Gail Rosier v. Jeffrey Strobel

677 F. App'x 370
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 17, 2017
Docket15-15091
StatusUnpublished

This text of 677 F. App'x 370 (Gail Rosier v. Jeffrey Strobel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gail Rosier v. Jeffrey Strobel, 677 F. App'x 370 (9th Cir. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ***

The contract and tort claims alleged by Gail Rosier in this diversity action arise out of the attempts by her ex-husband, Jeffrey Strobel, to collect child support and out of statements made by Strobel in New Hampshire and Arizona state court proceedings. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the contract claims precluded by a New Hampshire state court judgment and the remaining claims premised on statements for which Strobel enjoys immunity. We affirm.

1. Rosier’s contract claims arise from a child support agreement between her and Strobel. Upon Strobel’s motion, a New Hampshire trial court enforced the agreement, ordering Rosier to make funds available for the education of the couple’s son. The court later found Rosier in contempt of that order, and ordered her to pay child support arrearages. Applying New Hampshire law, see Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007), the district court correctly found Rosier’s contract claims in this case precluded because they “could have been litigated” in that proceeding. In re Hampers, 166 N.H. 422, 97 A.3d 1106, 1112-13 (2014) (quoting Gray v. Kelly, 161 N.H. 160, 13 A.3d 848, 851 (2010)); see also Osman v. Gagnon, 152 N.H. 359, 876 A.2d 193, 195 (2005).

2. Rosier’s tort claims arise from Stro-bel’s statements to the New Hampshire *371 court during the proceedings described above and his statements to an Arizona court regarding Rosier’s sentencing for an unrelated crime. These statements are privileged from civil liability because they were “made in the course of judicial proceedings” and “pertinent or relevant to the proceedings.” Provencher v. Buzzell-Plourde Assocs., 142 N.H. 848, 711 A.2d 251, 255 (1998); see also Green Acres Tr. v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 688 P.2d 617, 620-22 (1984). And, because Strobel’s statements were privileged, the district court did not err in denying Rosier leave to amend her complaint to add a claim for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 relating to those statements. 1

AFFIRMED.

***

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1

. In any event, Rule II sanctions are sought by motion, not as part of a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).

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Related

Green Acres Trust v. London
688 P.2d 617 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1984)
In the Matter of Marcus J. Hampers and Kristin C. Hampers
166 N.H. 422 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 2014)
Provencher v. Buzzell-Plourde Associates
711 A.2d 251 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1998)
Osman v. Gagnon
876 A.2d 193 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 2005)
Gray v. Kelly
13 A.3d 848 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 2010)

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Bluebook (online)
677 F. App'x 370, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gail-rosier-v-jeffrey-strobel-ca9-2017.