Gale v. AutoZone Parts Inc

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: August 26, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00881
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 KODEY GALE, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00881-BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 AUTOZONE PARTS INC., and DOES 1-20, 11 Defendants. 12

13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Kodey Gale’s motion to remand, 14 Dkt. 12. 15 On April 8, 2025, Gale filed a class action in King County Superior Court alleging 16 Defendant Autozone committed wage violations against its hourly and non-exempt 17 employees in Washington state. Dkt. 1-1. 18 On May 9, 2025, Autozone timely removed this case to federal court, asserting 19 Gale’s claims met all the jurisdictional requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act 20 (CAFA). Dkt. 1 at 4. It filed a declaration by economist Emil Czechowski in support, 21 22 1 who calculated Autozone’s total exposure to be over $5 million, assuming a 25% or 2 33.3% violation rate. Dkt. 4 at 6–7. 3 Gale moves to remand, arguing Autozone has not established the jurisdictional

4 amount by a preponderance of the evidence. Dkt. 12. Gale asserts Autozone should have 5 applied a more reasonable 20% violation rate, in which case the amount in controversy 6 for meal and rest break violations becomes $4,474,630.4. Id. at 3. The figure does not 7 include attorneys’ fees, which Gale contends Autozone unreasonably calculates at 25% of 8 the total recovery. Id. at 3–4.

9 Autozone responds that Gale fails to establish that a 20% violation rate is more 10 reasonable than 25% or 33%. Dkt. 13 at 8–10. It further argues that even if the Court 11 were to accept Gale’s assumptions, the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million 12 including the reasonable attorneys’ fees Gale seeks. Id. at 10. Autozone provides 10 prior 13 court orders to demonstrate the reasonableness of its assumption that attorneys’ fees will

14 be 25% of the damages award. Dkt. 14. 15 Putative class actions are removable under CAFA when the aggregate amount in 16 controversy exceeds $5,000,000 for the entire class, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 17 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). There is no presumption against removal for cases removed under 18 CAFA. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014)

19 (“No antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, a statute Congress enacted 20 to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.”). Under CAFA, the 21 removing defendant retains the obligation to demonstrate by a preponderance of the 22 evidence that the jurisdictional amount in controversy is met in order to sustain its 1 removal in the face of a motion to remand. Rodriquez v. AT&T Mobility Servs., LLC, 728 2 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2013). 3 Though the burden remains with the defendant, it is not a daunting one. Under this

4 standard, a removing defendant is not obligated to completely “research, state, and prove 5 the plaintiff’s claims for damages.” Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp., 536 F.Supp.2d 6 1199, 1204–05 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (citing McCraw v. Lyons, 863 F.Supp. 430, 434 (W.D. 7 Ky. 1994)). The appropriate measure of the amount in controversy must be based on 8 reasonable assumption. “A removing defendant is not required to go so far as to prove

9 Plaintiff's case for him by proving the actual rates of violation.” Tajonar v. Echosphere, 10 L.L.C., No. 14CV2732-LAB (RBB), 2015 WL 4064642, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 2, 2015) 11 (internal quotation omitted). 12 The plaintiff can challenge the amount in controversy by way of a “facial” or 13 “factual” attack on the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations. Harris v. KM Indus., Inc.,

14 980 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 2020). A facial attack accepts the defendant’s allegations as 15 true but challenges their sufficiency to meet the amount in controversy. Id. A factual 16 attack, on the other hand, “challenges the truth of the . . . jurisdictional allegations by 17 making a reasoned argument as to why any assumptions on which they are based are not 18 supported by evidence.” Id. at 700 (citing Salter v. Quality Carriers, 974 F.3d 959, 964

19 (9th Cir. 2020). When the plaintiff “mounts a factual attack, the burden is on the 20 defendant to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 21 exceeds the $5 million jurisdictional threshold.” Id. (citing Ibarra v. Manheim Inv., Inc., 22 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015)). Both parties may submit evidence outside the 1 complaint, such as affidavits or declarations, in support of their position. Ibarra, 775 F.3d 2 at 1197–98. 3 When the statute at issue “provides for the recovery of attorneys’ fees, prospective

4 attorneys’ fees must be included in the assessment of the amount in controversy.” Arias v. 5 Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2019). The defendant must prove 6 by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of attorneys’ fees at stake. Fritsch v. Swift 7 Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 796 (9th Cir. 2018). The Court may also apply 8 its own expertise “in determining the number of hours reasonably expended on the

9 litigation multiplied by a reasonably hourly rate” based on its “own knowledge of 10 customary rates and . . . reasonable and proper fees.” Id. (internal quotation marks 11 omitted). 12 Courts have varied approaches to estimating a defendant’s violation rate when 13 determining the amount in controversy. Young v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., No. 3:23-cv-05892-

14 DGE, 2024 WL 689605, at *4–5 (W. D. Wash. Feb. 20, 2024). For example, when the 15 complaint does not “specify the frequency of the alleged missed meal or rest periods,” 16 courts in this Circuit have “frequently upheld at least a 20% violation rate.” Chavez v. 17 Pratt (Robert Mann Packaging), LLC, No. 19-cv-00719-NC, 2019 WL 1501576, at *3. 18 However, a “higher violation rate might be appropriate if Plaintiff’s complaint alleged a

19 widespread or systematic pattern of violations.” Young, 2024 WL 689605, at *5. 20 Gale’s complaint alleges Autozone “regularly” committed meal and rest break 21 violations and “occasionally” committed wage violations. Dkt. 1-1 at 4. The Court 22 1 concludes this language can be reasonably construed to support a 25% to 33% violation 2 rate. Gale provides no additional evidence or declarations to rebut this assumption. 3 Even if the Court were to accept a 20% violation rate and Gale’s estimate of $4.47

4 million, the Court is persuaded that with the addition of attorneys’ fees, it would meet the 5 jurisdictional threshold. 6 Gale disputes Autozone’s assumption of 25% in attorneys’ fees. However, 7 Autozone persuasively provides evidence that Gale’s own counsel has sought up to one- 8 third of the recovery in prior employment actions. Dkt. 14. See Greene v. Harley-

9 Davidson, Inc., 965 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 2020) (defendant provided evidence of 10 attorneys’ fees sought by plaintiff’s counsel in prior similar cases). This is consistent with 11 the Court’s own experience calculating and awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees in class 12 actions. 13 The Court is persuaded that Autozone has, by a preponderance of the evidence,

14 shown that the amount in controversy is greater than $5 million based on reasonable 15 assumptions. 16 Gale’s motion to remand is therefore DENIED. 17 Autozone filed a notice of related case, Dkt. 5, asserting that another case before 18 this Court, Reynolds v. Autozone, No. 25-cv-05328-BHS, is substantially similar. The

19 putative classes in both cases will largely comprise the same individuals. Id. at 3. The 20 parties’ Joint Status Report, due September 29, 2025, shall SHOW CAUSE as to why 21 these cases should not be consolidated. 22 // 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 3 Dated this 26th day of August, 2025. A 4 5 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 6 United S tates District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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