until it would have been distributed had this exception not have been made.” The executors named in the will were the four sons of Andrew Hampton, of whom Benjamin W., John M. and Andrew Y., qualified and undertook the trust. The original trust thus arising under a will is an express or direct trust, and it is controlled, and to be interpreted by the terms of the will. It is apparent, that under this will Mrs. Rachel Griffin had no interest in the property devised or bequeathed to her six children. The legal title was in the executors qualifying [176]*176and the equitable estate was in the children, each child to he entitled to his or her share upon his or her marrying- or becoming twenty-one. All of the children of Rachel Griffin are twenty-one years of age, and all of them now living, unless it be William D. Griffin, have been or are married.

The deed of Linton to A. A. and J. L. Griffin being absolute on its face, the next question hei’e involved is whether it can by shown by parol testimony that they purchased as trustees with a knowledge of the trust; that the cash purchase money was money realized from sales of property coming to the children under the will, aud that the subsequent payments upon the land were made from moneys realized though the cultivation of the land by slaves belonging to the trust property and derived under the will. Perry on Trusts, in treating of this subject, asks the question, “ whether trust money can be followed into land by parol evidence,” and he answers the question by stating that “ it is clearly established it may on the ground that a purchase with trust money is virtually a purchase paid (pr by the cestui que trust, and such a purchase is a trust by operation of law and not within the statute of frauds, and the fund may be followed so long as its general character can be identified.” Perry on Trusts, §§138, 127.

Sir William Grant, in Lench vs. Lench, 10 Ves., 517, speaking of this matter, says: “Then as to the other ground that the purchase was made with the trust money, all depends upon the proof the fact; for whatever doubts may have been formerly entertained upon this subject, it is now settled that money may in this manner be followed into the land in which it is invested; and a claim of this sort may be supported by parol evidence.”

Says Lewis, Justice, in Thompson’s Appeal, 22d Penn. State, 17 : “ Whenevei; a trust fund has been wrongfully [177]*177converted into another species ot .property, if its ideutity can be traced, it will be held in its new form liable to the rights of the cestui que, trust. No change of its state and form can divest it of such trust. So long as it can be identified, either as the

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Bluebook (online)
20 Fla. 171, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gale-v-harby-fla-1883.